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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
―I ask you if you have lost faith in our Yankee tradition of good old-fashioned trading. 
Do you believe that our early instincts for successful barter have atrophied or 
degenerated? I do not think so.‖ 
 
~President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1934)
1
 
Tariffs and international trade were a hot, contentious question in the Democratic 
Party‘s presidential primaries of 2008. On August 6, 2007, the presumptive frontrunner, 
Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY), and other candidates were in a forum in Chicago where 
Clinton stated, ―Well, I had said that for many years that, you know, NAFTA and the way 
it‘s been implemented have hurt a lot of American workers.‖2 She referred to the North 
American Free Trade Agreement that her husband, former President Bill Clinton, signed 
into law in 1993. NAFTA eliminated all legal restrictions on the movement of goods and 
services between Canada, Mexico, and the United States‘ economies. Yet, despite her 
husband‘s signature on the bill, she said this about NAFTA: ―I‘m tired of being played 
for a patsy […] It‘s time we said to the rest of the world, ‗If you want to have anything to 
do with our market, you have to play by our rules.‘‖3 She was not the only Democrat to 
criticize NAFTA or demand regulatory consideration from countries. Governor Bill 
Richardson (D-NM), who ran but received no convention delegates, said that, ―We 
should never have another trade agreement unless it enforces labor protection, 
                                                 
1
 Franklin Roosevelt quoted in ―Address by Charles William Taussig at the 12th Annual Dinner of The 
Propeller Club of the United States at the Downtown Athletic Club, New York City, on National Maritime 
Day,‖ May 22, 1934, Economics – General, Box #65, Subject File, Cordell Hull Papers, Library of 
Congress (Washington, DC). 
2
 Helene Cooper, ―Democrats‘ Third Rail: Free Trade,‖ New York Times, August 12, 2008, Week in 
Review. 
3
 David Weigel, ―Free Market Clintonism, R.I.P.,‖ Reason, 
http://www.reason.com/news/show/125402.html (all citations to websites henceforth reference them as 
they were on November 11, 2010). 
2 
environmental standards, and job safety.‖4 Ironically, Richardson had helped NAFTA 
through Congress as House majority whip in 1993. Richardson was vital in the original 
passage of NAFTA, but now he worked the other way on trade. Clinton and Richardson 
were not the only Democrats in resistance to free trade, and the rest of the party joined in 
the chorus throughout the autumn. 
Senator Barack Obama (D-IL), the eventual party nominee and winner in the 
general election, also spoke about trade. David Weigel, a contributor for Reason, wrote 
that, ―Barack Obama, meanwhile, matched her [Clinton] stride for stride towards the old 
economic left. Before the January 3 Iowa caucus, the Iowa Fair Trade Campaign, a 
union-backed group that describes NAFTA and the World Trade Organization as ‗a 
proven failure for working people‘ asked the candidates to explain their trade stances. 
Obama promises that revising NAFTA was ‗one of the first things I‘ll do as president,‘ 
language in line with what he‘s said to other audiences but a lot tougher.‖5 International 
trade and NAFTA remained in Obama‘s sights. He said in Chicago that, ―I would 
immediately call the president of Mexico, the president of Canada, to try to amend 
NAFTA because I think that we can get labor agreements in that agreement right now.‖6 
Obama made it clear his opposition to free trade agreements. Upon taking office, his 
administration stalled proposed agreements with Columbia, Panama, and South Korea.
7
 
An outside candidate, Dennis Kucinich (D-OH), went so far as to advocate the United 
States‘ unilateral withdrawal from NAFTA, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and 
                                                 
4
 Cooper, ―Democrats‘ Third Rail: Free Trade.‖ 
5
 Weigel, ―Free Market Clintonism, R.I.P.‖ 
6
 Cooper, ―Democrats‘ Third Rail: Free Trade.‖ 
7
 Office of the United States Trade Representative, ―Free Trade Agreements,‖ Executive Office of the 
President, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements. 
3 
treaty commitments involving trade and the United States.
8
 Therefore, the Democratic 
Party of 2008 was clearly in a protectionist mood. Nonetheless, this flies right in the face 
of the stance of the party throughout most of its most crucial history in the early part of 
the twentieth-century. 
The American story of the economics, implications, policy, and politics of trade is 
long and complicated. Yet, a few patterns emerge. Trading with foreign lands and the 
rhetoric of free trade have been stalwarts in Washington from the beginning, 
―Presidents—from the founding fathers to contemporary executives—have uniformly 
espoused adherence to the principle of free trade.‖9 The United States absorbed the 
libertarian ideal of free exchange in its founding, and its history reflects this. Modern 
Democrats do not ascribe to this principle. The largest divergence from the contemporary 
Democratic Party came in the person of Cordell Hull (D-TN). Hull, the Secretary of State 
for President Franklin D. Roosevelt (D-NY) from 1933 to 1944, was the most ardent free 
trader of his era. Hull often spoke of his views on the trade question: ―I have never 
faltered, and I will never falter, in my belief that enduring peace and the welfare of 
nations are indissolubly connected with friendliness, fairness, equality, and the maximum 
practical degree of freedom in international trade.‖10 Moreover, ―A revival of world trade 
[is] an essential element in the maintenance of world peace. By this, I do not mean, of 
course, that flourishing international commerce is of itself a guarantee of peaceful 
international relations. But I do not mean without prosperous trade among nations any 
                                                 
8
 Cooper, ―Democrats‘ Third Rail: Free Trade.‖  
9
 Debra B. Conti, Reconciling Free Trade, Fair Trade, and Interdependence: The Rhetoric of Presidential 
Economic Leadership (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), xiii. 
10
 Cordell Hull quoted in Jack Irwin, ―The WTO‘s Failure in Light of the GATT‘s History,‖ Real Clear 
Markets, http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2008/07/the_wtos_failure_in_light_of_t.html. 
4 
foundation for enduring peace becomes precarious and is ultimately destroyed.‖11 Yet, as 
the Democrats of 2008 abundantly demonstrated, many of Hull‘s ideals and lessons are 
lost. This is true, in particular, regarding the crown jewel of America in the 1930s and the 
Roosevelt administration—the New Deal. 
Both academic and popular knowledge of American policies on international 
trade and tariffs in the 1930s is divided, slapdash, or inconsistent. Countless authors, 
articles, and even monographs have compared the contemporary economy to the Great 
Depression since the end of the Second World War. For instance, International Business 
Daily ran an editorial on June 29, 2010 and faulted the Obama administration for 
pursuing economic policies similar to Roosevelt during the New Deal. To quote IBD, 
―spend wildly, raise taxes on all Americans, erect trade barriers, and protect unions, to 
boost wages at others‘ expense‖ [emphasis added].12 The editors seemed to state that 
Roosevelt and his administration wanted a higher tariff. In 2003, on the other hand, Jim 
Powell wrote in FDR‘s Folly, ―FDR didn‘t do much about a contributing factor in the 
Great Depression, the Smoot-Hawley tariff, which throttled trade. Instead, he raised some 
tariffs, while Secretary of State Hull negotiated reciprocal trade agreements which cut 
tariffs only about 4 percent.‖13 Here, Roosevelt sought some trade restrictions, but the 
story is more complicated. In 2008, political columnist Michael Barone wrote, ―Moves 
towards protectionism like Hoover‘s (Roosevelt had the good sense to promote free 
                                                 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 International Business Daily editors, ―Krugman‘s Depression,‖ International Business Daily, 
http://www.investors.com/NewsAndAnalysis/Article/538727/201006281830/Krugmans-Depression.aspx. 
13
 Jim Powell, FDR‘s Folly: How Roosevelt and His New Deal Prolonged the Great Depression (New 
York, NY: The Crown Forum Publishing Group, 2003), ix. 
5 
trade)‖ [emphasis added].14 Now, conversely, Roosevelt and the New Deal were 
favorable to lower tariffs. These sources disagree about the basics on international trade 
in the 1930s. To boot, even Wikipedia—the ultimate bastion of all popular knowledge—
includes nothing about trade in its pages on the New Deal and the United States from 
1918 to 1945.
15
 Something is missing on this subject. 
Different commentators alternatively praise or condemn Roosevelt and his New 
Deal, but they contradict each other on trade policy. Critics usually focus on the 
economic effects of the New Deal. For instance, IBD commented: ―interventionist 
policies and draconian tax increases delayed full recovery by several years by 
intensifying a climate of pessimistic expectations that drove down private capital 
formation and household consumption to unprecedented lows.‖16 Milton Friedman and 
Anna Jacobson Schwartz in A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 took 
time out from their heady, monetary analysis to comment on the effects of fiscal policy 
on American businesses in the 1930s. The political and social message of the New Deal 
favored ―great change‖—experimentation, unionization, strikes, federal subsidies, and 
outright nationalization of industries.
17
 Thus, corporate leaders were left in the dark and 
unsure about their future costs.
18
 Business investment was chronically low during the 
1930s due to a reduced return on investment and the increased risk of government 
                                                 
14
 Michael Barone, ―New New Deal No Better than the Old One,‖ National Review, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/226129/new-new-deal-no-better-old-one/michael-barone. 
15
 Wikipedia contributors, ―New Deal,‖ Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_deal; Wikipedia 
contributors, ―History of the United States (1918-1945), Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_United_States_(1918%E2%80%931945). 
16
 International Business Daily editors, ―Krugman‘s Depression.‖ 
17
 Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 495-96. 
18
 Ibid., 495-96. 
6 
intrusions on economic activity.
19
 Federal demands for more labor unions, higher wages, 
social insurance programs, the heavy regulation of certain sectors of the economy, and 
the nationalization of some industries (like power generation through the Tennessee 
Valley Authority) scared investors away.
20
 Assertions here are illustrative of the thorny 
nature of this history. The debate about the worth of the New Deal is intricate, and it 
easily enflames modern partisan passions. Yet, either way, Freidman and Schwartz 
neglect trade policy in A Monetary History. There is more to the 1930s than domestic, 
insular economics, as this study of the New Deal shows. 
International commerce and trade liberalization in the United States during the 
1930s is an underappreciated part of the diplomacy, economics, politics, and popularity 
of the Roosevelt administration‘s New Deal. Furthermore, modern scholars typically 
separate trade policy from the rest of the New Deal (and specifically the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act of 1934), while the people of the life and times of the 1930s considered 
them together. The 1930s began with an economic crisis, and President Herbert Hoover 
(R-CA) and his administration responded with the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930. Smoot-
Hawley raised tariffs, provoked retaliation from the rest of the world, and exacerbated the 
Great Depression from 1930 to 1933. Here, however, is where the story typically stops. 
Nonetheless, in 1933, Franklin Roosevelt entered the presidency and selected Cordell 
Hull for Secretary of State. The World Economic Conference that summer, held in 
London, failed to liberalize trade or address global economic woes. Yet, as the vast 
majority of historians hitherto have missed, Hull did not stop there. He came back the 
                                                 
19
 Ibid., 495. 
20
 Ibid., 495. 
7 
next year, and the Roosevelt administration eventually passed the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act of 1934. The process of reciprocal trade (the joint lowering of tariffs 
through mutual concessions) became the rule of the Roosevelt administration. Hull and 
the Department of State concluded trade deals with nearly two-dozen other nations in the 
ensuing decade. The New Deal, as shocking as it may seem from a contemporary 
political vantage point, was a deal for freer trade. This investigation seeks to address this 
disconnect in the historical literature. 
My attempt in Free Trade and the New Deal is to understand trade and tariff 
policy in the 1930s in terms of the people who lived through the times of the Great 
Depression. This process was involved yet rewarding, and it includes a number of 
different perspectives along the path. The notions of elected and appointed leaders weigh 
heavily: Hoover, Hull, Roosevelt, and others. These men (and they were without 
exception men) made trade policies for the United States in the 1930s, and they 
influenced the public‘s opinion through speeches and contact with regular people. I have 
tried, wherever possible, to include articles and letters from officials down lower in the 
Hoover and Roosevelt administration along with private citizens from the differing strata 
of American society. These people not only voted, but also lived in the economy of the 
era, and international trade affected their lives. Yet, to quote Commander Norton from 
Arthur C. Clarke‘s Rendezvous with Rama, ―Two examples are damned poor statistics.‖21 
The narrative of trade in the 1930s was an economic one; therefore, I have used a 
magnitude of aggregate and statistical evidence about the commercial, industrial, and 
                                                 
21
 Arthur C. Clarke, Rendezvous with Rama (Orlando, FL: Bantam Spectra Books, 1990), 58. 
8 
rural economy of the New Deal. American trade policy needs assessment in diplomatic, 
economic, political, and social terms. Previous scholars, as I will demonstrate, have 
neglected it. International trade and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 were a 
part of the Great Depression and the New Deal, and each of them is vital to 
understanding American history comprehensively. 
The experience of the United States in the 1930s is one of the most important 
chapters in American history. The New Deal—the American response to the Great 
Depression—is the most enduring element of the decade. It has penetrated deeply into 
American iconography and politics. Rexford Tugwell (an economist who held various 
posts in the Roosevelt administration) coined the term in a New Republic article in 
1932.
22
 Tugwell intended the ―New Deal‖ as a break from the policies of the Republican 
majority of the 1920s, a nod towards Franklin Roosevelt‘s cousin Theodore Roosevelt‘s 
Square Deal, and a propaganda coup in the spirit of the Soviet Union‘s first Five-Year 
Plan.
23
 Americans who grew up during the Great Depression, the Second World War, and 
the Baby Boom considered it an accomplishment, ―Something akin to establishing the 
Republic or abolishing slavery.‖24 Tributes to the New Deal pervade American culture. In 
sports, the National Recovery Administration‘s blue eagle is the source for the name of 
the Philadelphia Eagles of the National Football League.
25
 In music, the rock ‗n‘ roll 
band Creedence Clearwater Revival referenced the New Deal in ―Who‘ll Stop the Rain‖ 
                                                 
22
 Amity Shlaes, The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression (New York, NY: Harper 
Collins Publishers, 2007), 126. 
23
 Ibid., 126. 
24
 Ronald Edsforth, The New Deal: America's Response to the Great Depression (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2000), 2. 
25
 ―Franchise Nicknames,‖ Pro Football Hall of Fame, 
http://www.profootballhof.com/history/nicknames.aspx. 
9 
in 1970: ―Five-year plans and New Deals, wrapped in golden chains.‖26 In film, The 
Emperor of the North Pole (a 1973 adaptation of The Road by Jack London) featured 
1930s hobo Lee Marvin battling railroad conductor Ernest Borgnine. Marvin ―greased the 
rails‖ at one point to stop the Prairie Special in order to catch up to Borgnine. The 
conductor of the train exclaims, ―I don‘t give a damn if they‘re Democrats; get this 
moving!‖27 The New Deal is a behemoth in American cultural identity, and it is a 
leviathan when it comes to the American electorate and polity. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 – The logo of the National Recovery Administration (NRA) is on the left, and 
the logo used by the Philadelphia Eagles from 1948 to 1968 is on the right.
28
 Bert Bell 
bought the remnants of the Frankfurt Yellow Jackets in 1932 and moved them to 
downtown Philadelphia. Frankfurt was a small, suburban district to the northeast of the 
city. Once in Philadelphia itself, Bell the renamed the football team. According to the Pro 
Football Hall of Fame, ―Since Bell hoped his franchise also was headed for a New Deal, 
he picked the Eagles as the team name.‖29 
 
                                                 
26
 John Fogerty, ―Who‘ll Stop the Rain,‖ Creedence Clearwater Revival, Chronicle, Vol. 1: The 20 Greatest 
Hits, Fantasy Compact Disc B000000XB9, 1990. 
27
 Christopher Knopf and Jack London, The Emperor of the North Pole, directed by Robert Aldrich, 
produced by Stanley Hough and Kenneth Hyman, shot in Cottage Grove, OR, distributed by Twentieth-
Century Fox, 1973. 
28
 Wikipedia contributors, ―New Deal NRA,‖ Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:NewDealNRA.jpg (this image does not have a copyright); ―Philadelphia 
Eagles Primary Logo 1948-1968,‖ Chris Creamer, 
http://www.sportslogos.net/logo.php?id=uzhay2wfh9tu4gkdlrq1 (this image does not have a copyright). 
29
 ―Franchise Nicknames.‖ 
10 
The New Deal retained a hold over many segments of American society, and it 
served as a model for the Democratic Party throughout the rest of the twentieth-century. 
In addition, the New Deal helps define American political identities. The New Deal 
changed the meaning of ―liberal‖ in the lexicon. After the 1930s, ―liberal‖ came to 
symbolize an advocacy for ―group‖ rights instead of the primacy of ―individual‖ 
liberties.
30
 The New Deal brought Keynesian theories into the American mainstream, 
which entailed positive beliefs on progressive taxation, government guarantees of 
security, and federal power having a role in controlling the economy.
31
 Long after 
Roosevelt‘s death, Democrats continued to ―borrow‖ from the New Deal to increase 
support for their initiatives. In light of the popularity of the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA), leaders in the 1950s planned a ―CVA‖ (on the Columbia River) and a ―MVA‖ 
(on the Missouri River).
32
 Later, President Lyndon B. Johnson (D-TX) envisioned a 
―Mekong Delta Authority‖ and a ―Red River Authority‖—developmental plans for North 
and South Vietnam intended as the ―carrot‖ to bait Hanoi and Saigon out of the Vietnam 
War. Roosevelt‘s legacy afflicted recent figures, as well: ―the electorate‘s favorable view 
of President Bill Clinton, the standard-bearer of FDR‘s party‖ [emphasis added].33 
President Obama fit this trend. For instance, The Nation ran an article on November 4, 
2008: ―Such rhetoric allowed him [Obama] to claim the legacy of the most popular and 
                                                 
30
 Shlaes, The Forgotten Man, 11. 
31
 Edsforth, The New Deal, 3. 
32
 Marion Clawson, New Deal Planning: The National Resources Planning Board (Washington, DC: 
Resources for the Future Press, 1981), 167. 
33
 Robert Himmelberg, The Great Depression and the New Deal (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 
79. 
11 
successful government programs in American history [the New Deal].‖34 The New Deal 
influences practically anything done in Washington, and politicians drew lessons from 
Roosevelt‘s brand of running campaigns and administrations. 
Roosevelt was one of the most successful politicians in American history through 
his tenure in the White House. Subsequent leaders have emulated his stratagems. 
Roosevelt brought a gaggle of ―Beltway outsiders‖ to Washington. This set an example 
for leaders after the Second World War, such as Eugene McCarthy (D-MN), George 
McGovern (D-SD), President James E. Carter (D-GA), and Obama.
35
 Roosevelt had few 
ideological convictions about the proper way to run a government or mitigate an 
economic crisis, and he was willing to let conflicting advisors hash out policy in conflict. 
For instance, Raymond Moley (at the time Undersecretary of State) once gave Roosevelt 
two proposed public statements.
36
 One advocated a higher tariff; the other advocated a 
lower tariff.
 37
 Roosevelt, seeing no conflict, ordered a speechwriter to ―weave the two 
together,‖ even though they were entirely incompatible stances.38 Roosevelt was adept at 
this kind of political maneuvering, and commentators still list the Democratic Party as, 
―the guardian of the New Deal legacy.‖39 Nevertheless, a somewhat conflicting legacy on 
the New Deal and international trade policies remains. Ronald Edsforth described the 
Democratic Party of the 1990s joining with the Republican majority after 1994 to 
                                                 
34
 William P. Jones, ―Obama‘s New Deal,‖ The Nation, http://www.thenation.com/article/obamas-new-
deal. 
35
 Robert Eden, ―The Democratic Party: Honoring and Dishonoring the New Deal‖ in The New Deal and Its 
Legacy: Critique and Reappraisal, ed. Robert Eden, 215-240 (New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1989), 
218. 
36
 William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal (New York, NY: Harper and Row 
Publishers, 1969), 33. 
37
 Ibid., 33. 
38
 Ibid., 33. 
39
 Eden, ―The Democratic Party,‖ 215. 
12 
―dismantle‖ the New Deal with welfare reform and NAFTA.40 This conceptualization is 
quite ironic in the face of historical fact. In the 1930s, the Democratic Party helped put 
the United States on the road to free trade in with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act 
of 1934 after decades of protectionism under Republican presidencies and Congresses. 
Hull, Roosevelt, and his administration sang a different tune, and the trade history of this 
era needs some cleaning and expansion. 
However, before advancing further, a full explanation of the terms and concepts 
involved with international trade needs mentioning. The idea of ―free trade‖ is vital. In 
short, free trade is the unhindered allowance of commercial relations and the ensuing 
exchange of products across political boundaries sans interference from law, regulation, 
or taxation.
41
 There is a continuum of terminology betwixt free trade and ―autarky,‖ its 
opposite. Autarky is complete disconnection from the world economy.
42
 Autarky is an 
economically unnatural state. Autarkies are virtually impossible in the modern world; 
only pariahs like North Korea approach the condition. Even then, at least 5% of 
Pyongyang‘s economy derives from exports of raw materials, minerals, and seafood to 
East Asian countries.
43
 ―Protectionism‖ is the condition amid free trade and autarky. 
Protectionism uses taxes on imports (tariffs), quotas on imports, and subsidies to ―shield‖ 
parts of an economy from overseas competition.
44
 ―Protectionist‖ is the adjectival form. 
Reciprocal trade lowers tariffs and eliminates quotas as both sides negotiate reciprocated 
                                                 
40
 Edsforth, The New Deal, 5. 
41
 Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory And Policy, 7
th
 edition (Toronto, 
ON: Addison Wesley, 2005), 5. 
42
 Ibid., 4. 
43
 World Fact Book, ―Korea, North,‖ Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html. 
44
 Krugman and Obstfeld, International Economics, 4. 
13 
concessions. This, in turn, moves both economies further from autarky or protectionism 
and towards free trade in a process called ―trade liberalization.‖ Economists since the 
eighteenth-century have recognized the economic benefits of free trade in increasing real 
income.
45
 In fact, free trade is so popular in academic circles that, in the New York Times, 
Gregory Mankiw described embracing free trade as the first position political candidates 
should adopt if they wished to attract the ―voting bloc‖ of professional economists.46 This 
lesson is not absolute; there are winners and losers from trade, and abstract theory does 
not always function in complicated reality. Nonetheless, these terms and techniques have 
value for assessing American trade policy in the 1930s. 
International trade is a neglected aspect of economic policymaking, and 
commentators generally consider it a parched and unexciting topic. However, trade 
policy offers a fascinating glimpse at the interactions between diplomacy, economics, 
identity, and politics in a government or society. At once, trade policy is both foreign and 
domestic policy. This was the case in the 1930s. The New Deal period was vibrant for 
American diplomats despite the Great Depression. Diplomatic traditions from the 
nineteenth-century, such as internationalism, matured. President Woodrow Wilson (D-
NJ) and his followers, the ―Wilsonians,‖ developed a view of international peace and 
order during the Great War.
47
 After the Second World War, Dean Rusk (Secretary of 
                                                 
45
 Ibid., 4. 
46
 Gregory N. Mankiw, ―What if the Candidates Pandered to Economists,‖ New York Times, July 13, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/13/business/13view.html?ex=1373601600&en=d29d44dcc70127bf&ei=
5124&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink. 
47
 Robert J. Bresler, ―The Ideology of the Executive State: Legacy of Liberal Internationalism‖ in 
Watershed of Empire: Essays on New Deal Foreign Policy, eds. Leonard P. Liggio and James J. Martin, 1-
18 (Colorado Springs, CO: Ralph Myles, 1976), 3. 
14 
State from 1961 to 1969) preserved Wilsonian ideals.
48
 ―Internationalism‖ involved 
collective security, organizations, stable governments, and removing trade barriers to 
promote prosperity and interdependence.
 49
 Hull was the foremost ―liberal 
internationalist‖ in the United States in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. He received praise 
for the promotion of such policies after the end of the Second World War. For instance, 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower (R-NY), Johnson, and Sam Rayburn (D-TX, 
episodically Speaker of the House from 1940 until 1961) thought highly of Hull and his 
diplomacy.
50
 Internationalists always believed that trade wars eventually snowball into 
shooting wars, and the 1930s offered hard evidence of this process—the Smoot-Hawley 
tariff renewed protectionism, begat xenophobia, nationalism, and even the Second World 
War.
51
 International and domestic economics are interrelated, and borders never separate 
them. Indeed, political boundaries are entirely an arbitrary division from an economic 
viewpoint. A line on a map has zero input in determining the efficient operation of the 
world economy, as economists and moral philosophers (such as Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo) argued in the late eighteenth-century. The New Deal must include its 
international components, for it is impossible to remove such a part as large as reciprocal 
trade from the rest of the whole. 
I have organized Free Trade and the New Deal somewhat chronologically, but 
mostly analytically. There are seven sections: this introduction, the historiography of 
trade in the 1930s, Smoot-Hawley, Hull‘s political career (with the World Economic 
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Conference), the Reciprocal Trade Agreements of 1934 regarding the Roosevelt 
administration and the New Deal, a section of analysis of New Deal trade economics and 
diplomacy, and a conclusion. My literature survey shows how international trade in the 
1930s is a neglected aspect of the period. Smoot-Hawley includes background 
information on trade before 1900, the Great War, the Roaring Twenties, and the calamity 
of 1929. This part also describes Hoover‘s response to the Great Depression, how Hoover 
thought about tariffs, and examination of Smoot-Hawley‘s economics. Next, the spotlight 
shifts to Hull, his work before 1932, and his ―fit‖ inside the New Deal. In addition, this 
section outlines the total collapse of the World Economic Conference in summer 1933. 
Lastly, I consider the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 in details. Free trade was 
an ingredient of the New Deal‘s response to the Great Depression for economic reasons. 
Reciprocal trade had a profound influence on the American economy and its diplomacy 
in the 1930s, and I explore this in analytical passages. There are more debates on the New 
Deal in the broader historiography than what I present here. Many of these are politically 
contentious, to say the least. Explaining the exact politics of the New Deal‘s legacy so far 
after the fact is not my objective here. Instead, I focus on one of the most underutilized 
topics of the history of the 1930s. 
16 
CHAPTER 2: HISTORIOGRAPHY ESSAY 
There are several problems in the historiography of the New Deal, and the most 
crucial is the lack of treatment for trade policy. Writing a history about the 1930s, the 
Great Depression, and the New Deal is difficult in the first place, since the popular 
American mythos internalized the New Deal in the 1930s and the decades thereafter. It 
can be hard to separate the New Deal itself from its legacy. International trade normally 
lends itself more easily to diplomatic history; on the other hand, trade involves economic 
history. Yet, historians of diplomacy and historians of economic and social relations 
integrate poorly, and trade can ―slip between the cracks.‖ There are diverse ways of 
approaching the New Deal in the historiography, and while tariff policy is not required of 
all of them, it would help with most. Critics of the New Deal (usually with a 
―conservative‖ bent in the political sense) neglect trade, though their ideology makes 
trade an oasis in the desert. In addition, what typically happens in New Deal histories is 
that the trade story focuses on Smoot-Hawley, maybe the World Economic Conference, 
and then falls silent. Lists, overall, are not friendly to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Act of 1934. Relative depth of analysis can be a problem, even when texts mention 
reciprocal trade. Political history tends to dominate the academic conception of the New 
Deal, and diplomacy or economics goes on the backburner. Most critically, some texts 
only note Hull and tariffs once or, sometimes, not at all. There are several loci of study 
about the New Deal, and trade in the 1930s stands astride many of them. It is curious, 
then, that trade does not receive more attention. 
17 
The New Deal has taken on a life of its own, far beyond the actual content of the 
events in the 1930s. Liberals (in the modern, political sense) and the Democratic Party 
after the Second World War considered the New Deal an idyllic way to govern.
52
 For 
instance, liberal historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. documented the New Deal. He 
hoped a positive look at the New Deal could influence the John F. Kennedy (D-MA) and 
Johnson administrations to behave more like Roosevelt in using the ―positive hand‖ of 
government to control the economy, reform society, and redress various social ills.
53
 
Liberal, political historians (such as James MacGregor Burns, Frank Freidel, William E. 
Leuchtenburg, Kenneth S. Davis, and the aforementioned Schlesinger) considered the 
New Deal a success.
54
 Therefore, the heritage of the New Deal has a history of its own. It 
is difficult to delineate clearly amid political afterthoughts and the events of the 1930s in 
this environment. For focus, Ronald Edsforth defined the New Deal as, ―the new 
President, the press, and everyone else in the country called the laws Congress began 
enacting just days after FDR took office […] This New Deal […] was America‘s 
response to the Great Depression.‖55 Hence, the New Deal was principally legislation. As 
well, it was both a recovery and a reform effort. For example, the Glass-Steagall bill was 
unmistakably about reform, while things like the National Recovery Administration 
(NRA) were recovery instruments.
56
 Tariffs and the 1934 bill definitely fit within this 
archetype for New Deal legislation. 
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In general, there is not synthetic material between diplomatic historians and 
economic historians in the historiography of the twentieth-century. Regrettably, one of 
the worst tendencies of American history is to imagine the United States in an 
international ―vacuum‖—in particular before heavy American involvement with the 
remainder of the planet after 1941.
57
 Nonetheless, isolationist groups (despite their best 
efforts) did not disengage the United States‘ economy from the global economy after the 
Great War, and the American economy grew in combination with a host of trading 
partners. Trade policy is in a naturally precarious position. Trade teeters between 
business history, diplomatic history, economic history, economic theory, and other 
viewpoints, as well. These diverse fields do not often interact; international trade suffers. 
Robert P. Murphy described it the most harshly: ―But most historians know nothing about 
economics, and most economists know little about history.‖58 Trade liberalization 
sometimes bears mentioning in the historiography. However, even then, sometimes 
historians described it in bizarre or confusing terms (such as ―purely permissive‖).59 
Essentially, in the end, the history field sequestered trade policy to the diplomatic realm. 
To demonstrate, Robert Dalleck‘s Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 
1932-1945 noted international trade in the 1930s over a dozen times, while the typical 
New Deal history is unusual if it brings it up once.
60
 Irwin Gellman went into some detail 
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about trade during the 1930s in Secret Affairs.
61
 Yet, the international market was still a 
part of the American domestic economy. If the New Deal was an economic program, then 
trade must fit into it to finalize the historical picture. 
Academics use countless approaches to appraise and analyze the New Deal. 
Additionally, different books have different perspectives and objectives. International 
trade could be involved with many of them for economic reasons, but it still falls out. 
There are economic histories, like Jim Potter‘s The American Economy between the 
World Wars, which quantitatively analyzes the American economy from 1918 to 1941.
62
 
There are political histories, too. For example, William J. Barber wrote Designs within 
Disorder on the politics of the ―pseudoscience‖ of policymaking inside of the Roosevelt 
administration.
63
 Elliot Rosen and Roosevelt, the Great Depression, and the Economics of 
Recovery (an important book for comprehending the historiography of the New Deal) 
concentrated on where the economic ideas of the Roosevelt administration came from—
how Roosevelt ―untangled it all and made policy decisions.‖64 Yet, none of these texts 
included much of anything about trade in diplomatic or economic terms. Rosen wrote a 
chapter named ―Trade Reciprocity,‖ save for it is about the politics of trade, debates 
inside of the Roosevelt administration, and bureaucratic competitions.
65
 This is not a 
pedantic attack on their entire approach, but rather something they missed. The tertiary 
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sources lack trade policy, too. For instance, Anthony Badger and his The New Deal, the 
Depression Years, 1931-1940 attempted to whittle down the bulk of the New Deal 
historiography to a single survey.
66
 Interestingly, though, Badger‘s text (which he 
gleaned from the rest of the historiography) had a characteristic lack of trade policy. 
There are still many serious, unresolved questions about the Great Depression and its 
era.
67
 Free trade and the New Deal in the 1930s is one of them. 
Evaluating the New Deal, either negatively or positively, is a titanic undertaking. 
There are many ways to do it, though. On the left of the spectrum, communists, 
nationalists, socialists, and New Left historians faulted the New Deal for not ―going far 
enough‖ to punish business for the Great Depression.68 They wanted a nationalization of 
private finance, reformed social castes, a banishment of income inequity, and economic 
collectivism.
69
 These are extreme examples, and there are many other outlooks. D. H. 
Watkins described the Great Depression and the New Deal as a part of the American 
―story,‖ as much as the Revolutionary War and the customary ―shot heard ‗round the 
world.‖70 Watkins argued for social history and micro-history by telling the tales of 
individual families and people in the face of economic catastrophe. The New Deal was 
typically about economic recovery, but Edsforth occasionally brought other political 
triumphs of the New Deal to the forefront (such as improved Indian affairs, legal equity, 
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and civil rights for African Americans).
71
 Enormous personalities color the history of the 
New Deal. Roosevelt, his advisors, cabinet, and the Brain Trust were vibrant, and they 
produced many ―big names‖ in their own right. The challenges of the Great Depression 
never dimmed the enthusiasm of reformers, and they earned a nickname: ―the New 
Dealers.‖72 This produced autobiographies, biographies, bureaucratic history, institutional 
history, and intellectual history. Any of these methodologies have their place, but they 
cannot avoid the fact that the Great Depression and the New Deal were fundamentally 
economic developments. Under such circumstances, the omission of trade policy in the 
general historiography becomes a glaring issue. 
Recent scholarship highlights the limitations of the New Deal purely in terms of 
fostering an economic recovery. Nevertheless, such commentary lacked a consistent 
message about trade policies. For example, Jim Powell in FDR‘s Folly berated the 
Smoot-Hawley tariff, but then he proposed that the Roosevelt administration raised tariffs 
(albeit slightly) and reduced them later with only minor economic consequences.
73
 
Powell did not present a singular message about trade and the New Deal here. Finish Farr 
in FDR criticized Roosevelt for supposed hypocrisy on war neutralities, Manchuria, 
China, and the burgeoning war in Europe.
74
 Farr even conspiratorially accuses Roosevelt 
of foreknowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
75
 Therefore, Farr disliked the foreign 
policy of the Roosevelt administration—but he does not complain about its trade policy. 
Murphy‘s The Politically Incorrect Guide to the Great Depression and the New Deal 
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strenuously undermines the ―standard‖ story of the New Deal saving the United States 
from ruin. However, Murphy never mentioned Hull,
76
 Japan (before the postwar 
occupation),
77
 international trade in the 1930s,
78
 or tariffs (outside of Smoot-Hawley).
79
 
A tariff bill emerged from the Congressional pipeline in 1934, and Murphy entirely 
neglected it. Other commentators left trade out of focus. For instance, the United States 
and Canada signed a trade deal in 1935, but Rosen did not delve into what it meant 
economically.
80
 Rosen, instead, drove at non-economic concerns—the fights amid 
executive agencies, the Democratic Party, and Roosevelt himself.
81
 Roosevelt and the 
New Deal are more assailable in current historiography than they were in the past, but 
coverage of the international trade market has not expanded as a result. 
Outside of the natural admonishments for Smoot-Hawley, derisive accounts of the 
New Deal lacked specifics on trade policy. Typically, the story of trade in the 1930s does 
not extend beyond the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930, or scholars omitted details. 
Returning to Powell, he discussed how the Revenue Act of 1934 raises a surcharge on 
oils, vegetables, and foods from the Philippines.
82
 Powell was obviously a free trader. 
Yet, without developing his point about trade policy, the passage about the Philippines 
seemed out of context and nitpicky for the sake of political gain (which were self-evident 
in the title of FDR‘s Folly). On Smoot-Hawley, Potter wrote, ―By 1932 two dozen 
foreign governments had retaliated with tariffs of their own, with quotas and specifically 
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anti-American embargoes and, for these and other reasons, American exports fell by 
half.‖83 Potter was critical of Smoot-Hawley—but he stops. There was no point on the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Amity Shlaes and The Forgotten Man had a 
strong thesis on tariffs: ―Roosevelt‘s desire to control tariff law worked to the benefit of 
the economy, for, through Cordell Hull, he undid some of the damage of the Smoot-
Hawley tariff.‖84 Her argument, despite its firmness, had no evidence thereafter to back it 
up. John T. Flynn (a political pundit in the 1930s) wrote Hull stayed in office in 1933 to 
further his ―febrile crusade for commercial reciprocity.‖85 These writers seemed aware of 
1930s trade liberalization, but they never made a true argument about its nature with data. 
Lists of New Deal programs were extremely unfriendly to Hull and the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements Act of 1934. In addition, the former usually neglected to mention 
either of the latter. The New Deal had a persistent and long-lasting influence on the 
function and role of the United States‘ federal government. The Hundred Days set the 
stage for Roosevelt‘s whole presidency in a series of legislative breakthroughs.86 Byron 
W. Daynes listed the Glass-Steagall Act (a bank reform law), the National Recovery 
Administration (or the NRA), the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), a 
development of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration (AAA), TVA, and Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) as the main pillars 
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of the New Deal in 1933 and 1934.
87
 He did not have the Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Act of 1934. Randall E. Parker noticed the ―alphabet soup‖ of agencies: CCC, TVA, the 
Public Works Administration (PWA), the Federal Emergency Relief Administration 
(FERA), the Civil Works Administration (CWA), the Works Progress Administration 
(WPA), Social Security, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA, or the Wagner Act)— 
nothing on trade.
88
 Parker named everything else, but there is no ―RT,‖ ―RTTA,‖ or 
―TTA.‖ Kenneth S. Davis and FDR: The New Deal Years 1933-1937 mentioned Hull 
regarding arms, the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, the World Economic Conference, and 
the Import-Export Bank—still nothing on trade.89 The New Deal has the same problem in 
postsecondary education. For instance, a lecture from an online American history survey 
at the University of Wisconsin described the ―radicalization‖ of the New Deal in 1934, 
but it has nothing on Hull or the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934.
90
 There was, 
also, a dearth of scrutiny when it comes to reciprocal trade. 
There is not much depth to the analysis of American trade policy in the 1930s, 
and the standard version of the story concentrates on the early 1930s too much. An 
overreliance on the importance of the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930s is much of the 
problem. Take one example of this phenomenon. Murphy and The Politically Incorrect 
Guide to the Great Depression and the New Deal detailed that, ―Total U.S. exports 
dropped from $7 billion in 1929 to $2.5 billion in 1932 though this fall was partially due 
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to the general economic decline and to price deflation.‖91 This was critical data, but 
Murphy‘s notion is incomplete. He stopped at 1932. He never waded into trade policy 
under Hull and the Roosevelt administration. Barber offered broad coverage to economic 
policy under Hoover: the ―high wage‖ doctrine,92 the Smoot-Hawley tariff,93 monetary 
policy,
94
 and farm policy,
95
 with no benefit afforded tariffs under Roosevelt (even in his 
later books).
96
 Yes, Smoot-Hawley was a monumental policy decision and a major tenet 
of the way Hoover failed to comprehend the scale and urgency of the Great Depression. 
Yet, it was not the conclusion of trade policy in the 1930s. To demonstrate, Rosen 
mentioned the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, but he does not go into its 
economics.
97
 Another big problem in the historiography is how politics tended to 
overshadow any discussion of the New Deal. Political historians, in particular, hold the 
Roosevelt and the New Deal in high repute.
98
 Politics sometimes forced the economics 
and trade policy into the backseat. 
Political history generally dominates scholarly and popular conceptions of the 
New Deal and the Great Depression. The same is true with trade policy. For instance, the 
critical scholars of the New Deal—who are either conservatives or libertarians—have 
little incentive to look for trade liberalization during the New Deal, as it would 
undermine their criticisms of Roosevelt to a political audience. Rosen‘s ―Trade 
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Reciprocity‖ was a rich source: ―In due course the debate over trade policy became 
enmeshed with the issue of potential U.S. involvement in what many sensed was an 
inevitable replay of the Great War.‖99 Hence, reciprocal trade was an issue of politics to 
Rosen and not economics. He described the situation as zero-sum. That is, groups fought 
for Roosevelt‘s ear: ―These developments served as background to a debate on the best 
route to agricultural recovery, with internationalists pitted against corporatists bent on 
autarky.‖100 Political and various other types of historians typically did not prefer to dig 
into the realm of economics. Hull receives attention from political historians but not 
much. Jordan A. Schwarz in The New Dealers included nothing on international markets, 
tariffs, and nothing on Hull outside of Democratic Party politics.
101
 The solitary reference 
to Hull in Joseph P. Lash‘s Dealers and Dreamers was Hull as a successor to Roosevelt 
in 1940.
102
 Historians did not go far enough with trade, and they misinterpreted its 
significance to the era. 
Scholars sometimes miss the importance of reciprocal trade to the New Deal and 
the lives of the 1930s or mischaracterize it in hostility to domestic programs. Rosen was a 
fruitful source, but here he has a primary citation. Newton D. Baker (Secretary of War 
under Wilson) wrote a letter to the New York Times on June 2, 1936 and stated Hull and 
freer trade programs were the most redeeming features of Roosevelt and the New Deal.
103
 
Yet, and quite curiously, Rosen then portrayed free trade as the antithesis of the New 
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Deal: ―[Internationalists like Hull] offered a coherent alternative to the New Deal‘s 
insular program.‖104 This passage implied the New Deal was solely ―insular‖ (isolated, 
like an island, even autarkic). Basic appraisal of the interrelation amid the world and 
domestic economies and the New Deal‘s nature as a recovery program shows the 
―insular‖ hypothesis cannot be true. In other contexts, the lack of trade policy was 
strange. In an otherwise detailed economic history, Potter included twenty-eight charts 
and graphs over 155 pages of body text (an approximate ratio of two visual displays per 
eleven pages).
105
 Yet, besides a table to show the United States‘ change in status from net 
debtor to net creditor nation between 1908 and 1918, Potter gave no attention to trade 
past Smoot-Hawley.
106
 Roosevelt went from ―Dr. New Deal‖ to ―Dr. Win-the-War‖ in 
the 1930s,
107
 but Roosevelt was ―Dr. Trade,‖ as well. Liberal internationalism is a 
forgotten element of the recovery plan. 
Seminal works on the New Deal and the Great Depression give Hull and tariffs 
only a single mention. Davis called on international trade during the New Deal only once, 
and he did it in the context of the World Economic Conference.
108
 He had nothing on 
trade after 1933. Badger named Hull once in his entire volume (despite the influence Hull 
had on agriculture and other export-oriented industries) and, again, in the context of the 
London conference.
109
 Carl H. Mote and The New Deal Goose Step, an obviously 
reproachful work, sneered once at free traders as an ―elitist‖ product of New England‘s 
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posh universities.
110
 After that, Mote included no more for trade. Frederick W. Marks 
criticized reciprocal trade in the 1930s for precisely one paragraph in Wind over Sand: 
the Diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt.
111
 The topic faded from view and long before 
important deals with allies, such as Britain and Canada, happened.
112
 The Presidency of 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt by George McJimsey was a massive work on the life and 
political career of Roosevelt. McJimsey included only two sentences on Hull, and both of 
these were in a political context.
113
 Barber‘s Designs within Disorder included Smoot-
Hawley just once, and he then skips to Lend-Lease before trade bears mentioning 
again.
114
 In total, Barber‘s 171 pages of body text mentioned Hull only once—
paradoxically, as well, in the exact same paragraph as the Smoot-Hawley tariff.
115
 Hull‘s 
career made this quite an irony. 
Troublingly, major works with the New Deal as their central focus have nothing 
at all on liberalization, Hull, and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. 
Academic histories and popular accounts both have this problem. Peter Fearon biased 
War, Prosperity, and Depression: The U.S. Economy, 1917-45 towards economic topics; 
Fearon mentions the Smoot-Hawley tariff eight times.
116
 However, Fearon offered no 
converge of tariffs after 1933—including the New Deal, Hull‘s career, the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements Act of 1934, or anything. To Flynn, minus the one critical sentence in 
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a previous paragraph, free trade did not come into analysis until after the conclusion of 
the Second World War.
117
 Flynn glossed the Roosevelt administration‘s trade policy in 
the New Deal era. Farr brought Hull up, but mostly in 1939 and 1940 when Roosevelt 
sought a potential successor before running for his third term in the White House.
118
 To 
reiterate, Roosevelt put Hull on a short list of candidates to become the thirty-third 
president long before Harry S. Truman (D-MO).
119
 Nonetheless, this was not the full 
extent of Hull‘s time as Secretary of State. Popular histories were similar. For instance, 
Michael Barone and Our Country played up Hull‘s wherewithal in Congress and in the 
presidential election of 1940, but there is nothing about his initiatives on tariffs while in 
the executive branch.
120
 Trade policy just does not attract much attention from many 
authors in the historiography. 
International trade relationships during the 1930s are a low priority in other 
books. For illustration, Roger Biles‘ A New Deal for the American People had 233 pages 
of body text on the New Deal, yet nothing on Hull or trade after the Smoot-Hawley tariff 
or the World Economic Conference.
121
 The New Deal and its Legacy, edited by Robert 
Eden, was a collection of twelve essays, the cream of over a hundred submissions on the 
heritage the United States owes to the New Deal.
122
 None of its articles put the economy 
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or trade under the microscope.
123
 In New Deal and Public Policy, Daynes argued the 
Second New Deal (the New Deal from 1934 to 1936) was the truly important and 
enduring part of the Roosevelt program.
124
 The Second New Deal had a role in expanding 
unionization, welfare, and creating Social Security.
125
 The Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Act of 1934 fits this timeline, but Daynes did not include it. Social histories of the New 
Deal, for all their other merits and objectives, were the most egregious when it comes to 
the neglect of trade policy. Watkins did not mention trade,
126
 or tariffs,
127
 but he did find 
the time for nine references to Father Coughlin,
128
 four of Woody Guthrie,
129
 and four on 
the Federal Arts Project.
130
 Robert Himmelberg and The Great Depression and the New 
Deal, in spite of all the economic history implied in its title, had no discussion of Hull. In 
contrast, it has four mentions of Roosevelt‘s packing scheme for the Supreme Court.131 
Political and social history does not mesh well with trade. Moreover, at times, some 
historical events of the 1930s and their seeming totality cloud historians‘ conclusions 
about trade. 
The World Economic Conference was a huge part of international trade‘s 
narrative in the 1930s. The conference focused, in part, on repairing the channels and 
volumes of international commerce lost in the early Great Depression. However, the 
conference exploded and failed late in the summer of 1933, and its implosion left 
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historians prone to forgetting about trade policy afterwards. Hull traveled to London to 
lower tariffs in order to increase American commercial relationships abroad. In the end, 
Hull accomplished next to nothing in Britain. There was a spat between Hull and 
protectionist-minded Raymond Moley, and Roosevelt eventually soured on the 
conference‘s monetary goals. Moley objected to reciprocal trade because he believed it 
would cost the United States jobs and entangle the nation in another European war.
132
 
The supposed finality of London‘s failure makes the New Deal appear more ―domestic,‖ 
but it was only a temporary setback. The situation changed in 1934, but most scholars 
missed it. Powell refers to Hull kicking Moley out of the Department of State in 1933, but 
there is nothing on Hull and reciprocal trade further down the road.
133
 Potter listed Hull 
as the head American envoy to the meeting in Britain, but he includes no information 
beyond this, such as Hull backing the United States away from Smoot-Hawley 
protectionism after 1934.
134
 These examples are a part of a trend. Hull did hate Moley for 
supporting autarky and lobbying Roosevelt to the point that the president opposed trade 
liberalization through much of 1933.
135
 Nonetheless, this does not give historians a ―free 
pass‖ to neglect tariffs and trade policy. The New Deal was not exclusively an insular 
program, and Hull did not quit going into 1934. 
Historians typically subsume tariff policy underneath the paradigm of Roosevelt‘s 
―Good Neighbor‖ policy of non-interventionism in Latin America. This is an important 
connection, but trade was a broader theme in the era. To demonstrate, Edsforth wrote, 
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―His [Roosevelt‘s] ‗Good Neighbor‘ renunciation of the use of force in the Caribbean and 
Latin American countries, and Secretary of State Cordell Hull‘s pursuit of more liberal 
trading arrangements with ‗most favored nations‘ were significant international 
initiatives.‖136 The full title of Edsforth‘s book was The New Deal: America‘s Response 
to the Great Depression, yet he blazed through Hull‘s programs and did not notice the 
importance of international trade, exports, and imports to the domestic economy. Trade 
was being a Good Neighbor, but it was more than that—it was a critical factor in the 
ordering of the United States‘ ―house,‖ as well. Robert F. Smith, in ―The Good Neighbor 
Policy,‖ emphasized reciprocal trade in the 1930s as an issue in Latin America—
unrelated to the New Deal or economic recovery.
137
 Smith said, ―The Reciprocal Trade 
Agreement of 1934 lowered the U.S. duty on Cuban raw sugar, and gave U.S. goods 
various concessions in the Cuban market.‖138 Hence, Hull and his programs enjoyed 
progress in Cuba. Yet, Smith placed this under the heading of the Good Neighbor policy, 
and he did not attach valuations about the trade deal for the embryonic American 
recovery. Historical scholarship, overall, blithers past tariffs and international trade 
policy in the 1930s. This is fascinating considering the focus on the topic after 1945 and 
the Second World War. 
Numerous commentators perplexingly recall trade after 1945 but forget it 
beforehand. There was a large quantity of important developments in the international 
economy immediately after the cession of hostilities in 1945. The Allies created the 
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United Nations (UN), the Bretton Woods system, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank to enforce 
security and enable freer trade through monetary stability and tariff reductions. Edsforth 
was a palpable example of this trend; he made a note of every one of the above 
organizations, but he did not have much of anything on trade during the 1930s.
139
 
Ironically, Edsforth wrote, ―In the 1940s, the New Dealers enshrined international 
collaboration in economic development, currency stabilization, and tariff reduction as the 
guiding principles of the foreign economic policy of the United States‖ [emphasis 
added].
140
 Edsforth was astute in his assessment of the postwar victory of liberal 
internationalism; however, he somehow missed an entire decade of diplomatic and 
economic initiatives. The New Dealers of the 1930s attempted to codify internationalism 
and reciprocal trade as the foreign policy of the United States, though they did not have 
tremendous success until after 1945. Yet, they did try. Similarly, Rosen noted, ―Though 
the anti-statist, open-market globalists made scant headway in these years; they had 
overcome Peek‘s approach to agricultural recovery based on autarky and a corporatist 
economy.‖141 The reciprocal trade of the Roosevelt administration might have been 
―scant‖ in a relative sense, but it still merits inclusion. Trade policy is economic policy. 
Hull and the free traders had their day in the 1930s, and trade fits into the New Deal. It 
deserves some sort of analysis on the level of its economics, as well. 
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Quite paradoxically, the scholars closer in actual memory to the 1930s do the best 
job in describing reciprocal trade‘s role in the period. Sometimes it can be difficult to 
separate history from journalism given the timeframes involved and the availability of 
sources. Conversely, and incongruously, older historians—with the least access to 
archival records on the Hoover and the Roosevelt administrations—pay the most 
attention to international trade. For instance, Basil Rauch and History of the New Deal 
1933-1938, which first saw press in 1944, had thirteen mentions of Hull and nine of the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934.
142
 Evidently, the memory of reciprocal trade 
was fresher in the 1940s and 1950s, and it dimmed with time. To demonstrate this point, 
take the career of William E. Leuchtenburg. He won a Bancroft Prize for his classic 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal in 1963. That book recorded the significance of 
reciprocal trade to the Roosevelt administration.
143
 Leuchtenburg included a relatively 
copious amount on tariffs and trade, and he managed to do it without admission to the 
personal papers of Hull, Roosevelt, and other major figures from the Great Depression.
144
 
Later, Leuchtenburg returned to the New Deal in The FDR Years of 1995. However, 
somewhere between 1963 and 1995, Leuchtenburg forgot about trade policy. The FDR 
Years made no references to reciprocal trade, the Smoot-Hawley tariff, the World 
Economic Conference of 1933, or the international economy of the 1930s.
145
 The 
historiography grows and changes over time, but this course is not always automatic an 
improvement. Historical conceptions of the 1930s in terms of cultural and social history 
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expanded, but the idea of the New Deal itself shrunk and desiccated itself of trade policy 
in the process. This change needs some redressing. 
There is an opening in the historiography of the New Deal, the Great Depression, 
and America in the 1930s on the subject of trade policy. The New Deal is a complicated 
subject in itself, as so many have already said so much about it, and Roosevelt‘s time in 
the White House has a mythology of its own. Trade policy does not naturally have a 
―home‖ subfield: business history, economy history, diplomatic history, and other modes 
of analysis tend to concentrate on different subjects and do not integrate with each other. 
There are divergent means for appraising the New Deal, in good or bad terms, and trade 
skirts between them. Economic historians do not approve of the New Deal to the same 
degree as political historians, but ideological views of the New Deal and the Great 
Depression perhaps keep some ―conservative‖ critics of the Roosevelt administration 
from realizing trade‘s role in the decade. The designers of the New Deal trusted the 
government to ensure economic stability and performance, but free trade implicitly relies 
on the natural flow of commerce, free markets, and capitalism. Thus, Hull and reciprocal 
trade cut across the modern political spectrum in interesting, complicated ways. 
Furthermore, narrative histories tend to dance around reciprocal trade in the 1930s, as 
well. They hit popular topics: the Smoot-Hawley tariff, the World Economic Conference, 
the United Nations, the Bretton Woods system, but not the Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Act of 1934. The evidence clearly suggests there was an underrepresentation of 
reciprocal trade in the general histories of the New Deal and the Great Depression, and 
there is a fissure worth explanation. 
36 
CHAPTER 3: THE SMOOT-HAWLEY TARIFF 
The trade story of the 1930s properly began in 1929 with the stock market 
crashes, an economic apocalypse, and the early Great Depression. Tariffs were a heated 
issue through most of the course of early American history. The Great War and the 
Roaring Twenties were a bit of a respite, but problems in the international economy never 
went away. In 1929, the stock market cratered after a strong decade in the 1920s, and the 
Hoover administration responded by passing the Smoot-Hawley tariff in the middle of 
1930. High tariffs, an ensuing trade war, stagnation in the rural economy, atrocious 
monetary policy, and other factors quickly combined to produce the early onset of the 
Great Depression. President Herbert Hoover, on the other hand, clung to the Smoot-
Hawley tariff, and a reversal in American trade policy was not possible until Franklin D. 
Roosevelt came into the White House. The Smoot-Hawley tariff had its adherents, and it 
might have even been a political success for Hoover and the Republican Party through 
1930 and 1931. Yet, the American economy failed to improve in the early 1930s. Things 
were worse after a few years of Smoot-Hawley protectionism. In 1933, as much as 30% 
of the American labor pool was out of a job, and total economic output probably shrunk a 
very similar proportion over the same phase. Economic analysis shows that Smoot-
Hawley damaged American exporters in the world economy. Hoover and the Republican 
majority of the 1920s had their way with a higher tariff in 1930, which produced 
disastrous results. It took a Democratic administration and its iconic New Deal to 
engender a new change after 1934. 
 
37 
The Background of Foreign Trade 
Tariffs were possibly the most significant diplomatic, economic, and political 
question in the United States in the nineteenth-century (outside of, of course, slavery). 
Washington primarily financed itself from the revenue of a high tariff before the 
daybreak of the twentieth-century and involvement in world politics.
146
 Sectional 
differences developed over trade. The agricultural South and, prior to the 1870s 
industrialization, the Midwest desired lower tariffs to made trade easier with Europe. 
Nevertheless, Northeastern industry wanted a breather from competition with European 
firms and sole access to Midwestern food. Tariffs were a sore issue in the South, which 
depended on cotton exports.
147
 A lower tariff was part of the rationale for the Confederate 
States of America.
148
 Washington gradually raised tariffs through the closing years of the 
nineteenth-century; this consistently sent the message that the United States was not 
interested in joining an international community of nations or solving global economic 
problems.
149
 Then, in 1898, the Spanish-American War greatly helped in forging the 
modern, nationalized political system of two major parties.
150
 Republicans rallied around 
the Northeast and the high tariff policies of President William McKinley, and Democrats 
and southerners coalesced in favor of a lower tariff, if only in antagonism.
151
 Even at this 
relatively early stage of American economy history, the United States‘ tariff could 
acutely pressure foreign economies. In 1911, for instance, when Washington raised tariffs 
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against Canada, the Liberal government of Wilfrid Laurier fell after it was unable to 
contain the nationalistic outburst of the Conservative opposition against the high 
American tariff.
152
 Trade mattered more and more with industrialization, the necessity of 
markets to absorb increased production, economic expansion, American involvement 
overseas (including a modest empire), and the coming of the Great War. 
Industrialization and expansion in the early twentieth-century radically altered the 
United States‘ economy. High tariffs were somewhat divorced from reality by this point, 
as it protected supposedly ―infant‖ industries while the American economy grew to be the 
largest on the globe. Tariffs protected select industries from foreign competition.
153
 The 
result was a high amount of growth in concentrated industries, like automobiles and 
construction.
154
 This limited the overall level of economic diversification in the American 
economy, and made the country extremely vulnerable to recession in the case of a 
significant downturn in an overdeveloped industry. The tariff did not change, though: ―It 
was not until Woodrow Wilson‘s election to the presidency in 1912 that any major 
reduction was made to the tariff.‖155 In the 1910s, the liberal ideology on trade policy 
finally came to the forefront, and Wilson‘s free trade philosophy influenced a young 
Democratic Congressman from Tennessee named Cordell Hull. International trade could 
benefit industries, but other groups gained, as well. For example, American farmers 
enjoyed the biggest boom period in their entire history during the Great War. Battles in 
Europe destroyed European capital and land, and virtually all able-bodied men entered 
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military service. Europe paid farmers in the United States to take up the slack. In 1910, 
wheat sold at $0.91 per bushel in Chicago and Americans grew 625 million bushels on 
45.8 million acres.
156
 Prices surged after the start of the war to $2.00 per bushel, and 
production expanded to a billion bushels per year on 60.3 million acres of land.
157
 This 
boom provided a benefit for agriculture, but it risked overextension and overplanting in 
the 1920s and the 1930s. In addition, a high volume of international trade meant the 
United States was involved in repairing the world economy from the ruin of the Great 
War. It was not an easy process, and it created imbalances. 
 
Figure 3.1 - The above chart shows the transformation of the United States from a ―net 
debtor nation‖ where foreigners invest more in the United States than American do 
abroad into a ―net creditor nation‖ where the opposite is true.158 The vital transition 
took place during the Great War, where European governments direly needed American 
capital to finance their huge war. 
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The Roaring Twenties 
The ―Roaring Twenties‖ followed a sharp but succinct recession immediately 
after the Great War. Historians long argued whether the Roaring Twenties was a boom or 
a bust period. Either way, the 1920s produced a vigorous economy. Naturally, the 
sobriquet of the ―Roaring‖ Twenties covered undesirable social developments outside of 
the realm of economics. Jim Potter listed apathy, corruption, hedonism, hypocrisy, 
intolerance, radicalism, smugness, violence, and xenophobia.
159
 He also mentioned lower 
voter participation levels, the Teapot Dome scandal, modernist authors like F. Scott 
Fitzgerald, Bruce Fairchild Barton (who quipped Jesus Christ was ―the founder of 
modern business‖), Red Scares and Palmer Raids, the Immigration Act of 1924, jingoism, 
the Klu Klux Klan, and isolationism.
160
 The Roaring Twenties were a dynamic time, 
which entailed change, upset, and inequalities in the daily lives of Americans.
161
 In 
particular, some industries expanded quickly. Subsequent job losses and displacements 
troubled workers and families. A dynamic economy is always reallocating resources and 
labor from unproductive industries to new, growing parts of the economy. Regular people 
face a high level of uncertainty and temporary unemployment in such a situation. Hence, 
popular anxiety in such a condition was a perfectly reasonable approach to the Roaring 
Twenties. Nevertheless, the American economy grew fast: industrial activity expanded 
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from index 85 in 1933 to index 118 by 1929 (a 38.82% increase in seven years, or 5.54% 
on average per year).
162
 
Such growth benefited the American worker in the 1930s despite the high rank of 
prices in the United States. High productivity supported high wages. For instance, in 
1925, for each dollar of wage the average American factory worker produced $2.50 
worth of production, while the average British factory employee produced only $2.14.
163
 
This translated into higher salaries in the end. In nominal dollars, American factory 
laborers averaged $1,280 in salaries a year and produced $3,194 worth of output.
164
 In 
contrast, wages were only $513 in Britain and output a mere $1,096.
165
 However, 
Americans workers faced some of the highest prices in the world during the Roaring 
Twenties. A price index from 1928 found a basket of consumer goods cost $2.20 in 
Philadelphia, $1.90 in Ottawa, $1.76 in Berlin, $1.64 in London, with the whole of 
Europe ranging between $1.83 (in Copenhagen) and $1.22 (in Brussels).
166
 Despite this, 
real wages were still highest in the United States. In 1928, if real wages in Philadelphia 
were set at 100, then wages in Ottawa were 80, London was 53, Berlin was 35, and 
Europe distributed itself from 64 in Copenhagen to 27 in Rome.
167
 In sum, American 
workers labored hard and did the best job combining their efforts with modern 
technology and capital. Therefore, they were able to overcome high domestic prices and 
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take home a higher real wage. Yet, for the enlargement in the commercial and industrial 
economies, there was a downside. 
The ―dark side‖ of the Roaring Twenties came in the form of an agricultural 
depression. The price of agricultural products plummeted after European farming 
recovered from the Great War. To put it bluntly, farm prices collapsed after 1920. In 
1919, wheat sold at $2.19 per bushel in Chicago, but in 1929, a bushel garnered only 
$1.05.
168
 Farmers had to borrow more money to purchase equipment against falling 
prices and then more land to amortize the cost of that newer machinery.
169
 American 
farmers needed higher prices to meet loan payments on land and capital. The Great War 
gave the United States an incentive to expand food production, but the boom turned into 
overproduction and a glut.
170
 The laissez-faire solution would call on low prices to force 
inefficient acres and farms out of production, thereby reducing the quantity produced, and 
therefore driving prices up to a sustainable level. Conversely, this outcome was 
politically and socially unworkable—it was far too difficult to ask millions of people to 
leave their farms and their traditional way of life. Farmers, desperate to stay ahead of 
their neighbors, planted more and more acres each year in an attempt to exploit 
economies of scale and generate more cash. Tragically, big harvests only drove prices 
down more. Agriculture never approached industry in terms of economic parity or 
expansion during the Roaring Twenties.
171
 There was this problem at home, and there 
were economic problems abroad, as well. 
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American foreign and trade policy made several mistakes in the process of 
emerging out of the Great War in the Roaring Twenties. The reestablishment of the 
balance of exchanges in capital and goods between North America and Europe was a 
principal misfortune. The United States‘ new status as a net creditor nation compounded 
the problem, as most European nations were unable to repay war debts. High tariffs in the 
1920s kept European and other foreign goods relatively uncompetitive in the United 
States.
172
 Consequently, Europeans could only pay off old loans with new loans, the 
liquidation of assets in the United States, or in precious metals.
173
 To quote Anthony 
Badger, ―It would be difficult for European nations to sell enough goods on the American 
market to repay their war loans.‖174 This created imbalance, insolvency throughout the 
American financial system, and weakness in the European economy. Indeed, only 
repayment or a complete write-off can erase the memory of a bad loan from a balance 
sheet. In 1941, a message inside the Department of State listed the foremost failures of 
the 1920s: protectionism (as lower tariffs would have allowed Europe to pay back loans), 
missed opportunities for expanded foreign trade, slow international redistribution of 
capital, and unstable currencies.
175
 Structural problems in the aftermath of the Great War 
needed addressing, but the Republican majority of the 1920s maintained a high tariff 
schedule. There was little impetus to change to the ruling party while the American 
economy appeared substantial and muscular. 
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Economic diplomacy and tariffs were not controversial subjects in the Roaring 
Twenties. The Democratic Party lowered tariffs under the Wilson administration in the 
1910s. In 1920, the Republican Party swept back into power in one of the greatest 
electoral triumphs in American history. Republicans reinstalled a high level of 
protectionism with the Emergency Tariff of 1921 and the Fordney-McCumber tariff of 
1922. The federal government essentially left tariffs alone after that, until 1930, due to 
the veneer of a strong industrial economy. Primary producers were at a natural 
disadvantage in terms of relative prices in the period between the Great War and the 
Second World War.
176
 Input prices, relative development in different sectors of the 
economy, and land availability all favored manufacturing over agriculture and resource 
extraction.
177
 As well, Northeastern industry traditionally benefitted the most from the 
protective tariff. However, in the Roaring Twenties, tariffs shielded agriculturalists, too. 
In 1924, consumers paid a tariff on over $780 million worth of materials entering to the 
United States in competition with farms.
178
 Protectionism existed, but a fair amount of 
imports still came into the United States without a duty. In nominal dollars, 1924‘s 
imports totaled $3.61 billion—$2.08 billion, or 57.62%, was duty-free.179 Politicians did 
not make tariffs much of an issue for society; voters did not demand it. The Democratic 
Party‘s platform in 1928 was virtually the same as the Republican one on trade policy; 
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both sides called for tariffs ―to equalize the cost of production‖ between competing 
states.
180
 This situation changed drastically in 1929. 
Duty classification of 1924’s imports Volume Percent 
Imports without any tax on the import 2,080,000,000 57.62% 
Imports in competition with farms with duty 780,000,000 21.60% 
Imports in non-farm industry with duty 750,000,000 20.78% 
Total imports for fiscal year 1924 3,610,000,000 100.00% 
 
Figure 3.2 – The above chart shows imports into the United States in 1924 by tariff 
duties, destined industry, and all in 1924 dollars.
181
 Agriculture had many disadvantages 
during the Roaring Twenties, but the sum amount of import taxes actually collected was 
higher on farm production than on non-farm output. On the other hand, the duty-free 
imports were usually more agricultural than otherwise, and they put the besieged 
American farmer into a worse spot. 
 
The Economic Crisis of 1929 
The American economy teetered off a precipice in 1929. Eventually, it crashed 
into the Great Depression the next year. The Great Depression was a cataclysm. 
Employment, economic growth, prices, and gross domestic product (from the peak in 
1929) did not completely recover until 1942. Modern explanations considered the Great 
Depression as a monetary phenomenon.
182
 The fundamental, human error of the Great 
Depression was confusion and poor leadership within the young Federal Reserve 
System.
183
 Notably, the Federal Reserve learned an incorrect lesson in the petite recession 
immediately after the Great War. The Fed raised short-term interest rates to maintain 
price stability in the face of a recession—normally a deflationary event—from 1918 to 
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1921 without adverse effects.
184
 The Federal Reserve System was two decades old by the 
late 1920s, but central bank officials did not clearly understand how to adjust monetary 
policy, and their actions deepened an economic downturn. In hindsight, the Fed‘s actions 
ran counter to the recommendations of economists and the decisive The General Theory 
of Employment, Interest, and Money, which John Maynard Keynes published in 1936. 
The Fed essentially thought it could ―tighten‖ monetary spigots to guard against inflation 
even during a slump. The Fed lacked any commanding leadership in the late 1920s. 
Benjamin Strong, the governor of the New York Fed from 1914 to 1928, retired due to ill 
health.
185
 His successor, George L. Harrison, was a lawyer and did not possess the 
commercial acumen, economic background, or leadership skills to unify the Federal 
Reserve System around monetary decisions made in New York.
186
 The result was a 
deflationary tailspin. Decreasing prices led to lower production, then to lower 
employment, then to lower wages, then to lower demand, and then to even lower 
production. Hence, the Fed was now impotent to stop it. The overconcentration of 
industrial growth in particular sectors of the economy and the strained agricultural 
economy exacerbated the crisis. Nonetheless, monetary policy was at the very heart of 
the Great Depression. 
The Fed tried to ―cool‖ the hot economy in the late 1920s to circumvent inflation, 
but it tightened too much. First, central bankers encouraged a system of ―real bills‖—that 
is, the Fed wanted to stop investors from taking out unsecured loans from banks in order 
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to pursue other investment opportunities.
187
 This reeked of speculation, and it risked 
inflation.
188
 The Fed‘s new policy of tighter financial resources and higher interest rates 
shocked the stock market, and the price of stocks declined greatly. The Wall Street stock 
market crash of 1929 and the dramatic declines of Black Thursday (October 24, 1929) 
and Black Tuesday (October 29, 1929) had little initial effect on the physical economy—
the middle class was not large in the 1920s, and very few individuals had the surplus 
capital to invest in stocks.
189
 Nevertheless, the stock market crash was a catalyst. Turmoil 
in New York increased the uncertainty in the economy for managers, lowered future 
expectations, dampened business plans, and slowed investment.
190
 The Fed, always 
worried about inflation and the dollar‘s link to the value of gold, raised short-term rates 
from 2.5% to 3.5% on October 16, 1930.
191
 This move was deflationary to an upsetting 
degree, and the economy started to spiral downwards. Historically, though, the monetarist 
reading of the Great Depression (as popularized by Milton Friedman) was hindsight. The 
finishing point of his theories about monetary policy came after the Second World War. 
In the 1920s and 1930s, other economic theories were in vogue for governmental 
policymakers. 
Economists and politicians had their own ideas about the cause of the crisis in the 
1920s. Moreover, Friedman and Schwartz admittedly identified only a ―secondary‖ 
effect—the Fed and monetary policy worsened things, but a recession started before the 
full Great Depression, and there were notable economic problems besides money in the 
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1920s.
192
 Indeed, monetary policy is not a separate entity, and it related intimately to 
fiscal policy.
193
 Economists in the 1930s had two major explanations for the Great 
Depression: (1) belief that high prices kept demand too low to realize supply, and that 
once prices adjusted the economy would fix itself (otherwise known as Say‘s Law); (2) 
loose Fed policy in the late 1920s created a bubble of ―mal-investment,‖ and its ―pop‖ 
brought down the stock market.
194
 Hence, either way, much of the growth of the Roaring 
Twenties was illusionary, and the economy needed to fall back to Earth. Firms with bad 
assets needed liquidation, holdings needed revaluation, and then growth would return. 
Both sides had their relative analytical merits in going forward through the rest of the 
Great Depression; yet, neither school addressed the depth, immediacy, or ruthlessness of 
the crisis. For instance, on the aggregate, the United States‘ gross domestic product fell 
from $103.6 billion in 1929 to $74.19 billion in 1933 (in 1929 dollars), a decline of 
28.39% in just three years.
195
 Every metric of note went with it: consumer confidence, 
employment, growth, stability, wealth, and others, too. The numbers appeared worse 
under closer assessment. 
From 1929 to 1933, the early part of the Great Depression put the American 
economy in a dire position. Deflation caused the worst of the damage. During that 
timeframe, net currency prices fell by half, net gross national product fell by a third, 
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implicit prices fell by a third, and monthly wholesale prices (which involved large 
manufacturers and agriculture) fell by nearly a third.
196
 Farmers had already planted too 
much and gone too far into debt, and now the value of their crops in the field 
nosedived.
197
 In addition, the burden of loans increased with the strength of the dollar. 
Deflation makes the weight of a loan heavier in the exact reverse of the process that 
makes inflation lighten the loan. Creditors favor deflation, for the price tag on a loan 
increases in real terms as currency increases in value. In the United States, farm income 
in 1929 was $11.9 billion, and it declined to $5.3 billion in 1933.
198
 Farmers had to pay 
off the same loans, only now with a reduced income. Firms and households were in bad 
shape, too. Real income fell 36% from 1929 to 1933, and the decrease in demand and 
purchasing power caused businesses to idle capital and workers in massive quantities.
199
 
The Department of Labor did not keep detailed unemployment statistics before the 
Second World War, but estimates put a third of the labor force out of work and looking 
for a job by 1933.
200
 These ominous developments, for all their terror, did not spare the 
health of international trade, either. 
The Great Depression stunted the volume of international trade. Imbalances in the 
latter helped ferment the former, as well. Globally, the total quantity of trade declined 
                                                 
196
 Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, 299. 
197
 Ibid., 299. 
198
 ―Secretary Hull‘s Address at Minneapolis,‖ October 7, 1936, 1933-1937, State, Cordell Hull, Box #73, 
President‘s Secretary‘s Files, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Papers, Roosevelt Presidential Library (Hyde 
Park, NY). 
199
 Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, 301. 
200
 Ibid., 301. 
50 
30% during the early Great Depression.
201
 Tariffs, war debts, and the Great War 
engendered unevenness in the world economy. This exacerbated economic decline. The 
challenges of reconstruction, replacing millions of its most youthful and productive men, 
honoring loans, and making good on war debts overwhelmed the relatively small tax 
bases of European countries during the 1920s.
202
 Europe suffered high taxation, 
unemployment, and low growth as a result.
203
 Europe, as a continent, was extremely 
vulnerable to economic upset or higher tariffs. This affected the United States, despite the 
isolationist pretensions of the age. The United States ran a trade surplus of $25 billion in 
the period between 1914 and 1929.
204
 Yet, if foreign governments decided to respond in 
kind with tariffs of their own, aimed at the United States, or if the European economy 
weakened, and the volume of international trade collapsed then all the workers and 
businesses relying on that $25 billion would suddenly lack customers.
205
 Theoretically, 
American consumption could expand to take up the slack, but that required American 
consumers to want the same goods as Europeans or, at least, time for production to adjust 
to new tastes and markets. This could not happen in the Great Depression‘s era, since 
falling real incomes left diminutive excess purchasing power on the domestic market. 
The period of 1929 to 1933 did not offer the time and the patience for a lessening 
dependence on international trade and a move towards domestic consumption. Yet, the 
Hoover administration responded via modified trade policies. 
                                                 
201
 Jakob B. Madsen, Trade Barriers and the Collapse of World Trade during the Great Depression,‖ 
Southern Economic Journal 67:4 (Apr. 2001), http://www.allbusiness.com/government/782284-1.html. 
202
 Himmelberg, The Great Depression and the New Deal, 23. 
203
 Ibid., 23. 
204
 Shlaes, The Forgotten Man, 95. 
205
 Ibid., 95. 
51 
Fiscal Year Exports Agricultural Exports Percent Agricultural 
1919-1920 7949 3862 48.6 
1920-1921 6386 2608 40.8 
1921-1922 3700 1916 51.8 
1922-1923 3887 1799 46.3 
1923-1924 4224 1867 44.2 
1924-1925 4778 2281 47.7 
1925-1926 4653 1892 40.7 
1926-1927 4867 1908 39.2 
1927-1928 4773 1815 38.0 
1928-1929 5284 1847 35.0 
1929-1930 4618 1496 32.4 
1930-1931 3032 1038 34.2 
1931-1932 1909 752 39.4 
 
Figure 3.3 – The above table enumerates exports by fiscal year (July 1 of first year to 
June 30 of second year) in millions of nominal dollars.
206
 The United States‘ exports 
peaked immediately after the Great War, declined during the ensuing recession, 
recovered throughout the rest of the Roaring Twenties, and crashed in 1929. In 
comparison, agriculture was especially hard hit by the collapse in international trade 
when viewed against non-farm economic activity. The smaller percentage of exports 
ascribed to agriculture each year illustrates how the international market‘s strains 
disproportionally harmed farmers during the 1920s and the early 1930s. 
 
Why a Smoot-Hawley Tariff? 
The Republican Party‘s lifejacket to the faltering economy in 1930 consisted of, 
in part, the Smoot-Hawley tariff. Historians typically describe the bill as infamous, and it 
raised tariff rates to their highest levels in American history. Unemployment skyrocketed 
from 3% in the fall of 1929 to approximately 9% in the spring of 1930.
207
 Washington 
had to move in response for the sake of political reality. There were a number of 
economic worries at the time, but the self-evident disintegration of the international trade 
market was a concern for both political parties. Hoover and Democratic leaders, such as 
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Governor Franklin Roosevelt of New York, concurred, ―The loss of international trade 
played an enormous role‖ in the downturn.208 On the other hand, Republicans were still in 
control of policy after 1928 and before the midterm elections of 1930. They turned to 
higher tariffs to redress the crisis. The result was the Tariff Act of 1930, which posterity 
named the Smoot-Hawley tariff after its cosponsors Senator Reed Smoot (R-UT) and 
Congressman Willis C. Hawley (R-OR). Smoot-Hawley raised tariffs on a wide range of 
goods: chemicals, clay, glass, stone, metal, wood, sugar, tobacco, agricultural products, 
cotton, alcohol, textiles, flax, hemp, wool, silk, and a myriad of others.
209
 Rand McNally, 
the educational and household map publisher, even jumped on the bandwagon, protesting 
to Smoot for protection of the American cartographical industry.
210
 Rand McNally used 
inferior map designs to European competitors; the American company did not want to 
face the costs of the modernization needed to stay in the race with European firms.
211
 
Smoot-Hawley gave farmers and rural workers new import protections in comparison to 
the old Fordney-McCumber law. Smoot-Hawley raised the average rate of duty on farm 
products from 19.9% to 34.0%.
212
 Passing the bill had more to do with politics than with 
rigorous economic policymaking. 
Foremost, Smoot-Hawley was about preserving the Republican Party‘s identity, 
tradition, and unity in the face of an economic slowdown. Hoover helped to pass the 
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Smoot-Hawley bill as a Republican president.
213
 The Republicans, as a party, favored 
high tariffs in the 1920s. Given the strong economy from 1921 to 1929 under Republican 
hegemony and high tariffs, the party took the next logical step and concluded higher 
tariffs would help the economy after the stock market crash.
214
 It was an aspect of the 
party. A protective or a ―restrictive‖ tariff (a tariff that eliminates foreign competition) 
was a Republican tradition; Hoover ran for president on a high tariff plank in 1928.
215
 
From this perspective, Smoot-Hawley made political sense, since as it unified Hoover‘s 
party behind him, despite the weakening economy, going into a tough midterm election. 
Tariffs served a similar function for Republicans before. Tariffs unified the Republican 
Party since William McKinley (R-OH) first ran on them in 1896 as a cure for the 
doldrums of the 1890s. Political commentators named the general tariff law of 1890 the 
―McKinley tariff‖ after Congressman McKinley. Presidents William H. Taft (R-OH), 
Warren G. Harding (R-OH), and Calvin Coolidge (R-MA) used tariffs in a similar 
fashion to foster Republican unanimity.
216
 The high tariffs pandered to the party‘s base in 
the Northeast, protected industries, and isolationists who disliked international trade for 
its supposed entangling effects. Thus, Smoot-Hawley was a popular enough measure to 
push forward. Furthermore, Hoover had other reasons to support the Smoot-Hawley bill 
besides politics. Hoover hoped to use tariffs to address his personal diagnosis for the 
economic crunch in the first place. 
                                                 
213
 Conti, Reconciling Free Trade, Fair Trade, and Interdependence, 17. 
214
 Ibid., 17. 
215
 Shlaes, The Forgotten Man, 95. 
216
 Barone, Our Country, 39-40. 
54 
Hoover applied the ―high wage‖ doctrine to the problem of the stock market crash 
and the downturn of the late 1920s. The ―high wage‖ notion was an economic and 
industrial theory popular in the early twentieth-century. It said that employers needed to 
pay workers high wages to keep the purchasing power and the productivity of an 
economy up. Ideally, high purchasing power in the hands of labor would stimulate 
demand, economic growth, and give workers an incentive to work harder. The high wage 
policy gave the United States‘ government and some industrialists a justification for 
intervention in the labor market and the international economy.
217
 The government used 
trade barriers, immigration caps, and domestic subsidies to keep American wages high at 
any cost.
218
 Henry Ford of Ford Motor Company was the most famous propagator of the 
high wage doctrine, and Hoover ascribed to it, as well. Hoover believed the crisis of 1929 
was the result of falling wages, which implied that consumers‘ purchasing power fell 
with their salaries.
219
 Hoover supported a higher tariff in response to the slowdown in 
order to keep farm and industrial wages high by excluding overseas competition.
220
 
Hoover‘s idea was less foreign competition meant American firms could sell at a higher 
price domestically, American workers would be able to demand higher wages, and 
overall purchasing power would expand as a result. Unfortunately, two problems doomed 
high wages: (1) higher prices under protectionism negated, in real terms, whatever gains 
made to nominal wages; (2) scorned foreign governments shot back with their own tariffs 
and hurt American exporters. If anything, in the face of a recession, wages needed to fall 
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and labor needed to be cheaper to induce firms to hire the unemployed.
221
 More 
mainstream economic theories offered support for Smoot-Hawley, too. 
Domestic economic and monetary policy offered their views on trade policy in 
1929 and 1930. Supporters of Smoot-Hawley argued that the exclusion of foreign 
competition would keep the American market for American farmers and American 
manufacturers.
222
 They could easily shroud these points in nationalistic garb. Thus, 
Smoot-Hawley would be an attempt to maintain domestic demand in the face of the 
constricting economic crisis. In theory, this might work. Yet, it still forced American 
consumers to pay higher prices for less output, and it risked retaliation from foreign 
governments with their tariffs. Hoover, born in Iowa, always feared for American 
agriculture. He was wary of foreigners flooding the domestic market with cheap food; 
hence, he wanted to keep tariffs elevated.
223
 Executive power was at issue with tariffs, 
too. Hoover thought of himself as a progressive, an engineer, a merchant, and an 
internationalist. He felt that these experiences, as well as his charitable work during the 
Great War, gave him a special insight on world economic problems.
224
 In practice, he 
wanted more power for the White House in terms of controlling the tariff.
225
 Hoover 
desired a ―flexible tariff‖ (that the president could adjust without Congressional 
approval), a nonpartisan tariff commission, and monetary controls to fight off frightening 
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deflation.
226
 Hoover hoped his expertise could use tariffs to work the United States back 
to prosperity. In particular, he defended the monetary controls all the way up to the 
election of 1932 in a speech in Salt Lake City.
227
 He cited that combating depreciated 
foreign currencies required a much higher tariff schedule.
228
 Industry usually enjoyed the 
most protectionism from tariffs in the United States‘ history, but Smoot-Hawley changed 
this. 
Agriculturalists thought their segment of the economy stood the most to gain from 
the passage of Smoot-Hawley. For example, Arthur M. Hyde (Hoover‘s Secretary of 
Agriculture) gave a radio talk on July 2, 1930 in defense of the benefits that tariffs 
offered for farmers and ranchers: ―For agriculture, the Tariff Act of 1930 will be a 
distinct gain.‖229 Congress filled Hoover‘s ears with protectionist orations. Senator 
Smoot, the bill‘s eventual namesake, was the most notable tariff advocate. Smoot served 
in the Senate from 1903 to 1933; he was one of the first members of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter Day Saints in Congress; he was a senior apostle of the church and third in 
its line of succession before his death in 1941. Smoot had a close relationship with 
agricultural interests. For instance, he maintained a correspondence and exchanged 
seasonal greetings with Harry S. Austin of the United States Sugar Manufacturers 
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Association through the 1920s.
230
 Smoot kept up on the data by periodically requesting it 
from the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Commerce.
231
 He was 
particular interested in the effect of international trade and tariffs on farmers and the rural 
economy.
232
 Agriculture‘s support for Smoot-Hawley was an important factor in the 
law‘s passage. Originally, farmers opposed the bill on the suspicion it was just another 
giveaway to Northeastern big industry, but agriculturalists eventually climbed on board 
for novel tariffs.
233
 The Smoot-Hawley tariff was popular enough, but there was hostility 
to higher tariffs, too. 
Divergent parts of American society sternly opposed Smoot-Hawley. Business 
leaders outside of the farm lobby argued hard against higher tariffs. Thomas W. Lamont 
(a banker and the head of J.P. Morgan & Co.) personally begged Hoover to veto Smoot-
Hawley in order to keep the law from further depressing expectations and trapping 
businesses in wallow to the point they could no longer expand.
234
 Graeme K. Howard 
(vice president of General Motors, later a Nazi sympathizer) sent a telegram to Hoover in 
early 1930; he predicted international depression once Smoot-Hawley closed the 
international market.
235
 The American consumer had the most to lose from protectionism. 
After a tariff hike, foreign goods would be more expensive, or domestic production—that 
was more expensive to begin with—would see consumption. Either way, high prices 
sapped household income. Additionally, businesses and farmers are consumers, too. 
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Firms have to buy labor, raw materials, and supplies on the market before combing them 
together to create their own production to sell. Consequently, some trade unions objected 
to higher tariffs. Hoover received letters from the Buffalo Chamber of Commerce,
236
 the 
Central Co-Operative Association,
237
 the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation,
238
 the Minnesota 
Farm Bureau Federation,
239
 and the Wisconsin Farm Bureau Federation
240
 in opposition 
to Smoot-Hawley. These were all very close to the Canadian border. Principally, they 
worried about higher prices for Canadian lumber and retaliation against farm exports. 
Nonetheless, Senators Robert Lafollette, Jr. (R-WI) and John Blaine (R-WI) broke in 
favor of Smoot-Hawley in June 1930. Smoot-Hawley passed Congress, and Hoover 
signed the bill on June 17, 1930. The stock market nosedived, again, the next day, in 
reaction to the Smoot-Hawley tariff becoming official.
241
 
President Hoover and the Smoot-Hawley Tariff 
Hoover‘s decision to sign the tariff bill was curious. His past beliefs and 
documents from his administration did not support protectionism. Hoover was one of the 
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most respected leaders, diplomats, internationalists, and humanitarians of the early 
twentieth-century. He earned an AB in geology from Stanford, but honorary degrees 
poured in for his charity work during the Great War—from places such as Brown, Penn, 
Alabama, Rutgers, Oxford, the University of Warsaw, and numerous others.
242
 Hoover 
knew about the interconnectivity of the world economy and the precariousness of 
international trade. Hoover was working as a mining engineer in China at the outbreak of 
the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. Before the Great War, Hoover directed a firm under 
contract in Russia to develop copper in the Kyshtym Estates near Chelyabinsk.
243
 
Chelyabinsk and the Kyshtym Estates were eventually the home of Chelyabinsk-40 (the 
Soviet Union‘s first complete nuclear reactor), a plutonium/uranium production plant, 
and the site of a radiation leak in 1957.
244
 Thus, Hoover knew about trade. He had to 
work directly with it. He hated economic nationalism and despised agricultural dumping 
because it tended to ruin a small nation‘s base for food production.245 Hoover tolerated 
higher tariffs for farms for the sake of protection, but he disliked protection for mature 
American industry and the logrolling amid interest groups when it came to tariffs in 
Congress.
246
 Political advice from within his administration argued against higher tariffs, 
as well. A report on the political fallout from tariffs out of the office of Edward Dana 
Durand (an economist and eventually member of the United States Tariff Commission) 
concluded that the White House had more to lose than gain by supporting Smoot-
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Hawley.
247
 Durand‘s staff predicted Hoover would benefit politically by opposing the 
bill, by standing up to special interests, and by showing the vision to keep foreign 
markets open.
248
 There were some indications such was the case in the early 1930s. 
Opposition to Smoot-Hawley was intense on both the economic and the political 
front. The Democratic Party, long the opposition party to the high tariff policies of the 
Republican majority of the Roaring Twenties, opposed any escalation of tariffs. Both 
their 1928 presidential nominee, Al Smith (D-NY), and his successor in Albany as 
governor of New York, Franklin D. Roosevelt, were critical of Hoover on the tariff.
249
 
Lindsey Rogers, an economist from Columbia University, fed Roosevelt, Smith, and 
other Democrats information and speech lines on tariffs, which they used to assail 
Hoover.
250
 They pilfered Professor Rogers‘ letters in such a similar manner media outlets 
accused the Democrats of parroting.
251
 Tariffs‘ contentiousness did not vaporize quickly. 
The next year, on May 29, 1931, Roosevelt said, ―I continue to be convinced that the 
Hawley-Smoot tariff law is one of the most important factors in the present world-wide 
depression.‖252 Newspaper editors outside of New England, executives, industrialists, 
export-dependent agriculturalists, internationalists, libertarians, and economists continued 
to gripe at the Hoover administration after the passage of Smoot-Hawley.
253
 In May 
1930, 1,028 economists signed an open letter to Hoover in the New York Times pleading 
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with the president to veto the tariff bill.
254
 The academic regard for Smoot-Hawley did 
not improve with time. Yet, Hoover joined his wagon to the tariff train, and he guarded 
Smoot-Hawley. 
Hoover protected protectionism. He stubbornly clung to Smoot-Hawley, and he 
kept it from modification for almost the next three years. After the 1930 midterms, 
Democrats narrowly controlled the House of Representatives and nearly had the Senate, 
mostly because of frustration over the weak economy. Consequently, Congress sent 
Hoover a handful of bills with the goal of liberating international trade by lowering 
American tariffs. Hoover vetoed a bill in 1932 from the Democratic Congress to lower 
tariffs 35% overall (HR 6662), and the White House continued to deem high tariffs a 
necessary policy to impel economic recovery.
255
 Hoover was not interested in any bill 
that was more internationalist, reciprocal, open, or liberal than Smoot-Hawley in some 
way on the tariff question.
256
 The pattern held until 1932 and the next election. Hoover 
warned a Democratic president and Congress would pass a trade agreements bill to 
overturn the protection of Fordney-McCumber and Smoot-Hawley.
257
 By extension, 
Hoover argued everyone should be scared of American goods in competition with cheap 
foreign products on the domestic market.
258
 The United States faced grave economic 
issues in 1932, and the economy dominated the political discourse. Tariffs never left the 
                                                 
254
 Barber, From New Era to New Deal, 146. 
255
 Conti, Reconciling Free Trade, Fair Trade, and Interdependence, 18-19. 
256
 Richard Snyder, ―Hoover and the Hawley-Smoot Tariff: A View of Executive Leadership,‖ Annals of 
Iowa 41:7 (Winter 1973), 1188. 
257
 Hoover Speech in St. Paul, MN, November 5, 1932, St. Paul Speech, Folder 712, Box #1187, White 
House Press Release Series, Presidential Papers, Herbert C. Hoover Papers, Hoover Presidential Library 
(West Branch, IA). 
258
 Ibid. 
62 
picture, and Hoover constantly had to justify the Smoot-Hawley tariff and its effects on 
the economy. He had little chance for reelection in 1932, which made his choice to focus 
on tariff policy an interesting one. 
The election of 1932 brought no reprieve for Smoot-Hawley. Hoover defended it 
to the last on the campaign trail. Tariffs were the theme of Hoover‘s final push for 
reelection in early November 1932, as distant such a possibility might have been. Hoover 
listed the revision of the tariff law as one of the first and best accomplishments of the 
Republican Party to fight the Great Depression in a speech in St. Paul days before the 
election.
259
 On November 6, or the Sunday before electoral Tuesday, the White House 
used its tariff policies as a final effort in Hoover‘s speech in Salt Lake City.260 Hoover 
tried to find disunity and hypocrisy from the Democrats on tariffs, and he tried to 
minimize the difference between the two parties in terms of their actual stances on the 
issue. Moreover, Hoover did not quit on Sunday. On the Monday before the 1932 
election, the Hoover administration issued a last minute press release detailing how 
Argentinean diplomats and industrialists were chomping at the bit in anticipation of a 
Democratic sweep.
261
 Buenos Aires expected lower tariffs from Washington with 
Roosevelt and the Democratic Party in power and, consequently, more opportunities for 
the Argentinean beef industry for markets in the United States.
262
 Hoover pointed this 
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out; yet, he played an economical uninformed zero-sum game of international relations 
and economic gain in the first place. Ranchers might suffer in the face of foreign 
competitors, but consumers would benefit from low meat prices. Economics said that the 
benefits to the latter outweigh the costs to the former. Hoover lost the 1932 election, and 
he never let the tariff question go for the rest of his life. 
Hoover returned to trade policy, and he even debated the relative merits of tariffs 
all the way through the 1950s. Hoover was relatively young when he left the White 
House and, after Harry Truman became president, he once again had a long and 
productive public career. He gave tariffs special attention. Hoover never left trade policy 
behind, and he still held meetings with business leaders, economists, and statisticians 
about international trade deals to 1954.
263
 Hoover still showed strong interest in doing 
whatever he could to protect the American farmer in the liberalized trade of the post-
Second World War era.
264
 The former president even wrote a long, unpublished essay in 
his own hand called ―Some Facts about the Tariff‖ in 1953, which had a lengthy 
discussion of the history and the economic theory involved in international economics.
265
 
Hoover was unable to let go of tariffs, and explicit or implied defenses of Smoot-Hawley 
imbued in many of his texts. However, and importantly, Hoover considered what came 
after him under Roosevelt and Cordell Hull a clean break from the tariff policies of the 
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Republican Party of the 1920s.
266
 Even twenty years later, Hoover received letters and 
copies of speeches that demonized the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 for 
being anything but ―reciprocal‖ and ―costing‖ American jobs.267 Hoover‘s assertions are 
understandable, as he disliked Roosevelt and the New Deal and did not want to have 
anything to do with it. However, Hoover‘s beliefs only show the newfangled course 
American trade policy took in the 1930s after 1934. Roosevelt and Hull came to office, 
and Smoot-Hawley was a part of the problem in their eyes. 
Economic Analysis of Smoot-Hawley 
The Smoot-Hawley tariff, its new import taxes, and its justifications did economic 
harm to the United States in the early 1930s. The high wage doctrine, Smoot-Hawley, 
and policies of the Hoover administration designed to ensure high wages did the most 
mischief. The economists Richard Vedder and Lowell Gallaway concluded that high 
wages were, ―the root cause for the extraordinary increase in unemployment in the years 
following the stock market crash.‖268 The conceptualization of this notion is intuitive. 
Hoover attempted to keep wages elevated with the Smoot-Hawley tariff and other 
measures; labor became artificially expensive on the market, and therefore firms 
accelerated layoffs and retarded hiring. Additionally, Smoot-Hawley forced the American 
consumer to buy comparatively expensive domestic goods instead of cheap foreign 
products—as the 1930 law was drastically high enough to restrict the entry of foreign 
                                                 
266
 Rosen, Roosevelt, the Great Depression, and the Economics of Recovery, 225. 
267
 Selvage Letter to Hoover, March 13, 1954, 1953-1954 and undated, Printed Materials and Clippings, 
Box #309, Subject File, Post-Presidential Papers, Herbert C. Hoover Papers, Hoover Presidential Library 
(West Branch, IA). 
268
 Richard Vedder and Lowell Gallaway quoted in Murphy, The Politically Incorrect Guide to the Great 
Depression and the New Deal, 41. 
65 
goods to the domestic market.
269
 Before Smoot-Hawley, the average import duty was 
13.8%, but it rose to 17.75% in 1931 and 20.0% in 1932.
270
 Amity Shlaes stated: ―Each 
day proved the Cassandra economists right anew: in the two years following Hoover‘s 
Smoot-Hawley legislation, U.S. imports dropped more than 40 percent.‖271 Shockingly, 
in light of Hoover‘s signature on the bill, the administration anticipated these effects. The 
Department of Commerce—Hoover served as Secretary of Commerce for Harding and 
Coolidge from 1921 to 1928—reported in 1930 that the Fordney-McCumber tariff was 
adequate.
272
 Furthermore, higher input prices would hurt farmers more than higher prices 
helped them, and the report recommended smaller tariff changes than the proposed 
Smoot-Hawley.
273
 The problem with protectionism has always been that it inevitably 
invites retaliatory tariffs from foreign governments. Exporters suffer as a result. Smoot-
Hawley was no exception to this tenet in the early 1930s. 
World governments swiftly retaliated to Smoot-Hawley. European capitals, in 
particular, raised tariffs in counter to Smoot-Hawley and worsened the Great Depression 
in the process.
274
 Paris threw up an automobile tariff against the United States, and Rome 
did, too; Canberra raised total import duties, New Delhi did, as well; Ottawa raised tariffs 
against the United States thrice; Swiss consumers wholesale boycotted American-made 
products.
275
 Switzerland was a notable, devastating case. Bern raised tariffs against 
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American automobiles, tires, gasoline, appliances, electronics, household equipment, 
office supplies, and meat in retaliation for Smoot-Hawley—and all of these industries 
were important American export and growth sectors in the Roaring Twenties.
276
 A 
complete list of retaliators is overwhelming, and it includes most of the world. In 1930, 
recall, there were fewer independent nation-states on the globe with the prevalence of 
colonial empires and commonwealths. Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Holland, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Poland, Romania, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, and others raised tariffs because of Smoot-Hawley.
277
 
The world erupted in an orgy of protectionism after June 1930. Conversely, the Smoot-
Hawley law was a part of a general trend towards higher tariffs in the late 1920s, but it 
greatly swelled this pattern. 
Swiss Trade (1930 to 1931) United States Entire World Difference 
Change in Imports (from) Down 29.6% Down 5.4% 24.2% 
Change in Exports (to) Down 30.5% Down 11.0% 19.5% 
 
Figure 3.4 – This table illustrates how the Smoot-Hawley tariff and Swiss retaliation (via 
tariffs and consumer boycotts) affected American-Swiss trade.
278
 Trade between these 
two nations declined at a higher rate from 1930 to 1931 than it did for the ―baseline‖ of 
the entire planet. Deflation and overall economic stagnation damaged the volume of 
international trade during the early Great Depression, granted. However, the above 
definitely demonstrates that policy changes (such as quotas and tariffs) had a 
considerable influence on trade‘s health, as well. 
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The world was a much more protected, autarkic place in 1929 through 1933 even 
without Smoot-Hawley. European governments gently inched their tariffs higher in the 
late 1920s in an effort to protect growth industries. Austria and Norway did in 1926; the 
Belgian Congo (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) did in 1927; Latvia, 
Palestine, Portugal, and the Portuguese West Africa (now Angola) did in 1928; Italy, 
Romania, Spain, and Turkey did so in 1929; the Soviet Union did in early 1930.
279
 On the 
other hand, increasing tariffs was not the absolute trend before Smoot-Hawley. France, 
Germany, and Switzerland revised their tariffs downwards in the same timeframe.
280
 
However, the Smoot-Hawley tariff kicked the protectionist bender into an overdrive, 
particularly in the British Empire. Australia (June 1930), India (March 1931), Canada 
(September 1930), the Gold Coast colony (now Ghana, June 1930), Iraq (November 
1930), New Zealand (July 1930), Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe, July 1930), and 
the British sections of China (January 1931) raised tariffs in reply to Smoot-Hawley.
281
 
Latin America was comparable. Argentina, Chile, Columbia, Cuba, and Mexico retaliated 
in the early 1931.
282
 The closing of the American market contributed to the economic 
slowdown in numerous countries, since it cost the world a key export market and access 
to cheap, plentiful raw materials and food.
283
 International trade helped turn national 
problems into a worldwide economic catastrophe. The most important trading partners of 
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the United States typically suffered the worse. Canada, especially, could not escape in 
terms of straightforward geography. 
Canada was advertently a target of Smoot-Hawley. The Canadian economy 
struggled to a disproportionate degree under higher American tariffs. The Liberal Party 
maintained a low tariff regime in the 1920s to incentivize economic development and 
encourage the export of Canadian agricultural products and raw materials—mostly to the 
United States.
284
 Hoover‘s approval of the Smoot-Hawley tariff startled Prime Minister 
William Lyon Mackenzie King and his Ottawa government.
285
 American foreign trade 
with Canada virtually evaporated after Smoot-Hawley. Certain industries and 
protectionist elements in Congress envied the power of Canadian farmers and miners on 
the American market, and they specifically used Smoot-Hawley to reclaim a share of that 
exchange.
286
 High tariffs affected diplomats, too. Smoot-Hawley pushed Canada closer to 
Britain and away from the United States in the short-term.
287
 Popular sentiments in 
Canada were predisposed to a high tariff for the sake of budding Canadian nationalism, 
independence from American culture, and an innate distrust of a combined ―North 
American‖ economy.288 As well, Smoot-Hawley annoyed the British Empire to the point 
it ultimately returned to a system of ―Imperial Preference‖—British colonies, dominions, 
and commonwealths allowed each other low tariffs and special trading relationships, 
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while commerce from outside of the British Empire faced high tariffs.
289
 Britain and its 
colonies adopted the Import Duties Act of 1932 to codify the system of Imperial 
Preference.
290
 London wanted to keep the empire together by keeping it as economically 
interdependent and autarkic to the rest of the world as possible.
291
 Europe, South 
America, and the United States lost major customers when tariffs congested the British 
Empire‘s markets. Understandably, Smoot-Hawley and retaliation thereafter (such as 
Imperial Preference) put American exporters in a tenuous position. 
 
Figure 3.5 – This figure shows the volume of eggs traded between the United States and 
Canada; it also shows the changes from 1930 to 1932, after Smoot-Hawley.
292
 
Washington increased the tariff on eggs from $0.08 to $0.10 per dozen in 1930, and then 
Britian and Canada raised tariffs from $0.03 to $0.10.
293
 Consequently, the American 
farmers who exported eggs to Canada were shutout of the Canadian market. In theory, 
American consumption could increase to consume the production formerly sold to 
Canadians. On the other hand, with no similar decline in Canadian egg exports and the 
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massive recession in the early Great Depression from 1929 to 1933, there was no way 
that export-oriented egg producers found themselves new American customers. 
 
Economic data reveals that Smoot-Hawely greatly damaged American export 
industries. To give the bottom line, 3.34% of the American economy depended on foreign 
trade in 1929.
294
 This was less than the world average; yet, given the United States‘ 
remoteness from European economies across the Atlantic, it is understandable. However, 
it was still a substantial quantity towards explaining the Great Depression and high 
unemployment. In concentrated industries, the numbers were worse. In automobile parts, 
exports declined from $541.4 million in 1929 to $90.6 million in 1933 (83.26% 
decrease); and for iron and steel production exports fell from $200.1 million down to 
$45.5 million (77.26% decrease).
295
 The collapse of trade hit heavy industries hard. 
Nonetheless, agriculture and extraction industries did not escape. Copper exported $183.4 
million in 1929, but by 1933 only $24.9 million (down 86.42%).
296
 Wheat farmers 
watched their exports tumble from $192.3 million in 1929 to $18.6 million in 1933 (down 
86.42%), and rubber exports fell from $77.0 million to $17.8 million (down 76.88%).
297
 
In addition, as eggs show, domestic markets were in no shape from 1929 to 1933 to make 
up the difference. Tariffs kept Americans from being able to buy foreign luxury goods. 
Luxury imports declined from $322.7 million to $207.5 million (July through December 
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1928 and 1930, respectively).
298
 Tariffs failed at protecting farmers, keeping domestic 
prices high, and could not overcome deflation. Corn sold at $0.10 to $0.20 per bushel in 
1932 despite a $0.25 per bushel tariff.
299
 Wheat sold at $0.30 per bushel even with a 
$0.42 per bushel import tax.
300
 The American farmer was increasing barred from 
overseas markets, and agriculturalists struggled accordingly. 
Ironically, agriculture—the segment of the American economy the Smoot-Hawley 
tariff was intended to protect—suffered the greatest injury. Much of the original intent of 
the bill was to balance costs and growth amid the agricultural and industrial sector. 
Protectionists though that  Smoot-Hawley would increase farm prices and increase input 
costs for urban corporations and enterprises.
301
 In an ideal world, the two sectors would 
grow together afterwards, at a measured pace. Unfortunately, this plan backfired and 
businesses had to pay higher prices and cut back on their own consumption.
302
 In effect, 
firms decreased their aggregate level of economic activity. Agricultural laborers, farmers, 
hired hands, and ranchers were all in the same boat in having to shoulder higher 
production costs, as well. In sum, the Smoot-Hawley tariff bill and the Great Depression-
era collapse of the international market harmed farmers. Agricultural exports totaled $1.8 
billion in 1929, but by 1933, they were down to $590 million, or a decline of 67.22% in 
just three years.
303
 Low prices, closing foreign markets, and a wreaked economy gave 
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farmers few places to turn. Farmers lost customers for their production due to 
protectionism.
304
 Peter Fearon noted that, ―The general view was, however, that Hawley-
Smoot did very little, if anything, to help the US farmer.‖305 Smoot-Hawley did the most 
to help its benefactors in New England and industrial plants in competition with Europe. 
Nonetheless, high tariffs on the international market harmed businesses across the whole 
of the United States. 
The question remains: was the decline in international trade from 1929 to 1933 
due to trade policy or general economic stagnation? Defenders of protectionism and 
Smoot-Hawley, including Hoover, charged that the sheer size of the Great Depression 
hurt American exports far more than retaliatory tariffs. However, empirical data and 
economic statistics can resolve this issue by decomposing the role played by the cyclical, 
monetary, and trade policy factors (like tariffs and quotas) involved with the decline of 
the volume of international trade from 1928 to 1933. Econometric research with full, 
panel data isolates these inputs and shows the exact level of responsibility due to tariffs. 
For context, the worst year for trade was 1931, and world exports declined 21% from 
1930 to 1931.
306
 The total fall from the high point of 1928 totaled 32% in 1931, and there 
were still declines in 1932 and 1933.
307
 The feeble economy played a role in creating this 
situation, but policymaking and tariffs were vital, too. The decline in world trade from 
1929 to 1933 totaled 33%.
308
 Of that, 14% of the decline was due to reduced real 
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incomes, 8% due to tariffs, 5% due to deflationary pressures, and 6% due to quotas.
309
 
Essentially, 41% of the decline in trade volume in the Great Depression was due to 
voluntary, human policy actions and the other 59% was due to general economic 
conditions, deflation, and stagnation.
310
 Granted, most of the Great Depression came 
outside of the realm of trade economics, but higher tariffs still hobbled a struggling 
economy all over the planet. 
 July-December 1928 July-December 1930 Percentage  
Total Imports 2005.5 1325.1 -34.0% 
Free Imports 1262.0 897.0 -29.0% 
Dutiable Imports 743.0 428.0 -42.0% 
 
Figure 3.6 – The above shows the total value of imports into the United States for the 
second half of 1928 (before Smoot-Hawley) and the second half of 1930 (after Smoot-
Hawley).
311
 The figures are in millions of nominal dollars. The economic decline sapped 
American‘s ability and desire to buy imported goods, but higher tariffs on dutiable goods 
meant goods affected by Smoot-Hawley saw their export numbers disproportionately fall. 
Therefore, tariffs had an appreciable influence. 
 
* * * 
The Smoot-Hawley tariff exacerbated the Great Depression, created a trade war, 
and left the international market in shambles throughout the world in the early 1930s. 
Trade policy was always an important issue in early American history, and it continued to 
be a controversial and vital subject through the Great War and the Roaring Twenties. 
Herbert Hoover came to the office of the presidency to find an economic crisis on his 
hands, and a part of his response was the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930. Smoot-Hawley 
made American tariffs the highest in their history, and went far beyond even the 
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protectionism of the older Fordney-McCumber tariff. Nonetheless, the monetary policy 
and the trade war after the passage of the Smoot-Hawley kept the economy from 
recovering. From 1929 to 1933, economic output and employment numbers declined by a 
third as a part of the Great Depression. There were many economic crises in the United 
States in the early 1930s, but economic data shows that international trade suffered more 
than its ―fair share‖ due to high tariffs and protectionism. Hoover went down in disgrace 
and defeat in the election of 1932, though he still considered tariffs crucial decades later. 
Roosevelt entered the White House, and American history took a distinct turn. 
Importantly, however, Smoot-Hawley marked a clear and distinct contrast with the policy 
of the new Roosevelt administration and the approaching Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Act of 1934. 
75 
CHAPTER 4: CORDELL HULL 
Cordell Hull, originally a Congressman and Senator from Tennessee, came to the 
helm of American foreign and trade policy in 1933. President Franklin Roosevelt selected 
Hull to the post of Secretary of State for a number of reasons, not the least of which was 
Hull‘s established record on free trade. Unfortunately, for Hull, significant elements of 
the White House did not accept the free trade position in 1933 and 1934. Through these 
years, Hull had to battle against ―economic nationalists‖—fellow New Dealers who 
favored control of the domestic economy through Washington and not the economic 
freedom of open commercial relations over national boundaries. The nationalists wanted 
tariffs and quotas; Hull did not. Hull came to office with the Great Depression on his 
hands, but the Hoover administration handed him an opportunity in the form of the World 
Economic Conference in London in summer 1933. Nevertheless, a frightened world was 
not interested in trade liberalization in the early Great Depression, and protectionist 
interests undermined Hull in Washington and with Roosevelt. Hull was one of the 
significant members of Roosevelt‘s cabinet and himself a New Dealer, though scholars 
do not usually count him as such. Considering Hull‘s life and political career from the 
beginning maximizes the total understanding of the role he played in the 1930s, the Great 
Depression, and the New Deal. He was a free trader, to his absolute intellectual and 
political core, in ways few politicians were. Roosevelt‘s choice for Hull as Secretary of 
State showed the role free trade played in the New Deal. Yet, the academic profession 
somehow neglected him. There needs to be a redressing of this problem for the history of 
the New Deal and the 1930s. 
76 
Hull’s Early Career 
Hull was the world‘s utmost champion of a free international economy in the 
early part of the twentieth-century. He enjoyed a long, prosperous public career in law 
and legislation before 1933 and the Roosevelt administration. He gave his first political 
speech in 1888, at the age of eighteen, on the tariff.
312
 He supported Grover Cleveland 
(D-NY) over Benjamin Harrison (R-IN) because of Cleveland‘s support for a lower 
tariff.
313
 Originally, Hull‘s buttressing of free trade in his youth was a product of regional 
identity. The South opposed tariffs essentially since the American Revolutionary War. 
Harold Hinton wrote, ―Tariff and treason were still practically synonymous in the 
vocabulary of Southern Democracy.‖314 Trade policy regionalized American politics. 
Agriculture, extraction-based, and export-driven areas in the Midwestern plains, the 
South, and the Mountain West favored international trade.
315
 On the other hand, the 
Northeast and the basin around the Great Lakes (which had a greater concentration of 
industrial activity) wanted protectionism to limit foreign competition.
316
 In his personal 
life, Hull was very austere, conservative, serious, and traditional. This colored his view of 
politics and American society. For example, in a campaign speech for Senate in 1930, he 
lambasted, ―joy riders, jazz seekers, and pleasure and amusement lovers‖ amid the other 
epicurean, hedonistic excesses of the Roaring Twenties.
317
 His advancement of the free 
trade agenda fulfilled a critical role in the Democratic Party from the 1910s to the 1940s. 
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Hull‘s vision could be potent, and he had a number of reasons for favoring liberalized 
trade relationships past regionalism. 
Hull had a practical understanding of what international trade meant to the United 
States and the rest of the world in economic and diplomatic terms. His viewpoint on the 
empirical and theoretical arguments for free trade matured by the time he entered 
Congress after the election of 1906. Initially, he opposed higher tariffs to encourage 
lower domestic prices for consumers and competition against monopolies.
318
 In Hull‘s 
mind, a trust only existed when a high, protective tariff shielded it from overseas 
competitors. Hull, as well, felt tariffs were a tax on consumers, as they forced them to pay 
higher prices for the benefit of connected, protected industries—hence, Hull‘s belief 
system dovetailed nicely with Progressivism and Progressive advocates in the New Deal 
coalition.
319
 As years passed in Congress, Hull added to his liberal orthodoxy on free 
trade. He developed arguments for trade based on a forthright diplomacy, global 
prosperity, and the prevention of war through economic interdependence.
320
 On top, Hull 
saw American foreign trade as ―entangling,‖ but in a good way. Trade gave businesses all 
over the world a stake in the peaceful flow of commerce. In addition, free trade helped to 
eliminate diversified, self-contained national economies, which aggressors needed to 
fight an industrial war. Conversely, purely on economics, Hull was not flawless. He 
always stressed the marketability of American goods in foreign markets and the necessity 
                                                 
318
 Hull, The Memoirs, 1:81. 
319
 William R. Allen, ―The International Trade Philosophy of Cordell Hull, 1907-1933,‖ The American 
Economic Review 43:1 (Mar. 1953), 108. 
320
 Hull, The Memoirs, 1:81. 
78 
of cheap raw materials for industry.
321
 He idealized trade at times and never seriously 
considered the threat it posed to established industries and American employment (at 
least in the short-term). Moving from autarky to free trade required adjustment, and Hull 
never included that in his established paradigm. 
Hull‘s beliefs about international trade could be incomplete or intransigent, at 
times, in a diplomatic sense. The future Secretary of State held deep precepts, and these 
determined many of his decisions. One particular contention was the most-favored nation 
(MFN) principle.
322
 MFN is a standard of international trade law and theory. In 
definition, MFN works such that if one nation gives a ―most-favored nation‖ (that is, a 
trading partner of MFN status) a concession on a tariff, then it must extend the 
concession to all countries on its MFN list. There are several benefits to the MFN 
principle from an economic standpoint. Foremost, it fosters an ―equality of treatment‖ 
between different nations. This means that firms and consumers are able to make 
decisions on purchases in efficient terms, as MFN means no potential suppliers appear 
artificially cheap or expensive due to quotas or tariffs. Additionally, MFN expands the 
access of smaller countries to the international market; otherwise, they lack the 
bargaining power with larger nations to lower their tariffs. Hull, via MFN, hoped to 
spread liberalization and to place pressure on protectionist governments. Namely, he 
utilized MFN to combat, ―exchange and quota controls, preferential tariffs, stand-still 
agreements, direct barter, and complete embargoes, to mention only a few.‖323 Imperial 
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Preference was the biggest contrast to MFN in the 1930s, and Hull hated the idea of 
―special relationships‖ in the global economy. He fumed against the British effort to 
cordon the empire off from the rest of the world. Later, he used Lend-Lease as an 
incentive for London, Ottawa, Canberra, and the other capitals of the empire to leave 
Imperial Preference.
324
 This kind of rigidity could cause some problems in the diplomatic 
amphitheater. 
Hull had an active legislative record in the House of Representatives from 1907 to 
1931 and the Senate from 1931 to 1933. He was routinely on the leading edge of 
economics, tariffs, and trade-related issues. Hull and the Democratic Party of the 1910s 
came into the sun after the election of 1912 and Woodrow Wilson‘s ascension to the 
presidency (the first Democrat in the White House since Cleveland in 1897, and only the 
second since President Andrew Johnson in the 1860s). He admired Wilson professionally 
and personally, owing to Wilson‘s support for a low tariff.325 Beyond tariffs, Hull had 
something to offer to the Wilson administration. Hull was a chief proponent of replacing 
tariff revenues with an income tax in the federal budget.
326
 He designed a structure to 
lower tariffs sine qua non, but also for the case of a national, wartime emergency. The 
volume of international commerce always declined severely whenever a war erupted. Up 
to the 1910s, the United States avoided disruptions, but a massive portion of the federal 
budget (before the passage of the 16
th
 Amendment in 1913) drew from tariff revenues. 
Therefore, in the event of a major war, trade would vanish, and Washington‘s source of 
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money with it. Hull wished to avoid such a nasty eventuality by shifting the tax burden 
onto the stability of incomes. He was an architect of the income tax system and, by 
extension, its use in the 1930s to further social outcomes.
327
 Hull was active on trade in 
the 1910s. He argued for trade in 1916 and stood by the side of Wilsonian 
internationalists.
328
 After 1916, he started to help to steer the decisions out of the Wilson 
administration itself. 
He was a nexus of American trade policy between Congress and the White House 
after 1916. He helped the Red Cross and similar charitable organizations receive an 
exemption from paying import duties during the Great War in July 1918.
329
 The terrible 
war in Europe and the American entry to the conflict as an associated power in April 
1917 put a lot on the negotiating table regarding international trade. In 1916, for example, 
Hull submitted a proposal to Wilson and the Department of State for a world conference 
after the war to fasten an agreement and an international clearinghouse to foster trade 
liberalization in the 1920s.
330
 Unhappily, for Hull, nothing came of this arrangement in 
the quarrelsome negotiations at Versailles in 1919. Yet, his conception tracks similarly to 
the modern WTO and, its antecedent, the GATT. Later in life, he believed that he 
influenced Wilson‘s famous Fourteen Points—predominantly the third one. To iterate 
three, ―(1) Open covenants of peace, no private/national understandings, (2) Freedom of 
navigation in peace and war outside territorial waters, (3) The removal, so far as possible, 
of all economic barriers and the establishment of equality of trade conditions among all 
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the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.‖331 
Free trade and liberal internationalism imbued the first two points. Wilson‘s third point is 
a powerful endorsement of Hull‘s free trade ideology and the MFN principle. The 
Democratic Party‘s mantle on free trade fell to him in the 1920s after Wilson suffered an 
incapacitating stroke in 1919. 
Hull became a power player in Democratic politics in the 1920s. Wilson was out 
of the picture, and much of the party leadership fell in the electoral debacle of 1920. 
Thus, Hull and his younger cohorts moved up. He chaired the Democratic National 
Committee from 1921 to 1924. He was a potential presidential nominee in 1928 and 
1932, but Al Smith‘s machinations and the political success of Franklin Roosevelt put an 
end to those possibilities.
332
 Hull bitterly despised the Republican Party on the tariff 
question in the 1920s. He accused the majority party of trading tariff protections for 
campaign contributions, and he detested how Republicans made any attempt at trade 
liberalization impossible.
333
 He was 100% a Democrat, for all the party did. In the 1920s 
and 1930s, the Democratic Party and Democrats in Congress drew most of their ideas 
about trade policy from him: ―Thus, the ideas on trade and international relations 
generally which we have reviewed [Hull‘s] furnished the philosophy of much of 
America‘s foreign policy during the New Deal period.‖334 He was a kingmaker in 1932. 
After Hull was out of the race for the Democratic presidential nomination, he threw his 
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support behind Governor Roosevelt.
335
 The South and agriculturalists (favorable to Hull) 
backed Roosevelt, and he garnered the Democratic Party‘s nomination with their 
sustenance.
336
 Hoover offered little resistance in 1932, so Hull essentially helped make 
Roosevelt the next president. This was not the last time the two dealt with one and other, 
but it was far from the first time for Hull and Roosevelt, as well. 
Roosevelt and Hull were both the intellectual and political children of Wilson, 
and their experiences with the Wilson administration in the 1910s tied them together. 
Roosevelt supported Wilson for the Democratic nomination in 1912. He supported him 
again in the general election over William H. Taft and Theodore Roosevelt (NY-
Progressive)—part of his own family.337 Wilson rewarded the young Franklin Roosevelt 
with the post of Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 1913 to 1920. Roosevelt served 
through the Great War, and he found the Fourteen Points brilliant.
338
 Roosevelt and Hull 
became familiar with each other during the 1910s, and Hull shared Roosevelt‘s 
assessment of Wilson. They both believed that Versailles failed to create a permanent, 
visible ―community of nations‖ and anticipated the potential for another big war.339 
Additionally, they wanted a stronger League of Nations and open trade relationships to 
foster a lasting peace.
340
 Roosevelt was the unsuccessful Democratic nominee for Vice 
President in 1920 against Senator Warren G. Harding. Nonetheless, he maintained 
ambitions for national office, despite his defeat. Hull, still in Congress throughout the 
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1920s, became a ―watchdog‖ for the New York governor in Washington.341 He met with 
Roosevelt from 1928 to 1933 and helped Roosevelt forge alliances amongst Senator 
Thomas J. Walsh (D-MT, future Attorney General-designate) and Congressman Henry T. 
Rainey (D-IL, future Speaker of the House) in preparation for a run in 1932.
342
 
Roosevelt‘s ideological infrastructure on economic policy, as much as he had any, 
frequently changed. Yet, during this time, Hull believed Roosevelt shared his beliefs 
about liberal internationalism and trade.
343
 
Hull was a leader in Congress on the tariff in the 1920s. The Republican majority 
of the decade kept him from making much progress on trade liberalization, on the other 
hand. To put it in Hull‘s words: ―I was to plead again and again for these principles of 
freer trade throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s, and then in my years as Secretary of 
State.‖344 He parlayed his tenure in the House into a Senate seat in 1930, mostly owing to 
strong support from agriculturalists in eastern Tennessee. Farmers supported him for his 
record: he voted for the rural credits system, agricultural relief, discounted wholesaling, 
discounted warehousing, federal marketing of farm products abroad, the Federal Farm 
Board, and other pieces of farm legislation.
345
 Free trade drew support from agricultural 
elements, as well. Farmers realized that the United States was one of the world‘s 
foremost food producers; hence, the country needed foreign markets to avoid a glut in the 
rural economy. Hull fought back against the Smoot-Hawley tariff. He introduced a clause 
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into the revenue bill of 1932 that prohibited any further tariff increases in Washington for 
the next two years.
346
 Two years were (hopefully) long enough to force Hoover out of 
office and Congress into Democratic hands. The idea of a tariff ―truce‖ enjoyed some 
popularity in summer 1932, and he returned to the idea in the autumn when he became 
Secretary of State-designate. Conversely, Hull‘s amendment went down 42-35 in the 
Senate on straight party lines (outside of two Democratic defectors).
347
 He was unable to 
push tariffs lower in the early 1930s. Of course, Smoot-Hawley was the obvious target of 
Hull‘s exasperations. 
The Smoot-Hawley law was a proximate impetus for the Great Depression in 
libertarian, Wilsonian, internationalist, and 1930s liberal thinking. Ironically, with 
Smoot-Hawley, Hull had a front row seat to proceedings. He first entered the Senate, 
already with sterling credentials as a free trader, in 1933. His committees included the 
Senate Committee on Finance—with Senator Reed Smoot as chair.348 Luckily, Hull 
missed the actual drafting, editing, debating, committee work, approval, and passage of 
the Smoot-Hawley bill by a year. Nevertheless, he worked in the immediate aftermath of 
Smoot-Hawley in the committee and within the context of the general economic crisis. 
He believed that the stock market crash of 1929 and the economic crunch of 1932 were 
trade-related; ―international trade withered‖ after Smoot-Hawley, which caused a 
collapse in domestic prices as exporters lost their customers and flooded the American 
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market with goods.
349
 Overall, he thought the cataclysm happened because of bad 
policymaking—in other words, high tariffs.350 Wilsonian internationalists considered 
Smoot-Hawley ―onerous‖ or ―repugnant.‖351 These charges contain more than a kernel of 
truth, as per economic analysis. On the other hand, the Great Depression involved a 
colossal world economy and not just the trade market. He neglected important 
bellwethers outside of trade policy. For instance, in 1929, he blamed the Wilson 
administration and the Republican majority‘s inability to lead the world away from 
protectionism for the stock market crash.
352
 Here, he tried to fix a rivet on a sinking ship. 
He made a salient point, but it was narrow. He ignored the vital cyclical, monetary, and 
secular factors influencing the economy. Hull was never perfect in his economic theory, 
but he was in a position to make things happen after 1933. 
Hull and the New Deal 
Roosevelt campaigned hard against Hoover on trade policy in 1932. Roosevelt 
found an opening with Smoot-Hawley, and he exploited it. In the end, essentially, the 
American people picked a promised trade liberalizer over a known protectionist. The 
ticket of Roosevelt and John Nance Garner (also known as ―Cactus Jack,‖ D-TX, Speaker 
of the House from 1931 until 1933) ran on a platform of balanced budgets, reciprocal 
trade, and currency stability—these were clean breaks from the Hoover administration, 
and they brought internationalists like Hull and Newton D. Baker on board. Wilsonians 
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and internationalists influenced the Roosevelt campaign in two ways: they prompted 
Roosevelt to attack Smoot-Hawley, and they led him to call for a plan of reciprocal trade 
agreements to replace Smoot-Hawley‘s protectionism.353 Roosevelt agreed with this 
assessment. To let the mouse roar for himself, he said in a speech that, ―Furthermore, 
when our Smoot-Hawley Tariff Law went into effect three years ago, over the protest of 
thousands of our own [executives] and farmers, the foreign nations, by way of retaliation, 
raised high tariff fences of their own.‖354 As an economic policymaker, Roosevelt was 
protean. However, in the statement, Roosevelt was against Smoot-Hawley in the heart of 
an industrialized, protectionist state in the Northeast. New York was his home, but the 
political economy of trade still had an influence. To demonstrate, Secretary of Commerce 
Hoover won New York in the election of 1928 over Al Smith—its own governor. Hoover 
came from the protectionist administrations of Harding and Coolidge, and he claimed 
their mantle. Roosevelt demonized Hoover on the Smoot-Hawley tariff, but he was not 
always consistent on the issue.
355
 Roosevelt‘s choice of Hull for Secretary of State 
removed much of his new administration‘s ambiguity when it came to their forthcoming 
reciprocal trade policy and the New Deal. 
There was a mixed reply to Roosevelt‘s selection of Hull for Secretary of State in 
1932. The Roaring Twenties, the ―Panic of 1929,‖ the Smoot-Hawley tariff, and the 
splendid election of 1932 launched a tariff debate inside of the Democratic Party in the 
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early 1930s. Regionalism dominated the discussion. The South and Midwest wanted 
lower tariffs in order to expand their farm exports, while the Northeast and heavy 
industries wished for high tariffs (Smoot-Hawley) to exclude foreign competition.
356
 The 
New Deal political coalition drew support from all over the country; Roosevelt won all 
but six states in 1932. Roosevelt‘s selection of Hull was, initially, a forceful endorsement 
of trade on the part of president-elect and the New Deal. Republicans, protectionist 
Democrats, and economic nationalists recognized that. Rauch wrote, ―It was not expected 
that Secretary Hull, the country‘s outstanding advocate of low tariffs for a generation, 
would allow the opportunity to achieve his lifetime purpose go to waste.‖357 These 
oppositional groups knew Hull‘s principles on trade policy, and they objected to his new, 
powerful pulpit at the Department of State. From there, Hull could turn free trading 
ideology into defined goals of trade liberalization for the United States. He was the first 
internationalists in such a high office since 1921. Hull and the opposition alike knew 
tariffs had a profound influence on the American economy and foreign policy. For 
measure, Hull considered trade an issue of both diplomacy and domestic 
policymaking.
358
 This ―lack of distinction‖ on his part was critical, as later scholars of the 
New Deal tended to unwisely consider them separately. 
Hull, once entrenched in the Department of State in 1933, believed that the 
expansion of international commerce would do well for the American economy and 
diplomacy. He thought not only of vague notions of ―prosperity,‖ as he provided hard 
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numbers (of whatever accuracy) on recoverable growth and potential employment. He led 
the Department of State in the 1930s in the conviction that there was room for a $20 
billion expansion of international trade—plenty of space for new business ventures, 
commercial opportunities, and employment for 12 million to 14 million people 
worldwide.
359
 In 1930, gross world product totaled $287.98 billion in nominal dollars.
360
 
With $20 billion, he believed that a 6.945% expansion in the total world economy was 
possible alone from trade liberalization. This figure is impressive, even in the context of 
the total decline of the Great Depression. Such hopes were at least optimistic, if not 
wildly fanciful, and he was vague about where the jobs would come from.
361
 However, 
the accuracy of the figures was immaterial—he believed them, and he utilized them to 
manage the Department of State and the United States‘ economic diplomacy in the 1930s. 
To quote Murray N. Rothbard here, Hull believed that, ―The political lineup follows the 
economic lineup.‖362 He firmly believed lower tariffs and open trade relationships begat 
prosperity and peace.
363
 He was a partisan of Wilson and the Fourteen Points to the end. 
Moreover, beyond his influence on trade policy, he was an important figure in the politics 
and policy of the New Deal. 
Hull was nationally popular by 1932, and Roosevelt harnessed his reputation by 
inviting him into the cabinet. Foremost, he simply looked the part of an ―elder 
                                                 
359
 Ibid., 1:521. 
360
 J. Bradford DeLong, ――Estimating World GDP, One Million B.C. – Present,‖ University of California-
Berkeley, http://econ161.berkeley.edu/TCEH/1998_Draft/World_GDP/Estimating_World_GDP.html. 
361
 Hull, The Memoirs, 1:521. 
362
 Murray N. Rothbard, The New Deal and the International Monetary System‖ in Watershed of Empire: 
Essays on New Deal Foreign Policy eds. Leonard P. Liggio and James J. Martin, 19-64 (Colorado Springs, 
CO: Ralph Myles, 1976), 47. 
363
 Rosen, Roosevelt, the Great Depression, and the Economics of Recovery, 30. 
89 
statesman,‖ and Hull‘s countenance upheld it well.364 Voters enjoyed Hull‘s subdued and 
sage personality in contrast to the suave Roosevelt and the younger, fresher, newer 
members of the Roosevelt administration—many of which looked too ―ethnic‖ or Jewish 
for national comfort.
365
 Hull‘s name carried some weight in Congress when it came to 
legislation.
366
 Hence, Roosevelt hoped Hull‘s connections and network in Congress 
would help pass contentious bills in 1933. As a longtime Congressman and Senator, 
Hull‘s presence in the cabinet would be homage to the authority of the legislative branch. 
Additionally, his position in the Department of State would deflect criticisms of the New 
Deal on its concentration of power in the executive branch. Most of the Roosevelt 
administration focused on domestic economics, so Hull was free to lead on the tariff 
question.
367
 His popularity grew in time with success at the Montevideo Conference, with 
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, and the signing of trade deals throughout 
the 1930s and 1940s.
368
 Secretary of State Hull made a statement on the part of the 
Roosevelt administration in support of freer trade under the New Deal, and it harkened to 
the Wilson administration of the 1910s before the Great War. The White House‘s image 
was essential, but Hull offered other benefits, too. 
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Figure 4.1 – This photograph of Hull, taken sometime in the 1930s, is from his tenure as 
the Secretary of State.
369
 Most of the New Dealers were new to government and rather 
youthful. The experienced Hull provided a counterweight to accusations of amateurism in 
the administration. Moreover, he looked the part of a ―southern gentleman,‖ which 
helped with that constituency. 
 
Hull enhanced the Roosevelt administration‘s regional balance. Roosevelt wanted 
his new government to reflect representative sections of American religions, ideologies, 
academic disciplines, geographical arenas, and subject expertise.
370
 Geography was an 
important element. Roosevelt hailed from the Northeast, and much of the remainder of 
the administration came from somewhere in New England, or perhaps they had passed 
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through prominent universities on the eastern seaboard. Hull, however, was a confirmed 
southerner and earned his degrees at a regional institution. Hull, Claude Swanson of 
Virginia (Secretary of the Navy, 1933 to 1939), and Daniel Roper of South Carolina 
(Secretary of Commerce, 1933 to 1938) offered regional balance with the otherwise 
severely Northeastern administration.
371
 Hull was a protagonist in this approach. 
Roosevelt planned for the Secretary of State-designate to create support from the older 
wing of the Democratic Party in the South, as well as from Wilsonian Democrats who 
wanted free trade and an internationalist foreign policy.
372
 In a world of interest groups, 
Hull and his seat in the cabinet formed the cornerstone of the New Deal‘s appeal to these 
factions. Trade was not the only issue in this situation, but tariffs still played a part in the 
politics of export-oriented states and in the South. Hull‘s policies added to the totality of 
the New Deal, and his experience and responsibilities merged with the national politics of 
the 1930s. 
The World Economic Conference 
The first predicament in Hull‘s inbox as the Secretary of State-designate was the 
World Economic Conference of 1933. The World Economic Conference, henceforth 
called the London Conference, was a major opportunity for trade liberalization at the 
nadir of the Great Depression. Conversely, it was a product of the Hoover administration, 
and it was something of a headache from the start. Hoover called for an international 
conference to address the effects of the Great Depression. The meeting, eventually held 
under President Roosevelt, acutely failed for many reasons. The summit took place from 
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June 12, 1933 to July 27, 1933 at the Geological Museum in London. The London 
Conference had three objectives: (1) addressing the imbalances created by the Great War 
and war debts; (2) stabilizing currencies; (3) reducing tariffs and restrictions on the flow 
of international trade.
373
 In particular, Hull highlighted the third point, and he yearned for 
an international agreement on trade liberalization during the economic crisis. No 
substantial agreement or work came to fulfillment on any of these issues, and historians 
universally agree the London Conference abjectly failed. Foremost, it was too late to save 
the world economy from the worst of the crisis by summer 1933. Roosevelt disliked the 
idea of the conference in private as a ―relic‖ of Hoover, and he did not want to deal with 
its high expectations so early in his first term. Conversely, Roosevelt publically supported 
the restoration of the international market in April 1933, before the symposium, plus 
―practical reciprocal tariff agreements […] to break through trade barriers and establish 
foreign markets for farm and industrial products.‖374 Smoot-Hawley induced autarky, and 
the letdown at the London Conference made the New Deal look increasingly domestic to 
commentators in analysis. Nonetheless, Hull‘s failure in London was the exception in the 
1930s, and not the typical rule. 
Hull engendered several developments on trade before the London Conference. 
Notably, he called for a tariff ―armistice‖ after the elections in November, and he then 
asked for a 10% reduction in all tariffs by governments as a mark of good faith before 
London.
375
 The former held well; the latter never materialized. Nonetheless, he had a 
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small cache of goodwill before the London Conference the next year. To quote Hull 
about the suggestion of a tariff truce, which he tendered on December 4, 1932, ―One was 
a truce on further increases in tariffs and similar trade obstructions; the second was a 
horizontal reduction of 10 per cent in all permanent tariff rates of all countries—both 
proposals to be made by our Government.‖376 Furthermore, he then brought Roosevelt a 
draft version of a reciprocal trade bill during the Hundred Days. He intended that a 
―Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1933‖ should pass Congress before or during the 
London Conference.
377
 He wanted to evacuate from Smoot-Hawley protectionism, and he 
wanted the ability to reduce American tariffs in reciprocation to similar liberalizations 
from the remainder of the world. Hull hoped to show leadership on the part of the United 
States through the ―ceasefire‖ and trade legislation in 1933.378 While solid, in theory, this 
design ran into immediate problems. The First New Deal (of 1933 and early 1934) sought 
domestic recovery primarily through the ―reflation‖ of prices—in other words, inflation 
via currency controls, cartelization (the NRA), and government price guarantees (the 
AAA).
379
 Ergo, certain elements around Roosevelt in the White House believed cheap 
foreign imports decreased domestic prices and ruined the efforts at reflation. Roosevelt‘s 
lack of resoluteness did not assist. 
Roosevelt left the London Conference drifting in the tide and marooned on a 
sandbar. His method of governance preferred the delegation of responsibility to 
subordinates and, oftentimes, in contradictory ways. Additionally, Roosevelt lacked clear, 
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deep, defining convictions about the economy and policy. Roosevelt had limited 
experience and familiarity with economists‘ dogma; therefore, access to the president was 
always vital.
380
 Roosevelt frequently mirrored what those around him said about 
economics—while they were in the room—and then changed when the next advisor met 
with him, and he reverted back to tabula rasa afterwards.
381
 He liked to rely on intuition 
when making decisions, despite the unsystematic results, and he disliked the research 
necessary to gain much knowledge on a subject.
382
 Economic nationalists favored the 
NRA, the AAA, and they were lukewarm on reciprocal trade. Yet, they controlled access 
to the president in 1933, and thus they proscribed most of his economic thoughts.
383
 Hull 
was busy with his job as Secretary of State, and he left the country to lead the American 
delegation to the conference in the summer of 1933. He only had a telegraph thereafter, 
which was a disadvantage compared to real contact with a gregarious person like 
Roosevelt. As well, Roosevelt sometimes distrusted famous and independent political 
figures, like Hull, since they did not depend on him for their notoriety.
384
 It seems 
Roosevelt never felt ―right‖ about the London Conference, which was good enough for 
him. James E. Sargent comments, ―Roosevelt‘s thinking about methods of making 
foreign policy during the Hundred Days was informal, improvised, and even 
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haphazard.‖385 He was not alone, and other parts of the Roosevelt administration shared 
his overall distrust of the world economic gathering in England in 1933. 
The early Roosevelt administration of 1933 and 1934 was a divided place, in spite 
of its reputation for legislative success in the Hundred Days. Since he did not have policy 
expertise himself, Roosevelt preferred it that way. He wanted the interest groups of the 
Democratic Party to come together, argue their points before him, and (in the manner of 
George Washington amid Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson) he would make the 
final decision.
386
 As a result, the First New Deal was confused and inefficient before the 
kinks in the system worked out. This was true with trade and the London Conference.
387
 
Roosevelt and his administration were popular, though, since they were at least ―doing 
something‖ to address the calamity.388 To quote Arthur Schlesinger, ―Even conservatives 
joined the applause.‖389 The White House divided into two camps over the London 
Conference. Hull and the internationalists imagined that London could resuscitate the 
international market, rebuild trade in North America and the North Atlantic, and 
reconnect the economy to the rest of the world.
390
 Economic nationalists (led by 
Undersecretary of State Raymond Moley, placed tenuously as Hull‘s immediate 
subordinate) did not reject free trade out of hand, but they wished to develop an ―internal 
economy‖ before branching out into the remainder of the globe.391 In the end, under the 
sway of the economic nationalists, Roosevelt rejected the London Conference because he 
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felt inflation at home—and not trade abroad—was the path to economic recovery in 
1933.
392
 Hence, the nationalists won in 1933, but Hull was not alone with his push for 
reciprocal trade in the Democratic Party. 
Hull was far from the last liberal internationalist, Wilsonian, or free trader in the 
1930s. For instance, Congressman Sam D. McReynolds (D-TN), the chair of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee from 1931 to 1941, accompanied Hull to London. 
McReynolds believed roughly the same things as Hull about trade policy. He articulated 
the American objectives for the meeting under Hull: ―We went there hopeful that we 
might put an end to disastrous nationalism which is hampering the movement of world 
trade, and the speeches made at the opening session added confidence to this belief.‖393 
Hull and McReynolds were natural political allies—they were both from Tennessee, had 
rural backgrounds, attended Cumberland University to study law, and rose to national 
prominence. McReynolds was an obvious one, but Hull had other allies. The appeal of 
liberal internationalism, Wilson‘s heritage, Hull‘s vocation in Congress, and his identity 
as a southerner added to the appeal of the London Conference for Americans. They added 
to the New Deal, as well. Illustratively, McReynolds eventually blamed the failure of the 
conference on the obstructionism from countries on the gold standard—not on Roosevelt, 
which would have been a criticism of the head of the New Deal coalition.
394
 Gold is 
deflationary as a currency; American and British inflationary policies snagged 
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negotiations. Sans consensus on monetary policy, no breakthroughs were possible on 
tariffs, despite a level of receptiveness to liberalization around the world after Smoot-
Hawley‘s trade war.395 There were conflicts and disagreement within the Democratic 
Party over the conference, but the globe itself had irresolvable differences about the 
question of metallic currencies, exchanges, and inflation. 
Diplomatic, economic, political, and social forces in the world harmed the 
prospects for a meaningful trade deal in London before Hull even left for the conference. 
In the United States, the AAA raised a small tariff on foreign fiber production imported 
into the country in early 1933, which embarrassed Hull and the American position as 
hypocritical.
396
 Washington‘s stance was bad after Smoot-Hawley, but Hull could claim 
he represented the wishes of a new government. However, minor tariff increases from 
executive agencies undermined his claim in negotiations. The AAA wanted high 
domestic prices, and cheap foreign imports could easily flood the market and drive prices 
downwards. Yet, by its actions, the AAA broke the tariff truce, and countries threatened 
more retaliation against American corn and wheat exports.
397
 Britain, with a higher level 
of government intervention in the economy and a more active central bank, had a similar 
plan to spur recovery through ―reflation.‖ London and capitals throughout the empire 
preferred to keep domestic prices high and to preserve solidarity via Imperial Preference, 
and they were not too keen on reciprocal trade.
398
 The British Empire feared that 
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liberalization would create further deflation and uncouple its political dominion. In 
particular, Roosevelt was jealous of the British for being the first to leave the gold 
standard and supposedly ―reflating‖ their depressed prices back to a prosperous level.399 
Roosevelt wanted to do it, as well. Regarding trade, many countries preferred bilateral or 
regional trade deals (which involved two or a similarly small number of nations) instead 
of the one ―fell swoop‖ envisioned by Hull.400 Hull‘s ambition for worldwide reductions 
in tariffs and quotas had to wait because he made little progress once he arrived to the 
London Conference itself. 
The London Conference came to naught. Hull could not make it work. Some 
scholars, like Amity Shlaes, described Hull‘s effort there as Herculean: Roosevelt sent 
him to work on trade liberalization—the exertion of Hull‘s life—and to ―undo the 
damage of Smoot-Hawley.‖401 In reality, circumstances probably set him up to fail, and 
his level of effort was rather irrelevant. Economist nationalists and a lukewarm Roosevelt 
harassed Hull from behind, the flanks caved as the currency debate stalled, and virtually 
nobody wanted to talk about trade liberalization while monetary policy went nowhere. 
The deflation/inflation battle raged, and Hull was stuck. Potter summarized, ―In June the 
American delegation led by Cordell Hull arrived in London for the negotiations, but early 
in July Roosevelt sent a message which amount to American repudiation of the 
conference.‖402 However, the point remains the United States, with the largest economy 
in the world in the 1930s, needed to demonstrate leadership in a crisis for the sake of 
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international trade and the global economy.
403
 The emergence of the veneer of autarky in 
New Deal policy after the London Conference helped to cause the neglect of the trade 
story in the historiography of the 1930s. The year 1933 was a low water mark but only 
the start. Hull returned to tariffs and trade at places like the Montevideo Conference—
where tariffs and international trade were the first issues on the table.
404
 An intramural 
fight inside of the American delegation terminated the chances Hull had in London for 
headway on tariffs. 
Roosevelt sent both Hull and Raymond Moley to London—a recipe for 
disagreement, at least, and probable disaster. In theory, the conference was Hull‘s 
prerogative. He should have had the solitary duty to pick the members of his delegation 
and their respective responsibilities, and Roosevelt should have allowed him to manage 
things. On the other hand, it was typical Roosevelt to infringe on the powers of his 
subordinates.
405
 He created a governing mess in the process, but it kept Roosevelt at the 
center of his government and the Democratic Party by making him the arbiter of disputes. 
He did not want agreement, he wanted opposition, and from there the president decided. 
This philosophy cracked in London. Hull left for England, and Roosevelt sent Moley to 
London thereafter. Moley was an economic nationalist, and he was critical of Hull‘s 
methodology on diplomacy and international economics.
406
 Later, Moley was a 
scintillating critic of the New Deal once he was out of the Department of State, due in 
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large part to Hull‘s progression on the reciprocal trade programs.407 Once in London, 
Moley stole a lot of Hull‘s thunder among the media and between diplomats. Hull and 
Moley did not agree whether to address the currency issue first, at the expense of tariffs, 
and Moley did not want to deal with tariffs at all. In the end, Hull played second fiddle. 
He swallowed his pride, and he did not resign for the sake of the rest of the Roosevelt 
administration. He even approved a message, drafted by Moley, which defended the New 
Deal and put the fall of the London Conference in positive light for the United States.
408
 
Meanwhile, back in Washington, Roosevelt continued to harm Hull‘s chances beyond 
sending Moley over in the first place. 
The death of a reciprocal trade bill in 1933 was the ultimate betrayal of Hull‘s 
work in London. Hull nearly had his way in 1933. Indeed, he packed a copy of the draft 
legislation in his briefcase before leaving for London, confident it would be law when he 
showed it to the entire conference at its opening as a profound announcement of 
American seriousness and leadership on trade liberalization.
409
 Hull thought Roosevelt 
intended to send a ―Trade Agreements Act of 1933‖ to Congress for approval in the 
summer.
410
 Unfortunately, for Hull, he was unaware of Roosevelt‘s misgivings about free 
trade in contrast to an inflationary NRA and AAA.
411
 Once Hull left, Roosevelt mainly 
started to listen to economic nationalists. He cooled on trade enough to lose the belief that 
it was worth it to force a bill through Congress. He eventually told Hull it was politically 
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impossible, but there was some indication that was not the case.
412
 In just a few months, 
the Democrats in Congress and the White House passed the first and second parts of the 
Glass-Steagall bank reform bill, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 
NRA, and a veteran‘s benefits bill.413 Roosevelt feared more legislation might be too 
much for a New Deal-fatigued Congress.
414
 Conversely, the president pushed through 
everything else he wanted with little difficulty, and there was no compelling reason he 
could not have a trade bill if he wished, as well.
415
 Roosevelt always had his finger in the 
political breeze, and London was not very popular with an isolationist and depression-
shocked American populace.
416
 Hence, Roosevelt seized on a political opportunity, but he 
set Hull back by about a year. 
Roosevelt pulled the plug on the London Conference on July 3, 1933 with the 
infamous ―bombshell message.‖ The bomb detonated when Roosevelt telegraphed a 
message to London that accused the conference of appeasing and furthering the interests 
of only countries on the gold standard.
417
 Without a doubt, Roosevelt was on the side of 
the economic nationalist, the inflation advocates, the NRA, and the AAA at this point. In 
this mindset, the negotiations in London began to look like a proxy restoration of the gold 
standard—which mean deflation, an anathema to the First New Deal. Roosevelt‘s 
decision not to submit a trade bill to Congress weakened Hull in London, but it was the 
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impasse over currency that sunk the ship.
418
 In any case, the London Conference was not 
going anywhere by July 3, 1933. Britain was uninterested in abandoning Imperial 
Preference, and France stubbornly clung to the gold standard and fought for the same 
from everybody else.
419
 Loss of the 1933 bill and the torpedoing of the conference had an 
immediate effect on international trade. The bombshell message negated pending trade 
agreements between the United States and Argentina, Columbia, Portugal, and Sweden 
with the anticipation of a 1933 law.
420
 Moreover, the reciprocal deal with Columbia was 
completed and awaiting signature, but then Hull had to throw it in the dustbin.
421
 
Roosevelt did not declare this the end of trade liberalization for the New Deal, though. 
He left the option for trade negotiations later.
422
 Nevertheless, Hull had to recover from 
London. 
President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull 
One of the best ways to illustrate how reciprocal trade policies influenced the 
Roosevelt administration and the New Deal after 1933 is to show how Hull was a crucial 
lynchpin of the whole New Deal agenda. There were benefits to having him in the White 
House to Roosevelt, but Hull‘s position and his stance on trade policy went beyond that. 
He garnered support from a myriad of groups, ranging from labor unions, to southerners, 
to exporters, to internationalists, to pacifists, and others. This continued through the 
election of 1936, and Roosevelt had to consider Hull a potential successor in 1940 before 
he decided to run for a third term himself. Hull was one of Roosevelt‘s most trusted 
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advisors on foreign policy and trade policy, and the two developed a close friendship in 
the late 1930s and early 1940s as the ―sole survivors‖ of the long and hard length of the 
Great Depression and the Second World War in the White House. Roosevelt left Hull as 
―the one in charge‖ in Washington on several occasions. However, and the most vitally, 
Roosevelt converted to Hull‘s position on reciprocal trade in 1934—the London 
Conference and 1933 were aberrations. Roosevelt gave him the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act of 1934, and he supported his Secretary of State while he liberalized 
American trade through the decade. The historical scholarship of the period simply 
missed this transformation of the New Deal‘s foreign and trade policy after 1933 and 
after 1934. 
Hull and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 fit into the New Deal in 
personal, economic, and political terms. However, there were some problematic tensions 
between Hull‘s economic views and Roosevelt‘s political outlook. Roosevelt tended to 
view the world through the lens of a lawyer, a politician, or an admiral.
423
 He never had 
much of a mind for economic theory or statistics. He cared about environmentalism, like 
his conservationist cousin Theodore, but that was about it.
424
 He depended on his 
advisors when it came to economics, and this was understandable in light of Roosevelt‘s 
upbringing and education. He went to Harvard for his undergraduate and Columbia to 
study law, though he never technically finished his degree, and then he spent the rest of 
his life in government. The academy taught Roosevelt to think legally, and his time in 
Albany gave him practical lessons about American politics. His effort as the Assistant 
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Secretary of the Navy for Wilson was crucial, for it make Roosevelt think in naval, 
strategic terminology. On the other hand, there was little chance for him to learn much 
about business, economics, or management on his résumé. Similarly, lawyers from 
Columbia and Harvard—not economists or figures with a background in corporate 
leadership—dominated the Roosevelt administration.425 The political Roosevelt 
constantly frustrated Hull on trade policy. Nevertheless, such feelings were natural, given 
the differing missions of the White House and the Secretary of State. At times, Hull had 
to struggle in order to fit trade liberalization into the rest of the administration‘s agenda in 
the 1930s. 
The conceptualization of the ―New Deal‖ in American society and politics 
changed in the 1930s. Thus, freer trade had to fit itself under the ―big umbrella‖ in 
differing ways. The largest question for Roosevelt, the Democratic Party, and the United 
States as a whole in the 1930s was ―reform‖ or ―recovery.‖ Much of the New Deal, and 
chiefly after 1934 during the ―Second New Deal,‖ did not intend only to foster economic 
recovery.
426
 The New Deal became the origin of a host of government initiatives that 
meant to connect ―positive economic and social change.‖427 Free trade could work either 
way: liberalization expanded overseas markets (recovery) and undid the Republican 
protectionism of the 1920s (reform). Additionally, New Deal programs routinely 
conflicted with each other. To return to a previous example, in 1933, Roosevelt felt the 
NRA and the AAA were obligatory to stabilize the macroeconomic picture after the 
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tragedy of the early 1930s.
428
 The First New Deal implied government control, slightly 
higher tariffs at times, and foreign retaliation to the same. However, at the same time, 
Roosevelt knew at least the basics of the theoretical arguments for free trade.
429
 
Therefore, Roosevelt must have found reflation and free trade miscible within the 
exigencies of the Great Depression. Tariffs were not the only issue lost in the legislative 
bacchanalia of 1933, and Roosevelt returned to trade policy the next year on Hull‘s 
side.
430
 Trade liberalization and liberal internationalism gelled with the basic facts of the 
Great Depression and the New Deal. There was a clear difference in approach to that of 
the Hoover administration, and Hull was one of the most important of the New Dealers to 
serve in the Roosevelt administration from 1933 to 1945. 
Labor unions were possibly the New Deal‘s most important constituency in the 
1930s. Fortunately, for Roosevelt, Hull and labor had a long and positive history together 
in the 1910s and 1920s. Hull grew up in eastern Tennessee, and he represented the 
Appalachian foothills in Congress. Eastern Tennessee, so far from Memphis and 
Nashville, was an agrarian place with little industry (besides distilleries, legal or 
otherwise) and not much of a footprint of organized labor. Nonetheless, despite this lack 
of incentive, Hull and labor were warm to each other. For instance, the Tennessee 
Federation of Labor and Railroad Brotherhoods endorsed Hull‘s Senate campaign in 
1930 over other Democrats and any Republican.
431
 In the process, they exonerated him 
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for his agricultural background. According to documents from the National Legislation 
Headquarters, Hull voted only twice against labor‘s interests on significant legislation 
between 1908 and 1926.
432
 This period included thirty-six important bills. Thus, he 
opposed unionized labor only 5.556% of the time.
433
 He opposed an expansion of 
workers‘ compensation in 1913 and the Esch-Cummins railroad regulation in 1920.434 He 
voted with unions for anti-child labor laws, antitrust exemptions for syndicates, and the 
popular election of senators, immigration laws, liability reform, overtime compensation, 
and transportation regulation.
435
 History remembered Hull the best, and with good cause, 
for being a free trader. Yet, from a political vista and within the context of the New Deal, 
there was much more to his career in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s than tariffs, quotas, and 
the international economy. 
The New Dealers were the people of the Roosevelt administration, anterior to the 
―big names‖ and the ―alphabet soup‖ of federal agencies. Hull interacted with them 
extensively. The New Deal was fundamentally about economics, and the international 
market always influenced the domestic economy. Commentators did not normally list 
Hull as a New Dealer, but he should have such status—as trade policy and tariffs were 
not only a diplomatic matter, but an economic issue, as well. Hull could be 
uncompromising regarding trade liberalization, and he tussled with other administration 
officials. Hull had a flaw in expecting disproportionate apology and some deference for 
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petty insults that accrue in the process of governing.
436
 For instance, Hull never forgave 
Moley for the subsidence of the London Conference, and he ranted against his new 
Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles in radio addresses in the 1940s.
437
 In spite of this, 
he worked with New Dealers in an effective manner. Francis Perkins (Secretary of Labor, 
1933 to 1945, and the first woman in the cabinet) and Hull helped the United States join 
the International Association for Labor Legislation (ILO).
438
 The ILO tried to bring 
higher wages, benefits, and greater workplace safety regulations to the industrialized 
world.
439
 Originally, it was a body of the League of Nations, and now it is a United 
Nations organ. Perkins thought these measures would benefit labor by lessening foreign 
advantages in wages, benefits, and overhead.
440
 Hull agreed with her, as he advocated 
American participation in the ILO as far back as the 1910s. Therefore, Perkins and Hull 
worked together well, but there were always at least some conflicts inside of the 
unabridged Roosevelt administration. 
The Department of State and the Department of the Treasury batted horns over 
monetary and trade policy in the 1930s. This was typical: the two sides have fought since 
the Washington administration. However, the pressures of the Great Depression did not 
help. Roosevelt‘s friend from New York, Henry J. Morgenthau, Jr., was the Secretary of 
the Treasury through most of the 1930s. Morgenthau later originated the iniquitous 
―Morgenthau plan‖ to divide Germany into several states, absolve it of all industry, and 
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leave it as farmland after the Second World War. Hull and Morgenthau each wanted 
control of international currency stabilization. Hull desired stability for the sake of 
international commerce. In April 1935, he wrote Morgenthau to assert trade policy was 
intimately associated with central banking.
441
 He argued that the Department of State and 
the tariff should have a voice in Morgenthau‘s handing of the dollar.442 Morgenthau kept 
control of the greenback but kept trade in mind. Roosevelt‘s plans in 1933 and 1934 were 
very inflationary, and the Department of the Treasury factored into implementing this 
policy. Monetary policy and trade policy intersect in calculating the value of international 
commerce in real terms using different currencies. Thus, New Deal economics and 
monetary policy needed to have a small reminder of Hull. Regular people in the 1930s 
knew this. For example, Morgenthau, ostensibly just a central banker, faced lobbying—
the World Trade League of the United States sent him the piece ―34 Plain Reasons for a 
Reciprocal Tariff Policy.‖443 Morgenthau and Hull were not enemies, but the latter did 
have a palpable nemesis. 
George N. Peek represented a different attitude to trade in the New Deal than 
Hull. Peek nearly won the day; they clashed from 1933 to 1935, though Hull eventually 
forced Peek out of the government. Peek was an agricultural economist, an official in the 
AAA, and the head of the Import-Export Bank for a short time. Peek advocated a ―barter 
system‖ of international trade.444 Barter worked such that the government bought goods 
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from American firms and farmers and then negotiated directly with foreign governments 
for a literal ―trade‖ of goods back and forth.445 The parties do not need to use any paper 
currency or gold, but only bilateral deals were possible; additionally, barter kept the 
United States‘ home market closed to foreign competition and lower prices for 
consumers.
446
 Peek‘s conception was a cautious approach in the milieu of the Great 
Depression, but it would not have opened up the international economy to the prosperous 
levels of the Roaring Twenties for a long time. Hull firmly opposed Peek. He ―won‖ the 
Democratic Party on trade when he became the Secretary of State in 1933, and he was 
not going to lose it. To quote Elliot Rosen, ―He [Hull] had bested the high-tariff 
Democrats, the Du Pont-Smith-Raskob group, in 1931-32, when he helped wrest control 
of the party away from their embrace.‖447 Peek had a coarse disposition, and he fought 
with Roosevelt and Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace over the barter system. 
Peek left the Roosevelt administration after the majority of the government broke in 
Hull‘s direction.448 Moley and Peek rapidly lost positions of power, which gave Hull 
control of trade policy. Furthermore, in actuality, economic nationalists were rather the 
exceptions, since most of the New Dealers supported reciprocal trade. 
Henry A. Wallace (the Secretary of Agriculture from 1933 to 1940, the Vice 
President from 1941 to 1945) supported Hull and trade liberalization. Wallace grew up in 
Iowa, attended Iowa State College, and founded the precursor to Pioneer Hi-Bred in 
1926. Roosevelt selected Wallace for Secretary of Agriculture because it increased 
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support for the New Deal in the farm states of the Midwest.
449
 Wallace opposed Smoot-
Hawley in 1930, and he wanted a low tariff, though he was complimentary of 
government intervention in the economy to help farmers.
450
 As the imbroglio at the 
London Conference demonstrated, Roosevelt waffled on tariffs all the way through 1933. 
Wallace was a major reason that Roosevelt reaffirmed reciprocal trade in 1934. Beyond 
opposition to Smoot-Hawley, Wallace was initially agnostic on the trade question, but he 
grew to see things Hull‘s way.451 He wished to see a development of foreign markets so 
the American farmer could export excess production. He wrote the influential pamphlet 
America Must Choose in 1934, which advocated an increased level of American 
immersion in the global economy.
452
 Roosevelt enjoyed the pamphlet, its arguments, and 
its popularity in farm regions. America Must Choose helped secure support for the 
passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Hull and Wallace worked 
closely on the trade question throughout the remainder of the 1930s. For example, 
Wallace sent Hull packets of notes and statistics from the Department of Agriculture on 
overseas trade and the rural economy as late as 1939.
453
 Wallace was perhaps the most 
vigorous New Dealer in support of the reciprocal trade agreements. Conversely, he was 
not the only one. Others came into Hull‘s redoubt, too. 
Many administration officials and members of the New Deal coalition believed in 
freer trade. Foremost, Hull and other free traders forced economic nationalists and 
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malcontents out of office early in Roosevelt‘s first term. Henceforth, Hull was free to 
remake American diplomacy internationally. Support came from the rest of the 
government. Harold L. Ickes (Secretary of the Interior) praised Hull on tariff reduction.
454
 
To quote him, ―His idea [Hull‘s] of reciprocal trade agreements and his persistence in 
having it adopted as a national policy will be recorded in history as a notable 
achievement.‖455 Harold L. was the father of Harold M. Ickes, the Deputy Chief of Staff 
in the Clinton administration when NAFTA passed through Congress. Charles William 
Taussig was a law professor at Columbia and a part of the ―Brain Trust‖ of informal and 
customarily pedagogical advisors to Roosevelt. Taussig supported freer trade, as well. In 
1934, Taussig told the New York Propeller Club (a trade union of maritime workers) that 
he looked forward to a ―substantial‖ increase in foreign commerce under Hull‘s 
guidance.
456
 Then, Taussig complimented Hull and Roosevelt for showing leadership and 
resuscitating the economy with foreign trade.
457
 Rexford Tugwell considered 
international trade carefully. He wrote the article ―The Tariff and International Relations‖ 
in 1930, which said revisions downwards from Smoot-Hawley were advisable.
458
 Such a 
course was precisely the method of Hull and the reciprocal trade agreements program. 
Moreover, to go beyond the concurrence of fellow New Dealers, Hull believed in the 
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New Deal‘s mission. The Great Depression was truly a time of extreme privation, and 
Hull understood this fact well in designing a response. 
The traditional southerner and Democrat in Hull had some reservations about the 
exact methods of the New Deal. Nevertheless, he went along with it for the sake of his 
country, his party, and his president. The First New Deal (which included the NRA, 
AAA, and regulation of businesses) divided Hull.
459
 Namely, he respected the American 
entrepreneurial spirit, though not all the surfeits of the capitalist system. Yet, he accepted 
the New Deal‘s necessity during an emergency, and he believed many economic and 
social problems were beyond his expertise and the latitude of his job as Secretary of 
State.
460
 In fact, he could be more radical than the other New Dealers on some matters. 
Hull advocated the direct application of federal aid to the destitute in 1933, which 
Roosevelt reneged on; he feared such programs would become a dole.
461
 Hull wholly 
praised the New Deal in rhetoric. When taking his honorary diploma from William and 
Mary, he said that the New Deal ―represents championship of human liberty, human 
rights, and humanity itself.‖462 He told the World Economic Conference on June 14, 1933 
that, ―Thus, the administration of President Roosevelt has within three months adopted an 
effective domestic program to promote business improvement in the fullest possible 
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measure.‖463 Hull always lent his full effort to the New Deal, despite of whatever 
misgivings. Critically, Hull saw no apparent conflict between the domestic New Deal and 
reciprocal trade. In a 1935 memorandum, Hull wrote: ―This program [reciprocal trade], 
therefore, rests upon the broad economic policy of gradually combining with the existing 
domestic programs of at least the important nations of the world a suitable program of 
economic cooperation as they emerge from serious depression conditions‖ [emphasis 
added].
464
 He saw reciprocal trade as a promising escape from the Great Depression. Hull 
wanted to bring back the international market with the New Deal and combine it with 
similar efforts around the world to fix the planetary economy. To him, trade was always a 
vital aspect of the New Deal in the United States of the 1930s. 
 
                                                 
463
 Cordell Hull quoted in ―Goodbye to Gold‖ from Ernst K. Lindley‘s The Roosevelt Revolution, London 
Economic Conference, Box #79, Subject File, Cordell Hull Papers, Library of Congress (Washington, 
DC). 
464
 Department of State Memorandum, 1935, 1933-1935, Trade Agreements, Box #88, Subject File, 
Cordell Hull Papers, Library of Congress (Washington, DC). 
114 
Figure 4.2 - Hull supported the New Deal out of fidelity to the Democratic Party. This 
included the aquatic engineering projects of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The 
dam above was a TVA construction, and it holds back the Dale Hollow Reservoir on the 
Obey River by Celina, TN on the Kentucky-Tennessee border.
465
 Ironically, the dam sunk 
Olympus, TN (Hull‘s birthplace) and Willow Grove, TN (where he went to elementary 
school) under the murky waters forever. 
 
Roosevelt left Hull in charge in Washington several times, and Hull was nearly 
the thirty-third president long before Harry S. Truman in 1945. The Presidential 
Succession Act of 1886 determined the order of executive officers before the passage of 
the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 and the 25
th
 Amendment in 1967. The 1886 law 
removed the Speaker of the House and the president pro tempore of the Senate from the 
list of succession. Therefore, in the 1930s, after the president came the vice president, 
Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of War, and the leftovers of the 
cabinet. Thus, Hull spent 1933 to 1944 only two hearts away from the presidency. 
Roosevelt was never in good health after an affliction of poliomyelitis paralyzed him 
from the waist down in 1921. He could have died or been assassinated. Five bullets from 
the Italian anarchist Giuseppe Zangara missed Roosevelt by a foot in Miami, Florida on 
February 15, 1933.
466
 Hull sent Roosevelt a telegram the next day and offered his 
gratitude for the safety of the president-elect.
467
 The Great Depression was dire, which 
invited assassination attempts from extremist groups and believers. Given his health, 
Roosevelt lived on the edge. John Garner was never popular in the New Deal coalition; 
hence, Hull (the next in formal succession and a more popular politician) was a logical 
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choice for 1936 or 1940. Roosevelt and Garner vacationed away from the muggy 
Washington in the summer.
468
 The 1930s predated air conditioning. In these instances, 
they left Hull as the ―acting president.‖469 Hull presided over Washington‘s response to 
some significant events, such as the San Francisco labor strike and riot of 1934.
470
 In 
essence, Roosevelt trusted Hull enough to leave him to ―watch the shop.‖ 
The turning point on international trade in the 1930s was the Montevideo 
Conference of late 1933. Hull did not abandon the trade issue after the London 
Conference. Later in the year, he traveled to Uruguay, and he tried again on trade through 
a smaller collection of American states with fewer disagreements about currencies. 
Montevideo was renowned for the issuance of the ―Good Neighbor‖ policy—specifically, 
nonintervention in the affairs of Latin American nations by the United States. However, 
Hull also engineered a vague, yet promising, trade agreement from nineteen different 
nations to liberalize trade in North and South America. The American media and public 
received the Good Neighbor policy and Hull‘s trade settlement positively.471 Roosevelt 
noticed the good press and the diplomatic élan of the Montevideo Conference and 
reconsidered his trade policy.
472
 The ―Good Neighbor‖ idea was important, but Roosevelt 
saw the political benefit to sustaining free trade in 1934. Roosevelt‘s reversal and his 
enthusiastic support for trade liberalization surprised Hull, in fact, upon his return back to 
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Washington from Montevideo.
473
 Suddenly, Roosevelt was personally and 100% behind 
lowering the tariff. The revolving door of advisors around him helped explain the quick 
change. The ―stabilizers,‖ the experimenters, idealists, and economic nationalists of the 
First New Deal lost a lot of favor by 1934.
474
 For instance, Hugh Johnson (the head of the 
NRA and the inventor of the Blue Eagle), Tugwell, Moley, and Peek were gone or 
shrinking in stature by the epoch of the Montevideo Conference.
475
 Consequently, the 
internationalist vanguard triumphed. Hull persisted through London, Montevideo, and the 
First New Deal. He eventually convinced Roosevelt to send the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act of 1934 to Congress as a part of the Second New Deal.
476
 At this 
moment, Roosevelt adopted reciprocal trade into his economic programs. Nonetheless, 
they had to defend the new legislation and shepherd its path through Congress. 
Despite some haziness in 1933, Roosevelt was firmly a free trader in 1934 and 
thereafter. Henceforth, the New Deal was a social agreement and an initiative that 
included reciprocal trade programs and Roosevelt himself was the head of and the main 
symbol of the New Deal. In early 1934, after the Montevideo Conference, Roosevelt 
started to argue for a reciprocal trade bill in Congress: ―I have none of the fear that 
possesses some timorous minds that we should get the worst of it in such reciprocal 
agreements. I ask you if you have lost faith in our Yankee tradition of good old-fashioned 
trading. Do you believe that our early instincts for successful barter have atrophied or 
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degenerated? I do not think so.‖477 Roosevelt told a press conference on February 28, 
1934 that, ―a full and permanent domestic recovery depends in part upon a revived and 
strengthened international trade‖ [emphasis added] as well as, ―American exports cannot 
be permanently increased without a corresponding increase to imports.‖478 Roosevelt was 
first a politician, and his view on tariffs simply evolved in 1934 with the political 
situation. He was generally for the reduction of tariffs, but he still held some reservations 
about the full scope of Hull‘s liberalizing ambitions.479 Hull dreamed of a multilateral 
breakthrough, which failed badly in London. Roosevelt preferred the safer avenue of 
smaller, bilateral trade agreements.
480
 Yet, Roosevelt pushed for part of his vision in 1934 
by requesting a Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 from Congress. Roosevelt 
―went to bat‖ for the bill in front of the legislative branch, and thereafter answered for it 
in elections and with the voting cohorts. Reciprocal trade was a part of the New Deal, for 
Roosevelt defended it on New Deal terms. 
Roosevelt signed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 into law on June 
12, 1934. Reciprocal trade, such agreements, and the most-favored nation principle were 
now the policy of the United States in the 1930s. However, this signature was not a whim 
on the part of the impulsive Roosevelt. He campaigned for a trade bill during the early 
months of 1934 up to the midyear. Naturally, he took stock of the potential political 
implications for Congress and the midterm elections of 1934. For instance, he wrote 
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Senator Morris Sheppard (D-TX) before the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Act of 1934 to reassure Sheppard of any political concern.
481
 Roosevelt told Sheppard 
reciprocal trade would not hurt Texas farmers: ―I do not think that the tariff-protected 
agricultural interests need worry in the slightest about the proposed tariff legislation. You 
are right in taking that position.‖482 Sheppard sat in the Senate from 1913 to 1941; 
therefore, Texas elected him in 1912 for the first time, and he was up for reelection in 
1936. Apparently, Sheppard must have had some worries about reciprocal trade, but 
Roosevelt stood by the tariff bill, and he told him not to fret about it. Roosevelt even 
involved himself in the problem of implementing the exact letter of the new tariff law to a 
small degree. He cared sufficiently about tariff administration to sign the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements Act of 1934 at 8:30 p.m. because the Treasury‘s customs houses 
requested it.
483
 June 12, 1934 was a Tuesday. Thus, having the new tariff bill become law 
between two business days made keeping accounts much easier.
484
 It allowed actuaries 
and statisticians to start with fresh, updated ledgers on the Wednesday morning. The 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 was a classic piece of New Deal legislation, as 
it centralized power in the White House and executive agencies. Roosevelt must have 
noticed this, and he had to have liked it, too. Reciprocal trade still invited criticism, but it 
could no longer halt Hull and trade in the New Deal. 
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Hull, Roosevelt, and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 symbolized 
the defeat of an autarkic, isolationist, and economically nationalist tradition by liberal 
internationalism in the United States. The happenstance of 1933 and in London left the 
outcome undecided, and it clouded the legacy of the First New Deal on trade. Now, 
however, the free traders—Roosevelt included—were in control. Hull overcame an 
isolationist tendency in American politics and society in the 1930s.
485
 The country still 
had a bad taste in its mouth about involvement in the rest of the world after the Great 
War, Versailles, and the debate over the League of Nations.
486
 Additionally, if trade 
failed to guarantee the peace, then liberalization chanced an accusation of the ―Merchants 
of Death‖—that is, the military-industrial complex forcing the country into a new war.487 
The Republican Party generally opposed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 
on the grounds of economic nationalism, implied defense of Smoot-Hawley, and their 
traditional protectionism.
488
 On the other hand, Republican dissent on reciprocal trade 
split.
489
 Geography was the factor. Republicans in export-driven states recognized the 
potential benefits of Hull‘s reciprocal trade policy, and the other half of the party (usually 
in states closer to Canada and Mexico and the threat of a flood of foreign goods on the 
domestic market) opposed freer trade.
490
 Conservative Democrats opposed Hull, as well 
as Democrats from the Northeast, protectionists, and anti-New Dealers.
491
 Senator Key 
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Pittman (D-NV) was particularly irksome. He was the chair of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations from 1933 to 1940, and he wished to keep Smoot-Hawley in order to 
protect Nevadan cattle and sheep baronies from market competition with Mexican 
ranchers.
492
 Nevertheless, Roosevelt pushed the bill through Congress and signed it. He 
stayed at Hull‘s side on the issue in the remainder of the decade. 
Roosevelt defended reciprocal trade in 1934, 1935, and in the election of 1936. 
Crucially, he intentionally designated Hull and the Department of State to implement the 
actual contents of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 into real policy.
493
 He 
knew of Hull‘s past record and thoughts on economic diplomacy. Therefore, Roosevelt‘s 
decision clearly delineates he had come around to the viewpoint of Wilsonian 
internationalists. There were alternatives to Hull. He could have given the responsibility 
of executing the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 to Henry Morgenthau, Jr. at 
the Department of the Treasury or to Daniel Roper at the Department of Commerce 
(which, in a similar situation, Hoover probably would have done). Conversely, this was 
not the case, and Roosevelt selected Hull‘s office. He wanted a free trader. Roosevelt did 
not hide from his support for commercial reciprocity in 1936. He argued free trade helped 
American farmers and factory employees find outlets for their production.
494
 He said that 
reciprocal trade helped to eliminate embargoes, quotas, ―special relationships‖ (or 
nascent alliances in the event of armed conflict), and it reduced the risk of war by 
fostering prosperity and interconnectivity.
495
 He did not ―fire and forget‖ on trade, and 
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his support of reciprocal trade was more than a matter of political inertia. Hull kept 
Roosevelt in on the loop on trade programs. In 1938, for example, Hull wrote Roosevelt 
to tell him about the developing trade deal with Canada.
496
 Hull posited Roosevelt or the 
Department of State should invite Prime Minister Mackenzie King from Ottawa to sign 
the deal and to give Roosevelt a chance at some ―informal diplomacy‖ with the Canadian 
leader.
497
 Roosevelt paid close attention to the progress of reciprocal trade, and it fit in 
with other New Deal legislation with newer executive authorities. 
Roosevelt and Hull enjoyed a cozy relationship in the late 1930s. Decades of 
historical events drew them together. They went through a fiery baptism in power from 
1933 to 1936; they were both of the same generation; they were both Wilsonians; they 
both had debilitating health problems (sarcoidosis, a respiratory infection similar to 
tuberculosis, for Hull; paralysis with a probable cause of polio for Roosevelt); they were 
the ―aged men‖ of the government by 1940. Hull held esteem for Roosevelt as a domestic 
president and as a commander-in-chief, ―All in all, he was a truly great president.‖498 
Their correspondence reflects this closeness. Roosevelt, his wife Eleanor, Hull, and his 
wife Frances often exchanged gifts, seasonal greetings, and thank you cards. For 
example, in 1934 and right after the Montevideo Conference, Frances gave Franklin and 
Eleanor a pack of mate from Argentina.
499
 Roosevelt later thanked Hull for the gift of 
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―that most lovely throw‖500 for Christmas of 1938 and ―my new pencil—especially with 
the colored leads‖501 for Christmas of 1941. Roosevelt wrote Frances Hull on August 11, 
1937 to thank her for giving him a game of bingo, and he promised to play it with his 
entourage while traveling the Hudson River between New York and Hyde Park.
502
 Hull 
wrote Roosevelt a birthday letter on January 30, 1942;
503
 Roosevelt responded with 
gratitude on February 3.
504
 Roosevelt wrote Hull on September 15, 1941 to thank him for 
his condolences over the passing of his mother Sara.
505
 Roosevelt favored Hull in humor, 
too. He joked to William O. Douglas, an aspiring nominee for the Supreme Court in 1939 
who eventually served until 1975, that the showdown between the White House and the 
judicial branch over the NRA and the court-packing scheme should come down to a 
baseball game.
506
 Moreover, he wanted the steady Hull on the pitching mound for the 
White House.
507
 It is difficult to imagine such a warm and friendly relationship if 
Roosevelt was dissatisfied with Hull‘s work as Secretary of State or his showcase 
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initiative in reciprocal trade. Their relationship grew with Hull‘s achievements, and 
Hull‘s influence over the New Deal and its coalition only increased with the passage of 
time. 
Hull was not a ―one-trick pony‖ with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 
1934 in the New Deal. In fact, his star peaked in 1940. Upon serving two full terms in 
office, Roosevelt intended to respect the customary, standard precedent of ―two only‖ set 
by George Washington and followed by every president thereafter. Hull was an obvious 
successor. McJimsey notes, ―The one candidate whom Roosevelt could accept, and 
behind whom the others could rally, was Hull. But Hull would do nothing without 
Roosevelt‘s blessing.‖508 John Nance Garner was too conservative to unify the 
Democrats, and other hopefuls (such as Postmaster General James A. Farley, D-NY) 
lacked broad appeal or foreign policy qualifications.
509
 Hence, Roosevelt set his mind on 
Hull. Hull wanted to run for the presidency, but he did not want to usurp his boss and his 
friend. Furthermore, he had several major political liabilities. He was pushing 70, his 
health was bad, he spoke with a lisp, and he worried about revelations of his wife‘s 
Jewish heritage.
510
 Roosevelt consulted with Harry Hopkins, his political confidant, and 
they concluded that he was ―too old.‖511 In the end, with everyone eliminated, Roosevelt 
ran for a third term himself. Done with the New Deal and Washington, ―Cactus Jack‖ 
Garner retired in 1940. Roosevelt asked Hull to replace him as vice president because of 
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their friendship and his political popularity.
512
 Hull declined the suggestion, preferring to 
stay the Secretary of State, and not wanting to incite the nationalists again.
513
 Henry A. 
Wallace, another free trader, eventually replaced Garner. Hull campaigned strenuously in 
1940, and he helped Democrats and New Dealers in the South win Congressional 
seats.
514
 Hull had ascended to the top of the New Deal ziggurat, and he brought trade 
liberalization with him along the highway. 
Frances Hull and her mixed background are worth exploring regarding her 
husband‘s career. Scholars generally recorded her as being Jewish, ―without 
exception.‖515 Conversely, the archived correspondence of the historian Irwin Gellman 
told a different story, though Gellman never published any of his findings himself. 
Frances‘ brother married into a prominent family of Jews from Baltimore, but this did not 
make her Jewish.
516
 On the other hand, her family had deeper connections than that to 
Judaism. Her father, Isaac Witz, was born Jewish but converted later to something ―non-
Jewish‖ early in his adult life.517 It is probable that he married a non-Jew, lived the rest of 
his live away from the synagogue, and raised children (including Frances) as Christians. 
There is no evidence presented of Frances‘ personal beliefs, but she did spend her youth 
away from Judaism. Nonetheless, her ancestry was Jewish, which spelt trouble for her 
husband if it became common knowledge. Hull was always strongest as a public official 
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in the South, and his relationship with his ―Jewish‖ wife would hurt him in his strongest 
region. It took until 1928 for a major party to nominate a Catholic, and until 1961 for a 
Catholic to garner the presidency (Al Smith and John F. Kennedy, respectively). Only in 
2000 did a party put a Jew on the presidential ticket, as the Democratic Party nominated 
Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) for vice president. There was doubtless no way the 
United States was ready for a president with an (externally) Jewish wife over sixty years 
previously. Thus, her Jewish lineage could have sunk Cordell‘s political career at every 
turn. They buried her descent as deeply as possible in 1940 to protect whatever chance he 
had at the White House.
518
 He eventually served as Secretary of State until 1944, but 
Roosevelt did not want to see him leave. 
Hull wanted to retire in late 1944, but Roosevelt tried to keep him on board for 
just a little bit longer. This showed how much Roosevelt valued Hull, and how much the 
free trader from Tennessee mattered for the New Deal, the Roosevelt administration, the 
1930s, and the 1940s. Hull sent Roosevelt a formal letter of resignation on November 21, 
1944; he cited poor health.
519
 He reminisced positively about his time as Secretary of 
State, and he regretted leaving the design of the postwar world and the United Nations 
unfinished.
520
 By November 1944, the Allies were manifestly on the path to victory. The 
invasion of the Philippines started in October 1944; the Battle of Leyte Gulf smashed the 
remnants of the Imperial Japanese Navy; Axis forces surrendered in Greece on November 
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4; on the Mariana Islands, B-29s were set to start bombing Honshu. Hull felt the need and 
the chance to leave with the war won. Roosevelt reacted to his resignation, ―Your letter 
of this afternoon has hit me between wind and water. It has been very sad for me even to 
contemplate the ending of our close relationship during all these twelve years.‖521 
Roosevelt‘s own health was failing in 1944, and he was close to Hull. He asked one last 
favor of his old friend, ―But I wish you would, as an alternative, allow me to accept it 
[Hull‘s letter] as of January twentieth, which is the end of our Third Term. Perhaps 
sentiment enters into this suggestion a bit, but it would give me great satisfaction if we 
should round out the three terms.‖522 Hull, at 73, did not have the strength to take 
Roosevelt‘s request to serve for another two months.523 Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. (a 
longtime official in the administration) would replace him as the first new Secretary of 
State since 1933. Roosevelt only had two Secretaries of State—he died himself soon 
thereafter on April 15, 1945. With Hull and Roosevelt out of the capital, the New Deal 
and its era came to its conclusion. 
* * * 
Hull was an important factor in the Roosevelt administration and the New Deal, 
and his political weight and policy influence demonstrated how reciprocal trade was an 
element of the Roosevelt program. Roosevelt picked him for his experience and a sense 
of regional balance in the cabinet and the administration as a group. The early Roosevelt 
administration was a confused place in terms of policy, and Hull had to fight it out for the 
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first year with economic nationalists, like Raymond Moley and George Peek, for control 
of trade policy. In 1933, the World Economic Conference did not go well for Hull, but 
the economic nationalists slowly worked their way out of office after Hull made progress 
with American states at the Montevideo Conference in 1933. Roosevelt came over to 
Hull‘s side and helped to pass the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, and 
Roosevelt safeguarded the bill in the election of 1936 and increased Hull‘s stature in the 
New Deal coalition. Hull and Roosevelt became closer on personal terms in the latter 
parts of the decade, and Hull‘s reciprocal trade programs continued to win Roosevelt 
over. They were on extremely good terms, and Roosevelt did not want to see Hull retire 
in the end. Hull was a locus of trade in the 1930s, and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Act of 1934 and its trade programs served as the basis for American trade policy for years 
thereafter. Cordell Hull was at the center of the 1930s, the New Deal, and the American 
response to the Great Depression through liberal internationalism and reciprocal trade 
programs. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1934 
There are two reasons to comprehend reciprocal trade in the 1930s as a facet of 
the New Deal and an important ingredient in the economic, political, and social history of 
the 1930s. The New Deal was (for all its other promises) essentially economic. Thus, 
economy theory teaches that trade policy is a type of economic policy and that the 
domestic and world economies were impossible to disassociate from each other. 
Critically, the American people of the 1930s thought of reciprocal trade as a part of the 
New Deal. History, while it is by necessity hindsight, is an attempt to understand the past 
through the eyes of the past. History involves going ―inside,‖ in the metaphorical sense, 
and chronicling people‘s identities, politics, and the economy. With this in mind, it is 
clear from letters, newspapers, and other evidence that the people of the 1930s had no 
problem thinking about reciprocal trade as the international component of the New Deal. 
At times, indeed, they explicitly combined the two. Later, the division came in the 
historiography. The Roosevelt administration considered reciprocal trade in regards to the 
rest of the New Deal, as well. Administration officials and economists knew how deeply 
they related together. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 was also a positive 
for the American economy. Free trade lowered real prices for consumers and aided 
exporters. Furthermore, in contrast to nations without trade deals and Smoot-Hawley, 
reciprocal trade generated disproportionate gain for the United States and its trading 
partners. In the diplomatic realm, reciprocal trade tied the world and American 
economies together. Freer trade was American leadership as the dangers of the Second 
World War rose on the horizon. Overall, the changes in trade policy were one of the 
129 
Roosevelt administration‘s successes in the 1930s. Reciprocal trade deals affected the 
United States, and beyond the political into the economic realm. 
The Economic Theory of Reciprocal Trade 
The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 grew out of a political condition, 
but it existed in a policy context. Namely, economic circumstances were dire when 
Roosevelt assumed power in early 1933. The United States gross domestic product 
declined almost 30% in just three years, and a similar proportion of the labor force was 
out of a job.
524
 In 1929 dollars, the level of private investment plummeted from $16.5 
billion in 1929 to $1.62 billion in 1932, and exports shrank from $5.9 billion in 1929 to 
$2.5 billion in 1932.
525
 On the other hand, spending by the government (local, state, and 
federal) in the same timeframe increased: $9.4 billion in 1929 to $10.86 billion in 
1932.
526
 This spending was necessary to maintain amassed demand in the face of a 
crashing economy, but it threatened a fiscal meltdown. Less economic activity meant less 
taxable income from a smaller tax base. Ergo, Washington and the states could not afford 
to keep the spigots open. Fiscal calamity and the omnipresent financial and monetary 
crisis after 1929 would have been too much for any government to handle. Time was 
tight for Roosevelt, despite his munificent personal charms. High financial instability and 
devastated levels of investment (a 90.182% decrease from 1929 to 1932) were 
particularly troubling, since economic growth and job creation correlated snugly with 
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business investment. Roosevelt managed to hold things, but this was never an assured 
outcome in the 1930s. His methods divided commentators at the time and scholars 
afterwards in exceedingly weighty ways. 
The New Deal is best understood in the milieu of its times; yet, it still inflames 
partisan tensions. In general, the New Deal carries positive connotations in both academic 
and popular accounts of the 1930s. Leading political historians, such as Arthur 
Schlesinger and William E. Leuchtenburg, had high praise for Roosevelt and his New 
Deal.
527
 Indeed, Schlesinger was the namesake of the research room at the Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt Presidential Library. Yet, not every historian agreed with the benefit or 
the benevolence of Roosevelt‘s policies. Scholars have deeply questioned the New Deal‘s 
virtues for either delaying or fostering economic recovery. Some works in this vein 
included Amity Shlaes‘ The Forgotten Man and Jim Powell‘s FDR‘s Folly. Ronald 
Murphy summarized, ―The failure of the New Deal and the government to prevent and 
avert the Great Depression is one of the great myths of American history, and a naked 
grab for power from the government, the media, and academia.‖528 Both sides have their 
points, and the entire economic and political history of the New Deal is an epic subject. 
My examination of Smoot-Hawley, Cordell Hull, and reciprocal trade in relation to the 
New Deal in the 1930s does not try to settle this question. If anything, despite my 
reliance on revisionist sources, I argue that reciprocal trade was a success for the New 
Deal. The point here is the context—the New Deal and the Roosevelt administration 
confronted a nightmare. Recovery or not, the very concept of a ―New Deal‖ settled 
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financial markets and soothed minds.
529
 Roosevelt looked like he was ―doing something‖ 
compared to Hoover, which was adequate. Roosevelt‘s ability to unify much of the 
country into a New Deal coalition was a political miracle. The New Deal included a 
Democratic Party of (usually racist) southerners, minorities (of every race and creed), 
unions, immigrants, second-generation Americans, conservatives, and urban political 
machines.
530
 The consequences of the New Deal‘s failure were portentous, no matter 
what good or bad reciprocal trade did for the American economy or its diplomatic efforts. 
The United States desperately needed a ―New Deal,‖ or something like it, to 
weather the storm of 1932 and 1933. Roosevelt and his administration mishandled trade 
policy in 1933 and through the London Conference, but they had larger things on their 
agendas. Americans were scared in 1932 and 1933, and the New Deal restored some faith 
in capitalism and democracy.
531
 High unemployment, declining prices, social unrest, and 
a breakdown in services meant there might not have been much of a United States 
without a ―New Deal.‖ The nation faced hunger, homelessness, hopelessness, powerless 
local authorities, collapsing courts of law, threatened property rights, looting, strikes, 
farm crisis, a Dust Bowl, foreclosures, anti-foreclosure riots, and general social 
disorder.
532
 Yet, the United States emerged from the Great Depression with its borders 
intact and most of its basic economic, political, and social institutions only modified to a 
small degree. This did not have to be the case. Leftists, reactionaries, industrialists, and 
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militarist around the world contemplated coup d‘état in the Great Depression.533 Japan 
succumbed to its imperialist/militarist wing and invaded Manchuria. In Germany, Adolf 
Hitler and the Nazi Party seized power in 1933. Anarchy, revolution, or a race war was 
not hard to see in the United States between 1929 and 1933.
534
 Modernist intellectuals 
expected such an outcome in North America and Western Europe. Thus, the Roosevelt 
administration‘s New Deal was a ―six-month‖ answer to a ―six-month crisis.‖535 From a 
world perspective, the New Deal was actually haphazard, but (even then) it still met with 
―visceral‖ opposition from conservatives and Republicans.536 The New Deal did not hold 
all the answers or all the proper ideals, but it kept the country from falling apart or 
resorting to fascism, civil war, dictatorship, or communism.
537
 The country did survive. 
Yet, the New Deal forever changed American politics and society in the 1930s and the 
primary philosophical underpinnings of the Washington government. 
The New Deal changed forever how the American people viewed the government, 
and it altered the relationship between the individual and the state. For example, a farmer 
from Kansas at the zenith of the Dust Bowl told to an interviewer that he had ―faith in our 
good government‖ [emphasis added].538 The New Deal helped make the federal 
government into a savior in tough economic times, but there was more to it than simple 
relief efforts. The New Deal animated the thought that Washington should intervene in 
                                                 
533
 Ibid., 7. 
534
 Ibid., 9. 
535
 George Wolfskill, ―New Deal Critics: Did They Miss the Point?‖ in Essays on the New Deal, edited by 
Harold M. Hollingsworth and William F. Holmes (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1969), 68. 
536
 Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1995), 52. 
537
 George Wolfskill, ―New Deal Critics,‖ 68. 
538
 Nunnally Johnson and John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath, directed by John Ford, produced by Darryl 
F. Zanuck and Nunnally Johnson, shot in McAlester, OK, distributed by Twentieth-Century Fox, 1940. 
133 
the economy on a consistent basis. For instance, in a column, Michael Barone quipped, 
laconically and sardonically, some New Deal social ideals: ―Property rights should be 
subordinate to human rights‖ along with ―government should regulate economic 
activity.‖539 Additionally, the federal government should freely use the tax code and other 
methods to redistribute income and wealth.
540
 Barone is a pundit with a conservative 
bent; yet, his analysis accurately described a few ways the New Deal modified the 
American polity. Indeed, most liberals and modern Democrats favor such interventions. 
Besides economics, the New Deal changed the Democratic Party. The 1930s transferred 
the Democratic foundation to the metropolises of the Northeast, the working class, 
unionized labor, the children of immigrants, and African Americans.
541
 There have been 
political realignments since 1932, but the New Deal caused the Democrats to leave the 
South.
542
 The context of the 1930s for reciprocal trade was contentious, and there were 
numerous problems sparring back and forth in the early New Deal. Hull‘s trade policies 
had to emerge out of such a situation. 
Elected leaders and politicians, in addition, are not naturally thinkers on tariffs 
and trade. Generally, political leadership tends to think about trade policy incorrectly or 
in non-economic terms. Much of the issue is the typical education of a normal member of 
the political class in the United States. Most diplomats, executives, and legislators study 
the law and work as attorneys before political life. Hence, government leaders tend to 
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overstate the adversarial nature of trade and economic interrelationships.
543
 This is a 
natural consequence of the legal worldview. In a courtroom, only one side can win. Law 
is a zero-sum game—one side is diametrically opposed to the other side, and somebody 
has to lose so somebody else can win. Economists, on the other hand, stress the mutual 
benefits of voluntary exchange and specialization. Specialization allows countries to 
concentrate on what they are best at (in a relative sense), expand productivity, and accrue 
benefits on the market. To an attorney, one side must always lose. For economic theory, 
both parties can win at the same time. Politicians are rarely experts on tariff matters, and 
they are usually disinclined towards asking experts in the field or economists for help.
544
 
Consequently, tariffs and trade policy are a misunderstood and an understudied area of 
American governance, legislation, and overall history.
545
 The same was true in the 1930s. 
Roosevelt was not ―literate‖ in the economic sense; Harvard and Columbia never 
formally trained him on the subject, and he did not have a huge interest in it.
546
 Instead, 
Roosevelt embraced ―experimentalism,‖ rather than a rational or a critical approach to 
solving the Great Depression. He liked the fact that the New Deal was inconsistent at 
times.
547
 In some senses, it was no wonder the spontaneous Roosevelt did not warm to 
reciprocal trade until 1934. As well, it took Roosevelt time to come around to trade 
policy as a topic after the black stretches of 1932 and 1933. 
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The sheer scale of the upheaval of the Great Depression distracted much of the 
White House away from trade policy in the early Roosevelt administration. Initially, the 
government focused on other problems (like monetary policy). Trade was not decisive to 
the economy of the 1930s, but it was significant. Lewis W. Douglas, a Congressman from 
Arizona and Roosevelt‘s budget director from 1933 to 1934, summarized trade‘s status in 
the early administration: ―I find frequently in conferences at the White House the 
following statement made. We only export five percent of our production: Why, then, 
should we be worried about foreign markets.‖548 A good sense of extent was important. 
However, approximately 5% of an economy of $73.3 billion in 1935 is not without 
consequences. Free trade was a screen against monopolistic practices on the part of 
domestic businesses, too.
549
 Foreign competition made it harder to form trusts in a single 
jurisdiction. The New Dealers grew up in the Progressive Era and watched trust busting, 
so they must have known that. Moreover, some members of the administration knew the 
theory involved with trade. For example, Mordecai Ezekiel (an agricultural economist 
and advisor to the office of the Secretary of Agriculture from 1933 to 1944) wrote, 
―Trade barriers have contributed to the presence and the prolongation of the depression; -
- Free trade would improve the situation in the long run, after the necessary readjustments 
had been worked through.‖550 Ezekiel offers all the orthodox economic rejoinders: there 
were benefits to trade, but there were painful allocations of resources, and there was a 
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need for time, patience, and relief. Despite the attention on the Great Depression, the 
administration gave tariffs a good amount of reflection. 
The Roosevelt administration considered reciprocal trade in relationship to the 
rest of the economy closely through the work of Mordecai Ezekiel. Ezekiel earned a 
doctorate in economics from the Robert Brookings Graduate School in Washington, and 
he helped formulate the AAA more than any other thinker did in 1933.
551
 He was an 
advisor to Roosevelt, Rexford G. Tugwell, M. L. Wilson (a graduate of Iowa State 
College and the Undersecretary of Agriculture in the late 1930s), and Henry J. 
Morgenthau.
552
 Inside of the Roosevelt administration, Ezekiel was very ―conventional‖ 
in the sense he agreed with nearly all of the New Deal‘s programs. For instance, Ezekiel 
advocated the ―joint planning‖ of the national economy between business, corporations, 
and the government to ensure full employment, price stability, overall economic health, 
and a moderation in politics.
553
 As a chief designer of the AAA, Ezekiel wondered if 
reciprocal trade would upset the Roosevelt administration‘s plans for reflation. He wrote 
an article called ―Would Reciprocal Reductions in Tariffs Affect the General Price 
Level‖ to ponder the issue.554 In the article, Ezekiel considered the potential 
macroeconomic implications of reciprocal trade, and he gave a long explanation of 
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deflation‘s negative effects for an economy.555 He came, however, to inconclusive 
results.
556
 Yet, he did not give up on the issue after one article. Elsewhere, Ezekiel 
concluded that reciprocal trade deals would help American workers find jobs, lower 
prices for consumers, and foster recovery under the New Deal.
557
 He shaded his 
conclusions, however. He admitted that workers in protected or uncompetitive industries 
(under the protection of Smoot-Hawley) stood to potentially lose their employment 
through trade liberalization.
558
 The economy, already under intense strain during the 
Great Depression, might not have survived much more disruption or resource reallocation 
in a world of freer trade.
559
 Ezekiel advised a high level of caution, and gradual 
liberalization, in combination with the rest of the administration‘s program. This was 
accurately what Roosevelt actually did, and this was how trade fit into the remainder of 
the New Deal in economic and political vocabulary. 
Roosevelt perceived economic benefits to bringing trade liberalization to the 
forefront in 1934. Domestic prices, as always with the First New Deal, were still the key 
factor. High prices, while the objective of the Roosevelt administration, could have a 
negative influence. High prices meant reduced turmoil in rural areas and less insurrection 
in farm states, but they made the New Deal look superfluous.
560
 Furthermore, higher 
prices incentivized farmers to overplant, which risked another devastating glut in the 
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rural economy.
561
 The watchful application of reciprocal trade could help keep prices 
down—but not too low—and allow farmers a channel for excess production that would 
not depress American prices. Free trade offered comparatives advantages, too. In 
London, Sam D. McReynolds outlined the problem: ―Today, tariff barriers, quotas on 
imports, exchange embargoes and the general desires of all countries to manufacture 
everything, whether it is economically sound or not, are hampering the efforts of each 
government to achieve recovery.‖562 McReynolds, again, touched on the thoughts of 
specialization. Specialization of production between countries allowed them to 
concentrate on strengths, exchange surpluses, and grow richer (in real terms) in the 
process. Thus, McReynolds disparaged self-sufficiency on a national scale for its implied 
inefficiencies, bottlenecks, and its barriers to economic recovery.
563
 Nationwide self-
sufficiency had always been impossible in an industrialized age of hydrocarbons and rare 
metals; therefore, it was better to embrace free trade and reap its benefits than to fight it. 
Lastly, Roosevelt knew the centralization of power in the executive during the New Deal 
looked outwardly, at least, tyrannical. Sometimes, he dealt with this problem with humor. 
In 1935, for example, he wrote Frederic R. Coudert (a New York attorney), ―I suppose, 
however, that some of your New York friends and mine will set this down as another 
communistic decree of a Brain Trust-ruled dictator!‖564 Roosevelt was ironic, but he was 
clearly aware of the criticisms. Yet, trade liberalization was capitalistic—it opened up 
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markets, put decisions back in the hands of individuals, and made Roosevelt appear less 
autocratic. 
The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 gave Hull and Roosevelt some 
leeway in reducing tariffs. Ironically, the 1934 bill was technically only an amendment to 
Smoot-Hawley for the sake of legislative reality.
565
 Hull wanted a new bill with radically 
lower tariffs, but the opposition in Congress forced the Department of State to accept 
only a limited amendment to the rates of Smoot-Hawley.
566
 On the bright side, however, 
there was modest functional difference either diplomatically or economically between the 
legal niceties of an amendment versus a new tariff bill. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Act of 1934 did three things: (1) the United States could negotiate reciprocal reductions 
in tariffs up to 50% reductions from Smoot-Hawley; (2) Senate ramifications of such 
deals were unnecessary; (3) the most-favored nation principle was now unequivocal 
American policy.
567
 The law was a victory for Hull, the Department of State, liberal 
internationalism, Wilsonians, and exporters. Hull and his office received precisely the 
authority that they (realistically) requested to start.
568
 Working around the Senate‘s 
constitutional power to ratify treaties in Article II Section II of the Constitution was 
crucial. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, like other New Deal legislation, 
expanded the authority of the executive branch. Yet, Hull needed the second point. 
Congressional logrolling and a minority of protected industries and interest groups 
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retarded any chance at liberalization before the 1930s.
569
 Hinton described it, ―Hull had 
impressed on the New Deal draftsmen the importance of avoiding President Taft‘s pitfall 
in attempting reciprocal tariff reduction through treaty methods.‖570 In the past, trade 
deals stalled in the Senate, where protectionists congregated and blocked the passage of 
commercial treaties with any sense of reciprocity. Hull, on the other hand, would not 
have that problem after 1934 with reciprocal trade agreements. 
Reciprocal trade programs conflicted with some parts of the rest of the New Deal 
but not in any inexorable way. Unfortunately, Hull‘s method of ―recovery through 
exports‖ damaged the pillars of the First New Deal—the NRA and AAA.571 Roosevelt 
wanted to control the domestic price with cartelization and currency manipulation.
572
 
Randall E. Parker describes how the NRA and the AAA were ―designed to reduce output 
and raise prices in the farming sector‖ [emphasis original].573 At first impression, if Hull 
had his way with trade in 1933, then a potential increase in imports threatened to lower 
domestic prices. Conversely, higher foreign demand for American exports could 
counteract downward pressure on prices at home. That quarrel hung in the New Deal 
until the Supreme Court forced the administration to abandon reflation. In 1935, the court 
ruled in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States that the NRA was a 
designation of legislative authority to the presidency and misuse of the interstate 
commerce power (Article I Section VIII). Thus, the Supreme Court undid the First New 
                                                 
569
 Hinton, Cordell Hull, 269. 
570
 Ibid., 269. 
571
 ―Goodbye to Gold‖ from Ernst K. Lindley‘s The Roosevelt Revolution, London Economic Conference, 
Box #79, Subject File, Cordell Hull Papers, Library of Congress (Washington, DC). 
572
 Ibid. 
573
 Parker, ―Overview,‖ 25. 
141 
Deal, and the NRA and AAA were unconstitutional. Inadvertently, though, Schechter 
Poultry resolved reciprocal trade‘s wobbly position in the New Deal. With no more NRA 
or AAA, there was no more conflict connecting inflation and trade. Debra Conti noticed 
the mood, ―With the election of Roosevelt, the focus of trade policy changed from import 
politics—restricting imports through tariff legislation—to export politics—focusing on 
opening up foreign markets.‖574 This did not happen immediately, but Hull pursued more 
deals. Freer trade fit with the Second New Deal. 
The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 was a piece of the ―Second New 
Deal‖ of 1934 to 1936. The Second New Deal marked a big change from the central 
planning inherent in the measures of 1933. It included enduring reforms, such as the 
Wagner Act (which prompted a higher level of labor force unionization), the Works 
Progress Administration (WPA, an agency that put millions to work on federal projects), 
and Social Security (with its defined contributions and retirement benefits). In largest 
senses, with the NRA and AAA out of the picture, the Second New Deal turned away 
from planning and back towards normalization and capitalism.
575
 Trade liberalization 
dovetails quite nicely with this conception. The American economy slowly began to heal 
after the early 1930s, and the Roosevelt administration gradually embraced businesses 
and ended measure like the NRA and AAA (either intentionally or by legal fiat).
576
 In 
such a situation, reciprocal trade made sense from a policymaking standpoint to loosen 
government bounds on the economy. Practically, as well, reciprocal trade had a certain 
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political appeal after Smoot-Hawley. Trade enlivened Wilsonians, internationalists, 
Jeffersonian idealists,
577
 pacifists, libertarians, classical liberals, exporters, consumer 
groups, isolationists, and agriculturalists and industrialists dependent on foreign suppliers 
for cheap raw materials.
578
 Some of these groups were indignant over the NRA and the 
AAA, as they wanted economic freedom, competition, and private property rights. Others 
wished for a low tariff for the sake of friendly foreign relations and the prevention of a 
future war. In both cases, reciprocal trade was an olive branch. After all, a high level of 
resentment for the Smoot-Hawley tariff helped in the passage of the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act of 1934.
579
 In part, in the 1930s, commentators in the 1930s imagined 
the Great Depression as a symptom of the trade war from 1930 to 1932. The president 
looked astute in overturning one of the causes of the conflagration in the first place. Thus, 
simply, historians cannot ignore trade as a factor of New Deal analysis. 
Economic theory offered a host of reasons why international trade was an 
important input in the Great Depression and the New Deal. Trade policy was economic 
policy, and the overseas market influenced any domestic economy. It was impossible to 
split a national economy from the rest of the world—even in the most extreme, autarkic 
situations. Yet, the historical scholarship on the 1930s accurately did this. For context, 
5.694% of the American gross domestic product derived from exports in 1929.
580
 This 
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was before the crash, and international trade‘s volume sunk in the Great Depression. The 
above percentage slipped to 3.546% by 1933 and then recovered to 4.832% by 1940—it 
was steady from 3.5% to 4.5% during the rest of the 1930s.
581
 Noticeably, this fall in the 
relative portion of exports in comparison to the rest of the economy showed that trade 
suffered more than its ―fair share‖ in the early Great Depression. The malefic of Smoot-
Hawley was much the problem; however, there were other issues worth exploring and 
especially in light of Hull‘s reciprocal program. Hence, international trade deserved at 
least a mention in a monograph over 200 to 300 pages long on the New Deal. Moreover, 
histories of the 1930s as a whole are likely to have either ―the New Deal‖ or ―the Great 
Depression‖ in their title, since the economic doldrums from 1929 to 1942 was the 
seminal topic of the period. Any suggestion that historians divide their content in a fixed 
ratio equal to that of exports‘ portion of the economy would be inflexibly pedantic. 
However, given trade‘s hold on the economy, a dozen or so pages or a diminutive chapter 
of investigation is not too much to ask. 
Year 
Gross World 
Product (GWP) 
Volume of 
International Trade 
International Trade as a 
Percentage of GWP 
1930 $3.537 trillion
582
 $353 billion
583
 9.9802% 
2007 $67.2 trillion
584
 $13.212 trillion
585
 19.6607% 
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Figure 5.1 – All the figures are in 2007 dollars. As it came before the worldwide 
recession of 2008, the year 2007 shows trade‘s ―fullest‖ extent before the downturn. 
International trade was nearly a tenth of the world economy in the 1920s and the 1930s 
and its importance continued to grow after the Second World War. Trade is more 
important now than it was then, in fact, but no picture of the Great Depression, the New 
Deal, and the workings of the Roosevelt administration is possible without a 
consideration of American tariffs and trade policy vis-à-vis Hull‘s program. 
 
Critically, international trade would help deal with some of the historical 
problems of the 1930s. The causes of the early Great Depression, its high level of 
unemployment, low business investment, and the intractability of the slump were among 
the deepest historical mysteries of the early twentieth-century.
586
 The international 
market‘s disproportionate suffering helped explain some of the issue. Economists have a 
concept called Okun‘s Law, which postulates an inverse relationship between 
unemployment and economic growth, as firms need extra labor to produce more.
587
 The 
implications of Okun‘s Law are intuitive: less activity means less production, less 
production means less labor demanded, and fewer jobs means unemployment. 
Econometrics estimated that, within the United States, a 1% increase in unemployment 
correlate with a 2% decrease in output.
588
 The economy was poor in the 1930s, but 
exports fell past their fair share. This was, potentially, a source of the chronically high 
unemployment. Additionally, economists notice the gains to real wealth because of 
liberalization and economic specialization.
589
 On the other hand, an economy needs time 
to reallocate scarce capital, land, and labor to productive and export-oriented industries 
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and away from uncompetitive ventures to realize these gains.
590
 The high unemployment 
of the 1930s shows very little reallocation of inputs took place in the decade. In this 
situation, Hull perceived that a return to Fordney-McCumber duties from 1928 would be 
a positive for the global economy.
591
 Older tariffs had already done their damage to the 
flow of commerce, and undoing Smoot-Hawley would allow the world to return to the 
configuration of 1928 without much reallocation. Henceforth, industries could emerge, 
harness idle resources, and grow quicker into a world of lower tariffs.
592
 Hull internalized 
the lessons of the economic theory, and he tried to make them come alive in practice. 
The Social Representation of Reciprocal Trade 
Of the most crucial importance, the American people understood that the 
reciprocal trade programs were a part of the New Deal in the 1930s themselves. 
Roosevelt and the Democrats ran on economic recovery in 1932. This included the 
restoration of international commerce, and they did not separate reciprocal trade from the 
rest of their economic curriculum. To demonstrate, the Democratic National Convention 
Platform of 1932 proclaimed, ―We advocate a competitive tariff for revenue, with a fact-
finding commission free from executive interference, reciprocal tariff agreements with 
other nations, and an international economic conference designed to restore 
international trade and facilitate exchange‖ [emphasis added].593 This statement was 
somewhat vague, but it promised trade liberalization was the route of the Roosevelt 
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campaign. Elsewhere, the platform condemned the Republicans on Smoot-Hawley and 
trade; ―They [the Republicans] have ruined our foreign trade.‖594 Noticeably, however, 
the quip about reciprocal trade fell right in the middle of a section on economic reforms. 
The platform listed reciprocal trade after ―a sound currency‖ and before ―the extension of 
federal credit,‖ and along with such measures as a balanced budget, lower 
unemployment, social insurance, support for agriculture, and the development of water 
resources into hydroelectricity.
595
 This was an accurate description of the New Deal as 
the party conceived it, and reciprocal trade followed and fits in with policy and the 
remainder of the program. Roosevelt included the international market in his inaugural 
address of 1933: ―Our international trade relations, though vastly important, are in point 
of time and necessity secondary to the establishment of a sound national economy.‖596 
Commentators took this statement, at times, to be a refutation. Yet, Roosevelt always 
parsed his statements, and he still stressed the ―vastly important‖ nature of international 
trade to the United States‘ financial system and economy. Later in the speech, he 
reiterated, ―I shall spare no effort to restore world trade by international economic 
readjustment.‖597 Despite the indistinctness in 1933, he wanted more and freer trade for 
the American economy. 
Reciprocal trade programs became a popular part of the New Deal, and free trade 
added to the appeal of the Roosevelt system to sections of the electorate. When first 
going through Congress, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 had a difficult 
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time. Then, political winds shifted, and the economy began to recover. The original 
opponents of the bill lost their seats in 1934 and 1936.
598
 Sans demagogue, protectionist 
Republicans in positions of power, reciprocal trade‘s popularity increased as its 
contentiousness decreased.
599
 Republicans and protectionists were out of favor, out of 
office, and out of the public spotlight. Some organizations developed in support of New 
Deal diplomacy and trade. The Good Neighbor League reported its tenets in a manifesto: 
―The President has persistently tried to produce better economic relations by pulling 
down high trade barriers in order to encourage the establishment of foreign markets. This 
in its practical operation would produce a more cordial ‗good neighbor‘ relationship.‖600 
Here, the Good Neighbor League recognized that Good Neighbor diplomacy was free 
trade in addition to non-interventionism in Latin America. The Fair Trade League sent 
Morgenthau the essay ―The Hawley-Smoot Tariff,‖ which claimed 2.4 million Americans 
(roughly 10% of all households) derived income from foreign trade.
601
 Free trade 
appealed to labor, as well. The daughter of John L. Lewis, a bigwig in the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (CIO), praised Hull for his efforts at international trade 
reciprocity.
602
 On top of labor unions, agriculture and agrarian interests were a central 
focal point of the New Deal. 
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Reciprocal trade attracted agriculturalists to the New Deal, in particular cotton 
growers. Cotton still ruled southern agriculture in the 1930s, and the region‘s nineteenth-
century posture towards free trade for the sake of cotton exports persisted.
603
 Hull, while 
not directly involved in cotton in the agrarian places of eastern Tennessee, still grew up in 
the free trade milieu of the South. Trade helped garner support for Roosevelt and the New 
Deal from cotton growers and the region as a whole. Smoot-Hawley and the trade war 
from 1930 to 1932 with Europe and the rest of the world greatly damaged the interest of 
cotton producers, and they needed overseas markets by 1933.
604
 Hence, due to regional 
identity and despite reservations conservative southerners had about the more radical 
New Deal programs, they supported the White House for a stake in Hull and commercial 
reciprocity. William L. Clayton, a cotton marketer from Houston and a former official in 
the War Industries Board, led the charge. He called Hull, ―the soundest thinking man in 
public life today,‖ since Hull championed lower tariffs.605 In contrast, he disagreed with 
the preponderance of the farm policies of the Roosevelt administration and the 
cartelization of the AAA.
606
 Yet, he still supported Roosevelt for the sake of Hull and 
trade.
607
 Clayton, who earned the nickname ―King Cotton‖ in the 1910s and 1920s, said 
before the election of 1936, ―A vote for Roosevelt is a vote to keep Secretary Hull in 
office.‖608 To him, reciprocal trade made the remainder of the New Deal worth tolerating. 
Cotton‘s support for free trade was understandable, since cotton always wanted to lower 
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tariffs and expand exports to Britain, France, and Germany. Conversely, the American 
farm economy of the 1930s was large and diversified, and dissimilar sectors coveted 
Smoot-Hawley‘s brawnier protections. 
Protectionists and anti-New Dealers seized on the agricultural question in order to 
assail Hull and Roosevelt on trade. Noticeably, New Deal critics had no trouble thinking 
about trade in relationship to the whole Roosevelt program, and they tried to use it 
against the White House. Agriculturalists were at the forefront of the opposition to the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934.
609
 Recalcitrant farmers were enamored with 
the lessening of foreign competition and the perception of higher farm prices because of 
Smoot-Hawley. Moreover, farmers were unique in their resistance to reciprocal trade. 
Unions, for example, believed freer trade threatened only a small number of American 
workers and offered opportunities for commercial expansion, and they consequently 
aided Hull.
610
 Protected industries complained about the prospect of trade liberalization to 
their delegates in Congress, and Republicans from protectionist districts made the final 
passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 difficult.
611
 The bill did pass, 
274-111 in the House, but only two Republicans voted in favor of it.
612
 In 1936, the 
resistance came at trade again. Protectionists argued that American wheat imports 
increased from 1934 to 1936 after reciprocal trade‘s passage, which must have hurt the 
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average American farmer.
613
 The Republican presidential nominee in 1936, Governor Alf 
Landon (R-KS), said in Minneapolis that the trade program cost the American farmer the 
domestic market to foreign competition.
614
 In spite of some of the inherent xenophobia, 
agriculture imports did increase by 84% from 1933 to 1936 while farm exports increased 
only 24% in the same epoch.
615
 Hull countered there was a massive drought and a Dust 
Bowl in 1934 and 1935, which reduced the United States‘ capacity for production and 
necessitated temporary importation.
616
 Ordinary people lacked much of an economic 
context, and there were numbers to back up either side of the contest. Nonetheless, these 
attacks on trade failed to make much progress. 
Republican resistance, despite its best efforts in 1934 and 1936, could not stop the 
New Deal or reciprocal trade programs. Trade policy was a critical issue for the 
American economy, but also for American identity, politics, and society. Namely, tariffs 
were a crucial theoretical and practical cleavage amid internationalists, conservatives, 
liberals, socialists, statists, farmers, agrarians, pastoralists, and populists.
617
 In the 1930s, 
being for or against tariffs helped compose ―who you were‖ in terms of these ideologies. 
Additionally, part of how you read your political engagement in the United States of the 
early twentieth-century was via your trade stance—if you were against trade, you were 
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rightist and Republican; if you favored trade, you were leftist and a Democrat.
618
 
Roosevelt‘s popularity and the New Deal made the nation ―drift left‖ in the 1930s, and 
the change put the Republicans and protectionists on the wrong side. Perception held that 
only a few outstanding, and ubiquitously Republican, figures had anything bad to say 
about free trade.
619
 Furthermore, the prominent opponents to Hull‘s trade initiatives were 
always anti-New Dealers, including such leaders as Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg (R-
MI) and George N. Peek (once he was out of the administration).
620
 Currents drifted 
strongly left in 1932, and the pattern continued throughout the rest of the 1930s. 
Sardonically, Senator Reed Smoot, the namesake of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, lost his seat 
in 1932 to Elbert D. Thomas—a former Latter Day Saints missionary to Japan who felt 
American tariffs hurt the gentle Japanese people.
621
 In the end, a minority of Republicans 
(described in The Economist as ―the Eastern or Wall Street species‖) broke in Hull‘s 
direction on trade policy.
622
 Business leaders recognized the American need for expanded 
markets to enlarge production back to the levels of the 1920s. As well, protectionists 
were critical of trade in terms of the New Deal coalition. 
People in the 1930s thought of trade and the New Deal together, either in support 
or in opposition. After all, this was how the Republicans termed them. To quote from the 
Republican National Committee bulletin ―The Farmer Pays‖ from 1936, ―The New Deal 
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Reciprocal Trade Agreements have taken the American Farmer out of the Foreign Market 
and put the Foreign Farmer into the American Market‖ [emphasis added].623 Here, trade 
reform was unambiguously a part of the New Deal. The Republicans had two objections 
to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934: (1) the potential harm to specific 
industries currently behind a tariff wall, and (2) the entrustment of the Senate‘s treaty-
making powers to the executive.
624
 Hence, these points fit into a pattern of criticizing the 
New Deal for its trend of centralizing power, growing the duty of the president, and 
engendering new executive agencies. In 1936, the opposition to Democrats ran against 
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and the New Deal—together.625 However, 
the New Deal‘s trade policies and the observable failure of Smoot-Hawley did not gain 
them many converts.
626
 Michael A. Butler in Cautious Visionary, the most 
comprehensive look at trade in the 1930s from a diplomatic perspective, wrote that, ―The 
election of 1936 tested the popularity of Hull‘s trade policy as well as other aspects of the 
New Deal.‖627 Butler was close, but he does not go far enough in realizing trade‘s task in 
the New Deal and its significance for the rest of the decade. Hull and reciprocal trade 
were a part of the New Deal itself in the 1930s, without reservations, as commentators 
from the epoch made apparent. 
Newspaper articles from the 1930s explicitly mentioned the trade programs as an 
aspect of the overall New Deal. For instance, the Associated Press wire described Hull 
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and reciprocal trade programs: ―The Cabinet member, champion, and director of the New 
Deal‘s trade pact plan, denounced opponents‖ [emphasis added].628 Dorothy Thompson, 
a Republican newspaper broadcaster and columnist (and the most influential woman in 
the United States in the 1930s behind Eleanor Roosevelt),
629
 was amenable to Hull‘s 
reciprocal trade programs. She described them: ―In contrast it seems to me that the policy 
which has been pursued by Mr. Cordell Hull as Secretary of State is the least open to 
criticism of any major program undertaken by the present administration.‖630 First, she 
does not reject reciprocal trade; second, she considers it a ―major program‖ of the 
Roosevelt administration. Thus, trade had appeal, and it had to be part of the New Deal. 
Before the rise of radio and television, newspapers were the main means of political and 
social communication in the United States of the early twentieth-century. Hull interacted 
with the papers. For example, he wrote a response to a Baltimore Sun editorial in 1936, 
and he defended pending trade deals with Belgium and Cuba.
631
 Other journalists 
considered trade a part of the New Deal, too. The Economist reported in ―Republican 
Support for Mr. Hull‖ that mixed condemnation and praise for reciprocal trade confused 
Democratic and Republican identities, but that Hull‘s trade programs were still of the 
New Deal.
632
 ―A Suggested New Deal in Diplomacy‖ by U. Grant-Smith combined the 
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humanitarianism of the New Deal with liberal internationalism in order to advocate freer 
trade.
633
 Christian Science Monitor noted, in ―Cordell Hull, Practical Idealist,‖ that, 
―New Deal skies [were] laced by the blazing trails of many a dramatic personality and 
meteoric career.‖634 However, the article complimented his dependability and his success 
with trade—as New Dealers, like Icarus, typically crashed and burned.635 In a bulleted 
manifesto, the Good Neighbor League asserted, ―SIXTH: His administration, by the 
successful negotiation of reciprocal trade treaties, has delivered a decisive blow.‖636 The 
text listed other major parts of the New Deal and Good Neighbor diplomacy to go along 
with it. 
Newspaper editorials, newspaper editors, and readers understood the magnitude 
of trade in the New Deal. The Boston Herald, for example, published an article called ―Is 
New England Fragile?‖637 ―Is New England Fragile?‖ argued that the Roosevelt 
administration was astute to expand American commerce through reciprocal trade.
638
 
Hull exposed New England‘s industry, traditionally under the protection of high tariffs, to 
competition. Conversely, the Boston Herald noted high American productivity could 
compete with anybody, and something as mundane as shoe factories in Czechoslovakia 
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did not threaten jobs.
639
 The Wall Street Journal approved of internationalism; hence, it 
esteemed Hull for reducing tariffs and helping farmers find markets, export, and pay their 
bills.
640
 The Economist commended Hull for attacking the tariff-clogged market of the 
1930s and recommended him for a Nobel Peace Prize.
641
 Trade mattered not only to 
national papers, but also to small, local papers for specific social groups. To demonstrate, 
The Collegian (a student weekly from Yale University) ran an article titled ―Where Will I 
Find My Job?‖642 Under the heading ―Independence,‖ Yale‘s student editor wrote, ―Like 
it or not, we are all being compelled to recognize that such things as war debts and tariffs 
do touch our material welfare within our borders.‖643 These people knew trade mattered 
for the national economy. The New Deal was fundamentally economic; it required trade‘s 
inception. 
Speeches by members of the Roosevelt administration demonstrated how the 
1930s thought of trade and the New Deal. To quote from Charles Taussig‘s speech to the 
New York Propeller Club: ―Men of ships and shipping occupy an enviable position in the 
forwarding of the New Deal. For the first time in many years, an administration in 
Washington has stressed the importance of foreign trade.‖644 He gave his speech on May 
22, 1934 as the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 made its way through 
Congress. Obviously, he supported Hull and free trade liberalization—yet, this statement 
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showed Taussig thought of reciprocal trade under the nexus of the Second New Deal in 
1934. He conflated them in language; therefore, he conflated them in thought. Figures 
from within the Roosevelt administration outside of Taussig followed the pattern. 
Mordecai Ezekiel, for example, gave a talk to the Land Grant College Association on 
November 21, 1934.
645
 His address was technical, and he compared the economic and 
lawful conflicts between the AAA and reciprocal trade.
646
 In 1933, the AAA raised a few 
tariffs, which complicated but did not end the story of trade under the New Deal, and 
Ezekiel was a principle proponent of the AAA.
647
 Conversely, he found no apparent or 
inescapable conflict between the AAA and reciprocal trade deals.
648
 Indeed, he believed 
that increased American agricultural exports would make the AAA‘s mission to support 
farm prices easier, and that it would allow farmers to expand acreage under plow to meet 
foreign demand.
649
 The Secretary of State, as a member of the administration, considered 
the issue, too. 
Hull indicated he considered the reciprocal trade program and the New Deal as a 
part of one and other. Foremost, he described liberalization as an aspect of the economic 
initiatives of the administration: ―Second, the combination of a suitable international 
economic program with a like domestic program, with a view to world economic 
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rehabilitation.‖650 As well, he spoke in favor of trade for the sake of the administration 
and Roosevelt‘s reelection. He gave an address in Minneapolis on October 7, 1936 to 
highlight New Deal liberalization, and the New York Times reprinted the full text of the 
speech the next day.
651
 Picking Minneapolis was strategic. Landon campaigned there; 
Minnesota‘s economy was heavily agricultural in the 1930s; Minnesota‘s farmers faced 
the phantoms and opportunities of competition with Canada; Minnesota was the only 
state with the individualistic quirk of having a Democratic-Farm-Labor Party instead of a 
Democratic Party. Undeterred, Hull said reciprocal trade was, ―an instrument for the 
furthering of not only prosperity but also of peace.‖652 He became the White House‘s 
spokesperson on the issue. He won over Roosevelt, too. To quote Dr. New Deal himself 
on Hull‘s work, ―[He is] doing a magnificent job and I am delighted at the way the 
country is beginning to see and give him proper credit for it.‖653 Even the critics 
considered him one of the New Dealers: ―In their place came the procession of the 
righteous captains of the New Deal—Frankfurter, and Hull and Henry Wallace‖ 
[emphasis added].
654
 By extension, consequently, with Hull as a New Dealer, reciprocal 
trade programs had to be themselves a ―new deal.‖ 
New forms of mass media, while still in their infancy in the 1930s, helped 
disseminate information about trade policy to the public. Crucially, radio addresses by 
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figures outside of the Roosevelt administration frequently spoke of free trade both 
positively and as a part of the New Deal. The first commercial American radio station, 
KDKA of Pittsburgh, came online in 1920. By 1930, about 50% of American households 
owned a radio, and that number matured to 80% by the end of the decade.
655
 Radio 
became the way the masses learned about their government, and here freer trade and the 
New Deal came together. For instance, Harry W. Flannery Views the News featured the 
talk ―Trade Treaties‖ on November 17, 1938 on the subject of the Roosevelt 
administration‘s trade policies.656 Harry W. Flannery himself was a correspondent for 
CBS and wrote the monograph Assignment to Berlin in 1941.
657
 He commented, 
―Advancing to nineteen the total of trade agreements concluded in the New Deal‘s 
‗Yankee trading‘ policy, the treaties signed today [with Britain and Canada] are 
considered by far the most important yet completed‖ [emphasis added].658 Moreover, 
―He‘s [Hull] a New Dealer with old ideas --- ideas that he‘s had for a quarter of a century 
and is just now able to put into effect.‖659 Thus, Flannery considered the reciprocal 
program part of the New Deal, and he supported them. He was not the only one. Frederic 
R. Coudert (an attorney and friend to Roosevelt from New York) gave a radio speech in 
1936 to support Roosevelt‘s lower tariff and compliment Hull for fostering economic 
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recovery through trade.
660
 Dr. Paul V. Horn, an economist from New York University, 
described over the radio how the foodstuffs, luxury goods, and products in a family 
kitchen and pantry depended on overseas suppliers before urging support for reciprocal 
trade.
661
 Other social leaders utilized this type of mass media to disseminate information 
on economics. 
Motivational speakers and clergy used the radio in communication with their 
flocks on tariffs and trade. Two figures exemplify this: Major Jealous Divine and Dr. 
Charles Copeland Smith. Father Divine was an African American spiritual revivalist, and 
he was similar to Father Charles Edward Coughlin in his populist leanings.
662
 For his 
sake, Coughlin supported the New Deal and advocated radical, socialist measures like the 
nationalization of industrial production and universal guarantees of economic outcomes. 
His theories garnered millions of followers in the 1930s.
663
 Later, on the other hand, 
Coughlin fell from favor when he turned on the supposed ―conservatism‖ of the New 
Deal and began to sympathize with the fascist movements of Europe for their anti-
Semitism and economic collectivism. Father Divine focused on popular morality: 
temperance, chastity, gambling, and squelching vices. In addition, he was an 
internationalist and a pacifist just like Hull.
664
 In an address in 1936, Divine advocated a 
100% moratorium on all tariffs and a global cession of war for an audience of supports 
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from all the parties—Democrats, Republicans, and even Communists.665 Dr. Charles 
Copeland Smith was an English-born but American-raised humanitarian and motivational 
speaker.
666
 He received the King‘s Medal from the British Parliament after the Great War 
for his charitable work, and he worked on improving labor relations with management in 
Chicago in the Roaring Twenties.
667
 On the radio, on March 27, 1938, Smith called Hull 
an emblem of a world based on non-intervention, treaties, law, order, conferences, 
disarmament, reciprocal trade, prosperity, equality of treatment (MFN), and open 
opportunity.
668
 These channels brought Americans information ―from above‖ on free 
trade and the New Deal. They responded, ―from below,‖ with their letters. 
Roosevelt received letters from ordinary Americans in support of reciprocal trade 
deals. The awesome preponderance of these communiqués was supportive; hence, freer 
trade added to support for Roosevelt and the New Deal. Capitalism as an economic 
system, in comparison to central planning, puts economic decisions about the allocation 
and use of resources in the hands of consumers, firms, and individual workers. Thus, it 
was imperative to hear some of their voices when discussing the effects of governmental 
policies on a market-based economy. For instance, D. S. Iglehart, president of W.R. 
Grace & Co. (a chemical and prescription drug manufacturer) messaged Roosevelt in 
June 1933 to support reciprocal trade, the proposed ―Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 
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1933,‖ and Hull‘s London caper.669 Iglehart claimed that he took a poll of 150 ―important 
manufacturers‖ on trade, and ―this elicited expression of opinion favorable to your [the 
Roosevelt administration‘s] policy.‖670 Businesses wanted more markets, according to 
Iglehart. In 1933, Howard S. Cullman (the commissioner of the New York Port 
Authority) wrote Roosevelt about the decline in activity for shippers, warehouses, 
dockworkers, and customs after the passage of Smoot-Hawley.
671
 As well, he supported 
―reciprocal tariff readjustments.‖672 Not everybody who wrote Roosevelt was in large-
scale commerce. A little girl in fifth grade, Anne Carter, wrote Roosevelt and told the 
president that the delicate balancing involved in the tariff issue worried her.
673
 She was 
serious: ―but I meann bussiness‖ [spelling original].674 Roosevelt eventually took this 
kind of advice, and he came over to the stance of the free traders. In 1935, Roosevelt 
approved a 50% reduction (from $1 to $0.50 per gallon) of the duty on imports of foreign 
alcohol.
675
 The president, therefore, brought cheaper alcohol and more selection to the 
American consumer with one swift stroke on tariffs. Letters continued to pour in after 
1933 and through the remnant of the decade on American foreign trade. 
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Roosevelt responded to a few of the key letters on trade. The correspondence 
between F. Edward O‘Neil and the president was a case in point. Officially, O‘Neal was 
the Missouri state chair of the National Committee for Reciprocal Trade.
676
 On 
November 18, 1935, O‘Neal wrote Roosevelt that over 100 firms in St. Louis alone 
would benefit from lower prices on materials from Canada upon the wrapping up of a 
reciprocal tariff agreement with Ottawa.
677
 Canadian exporters offered lower prices for 
grain, lumber, and minerals; moreover, selling finished goods in Canada was (potentially) 
lucrative. Notably, Roosevelt responded to O‘Neal, concurring on the wisdom of 
reciprocal trade and in particular on a trade deal with Canada.
678
 To quote, ―It is indeed 
reassuring to learn that more than one hundred concerns in St. Louis will derive benefits 
by resumption in the near future of trade with Canada hitherto hampered by tariff barriers 
which the new agreement is calculated to overcome.‖679 Old friends and allies refined this 
sentiment. Coudert wrote Roosevelt in 1935 and after reciprocal trade began to take 
affect: ―Surely this is one of the best things effected [sic] by American policy in 
years.‖680 Gardner Harding, the head of publicity for George Peek, converted to Hull‘s 
views on tariffs: ―I am offering you my own testimony in support of your foreign policy 
and your election campaign.‖681 Harding also wrote the article ―Foreign Trade in the 
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Public Interest‖ in support of trade, which appeared in Atlantic Monthly.682 Put simply, 
the 1930s embraced foreign trade as a part of the economics of the time, as the surviving 
and archived records demonstrated. 
* * * 
There are two main reasons to think about the reciprocal trade program as a part 
of the total package of the New Deal. Notably, trade policy was economic policy, and 
there is no such thing as a complete picture of a domestic economy without considering 
the international market in the same breaths. Policymakers in the Roosevelt 
administration like Cordell Hull and their economic advisors, such as Ezekiel Mordecai, 
understood these facts in designing a response to the Great Depression and the economic 
crisis of the early 1930s. Additionally, the actual people of the 1930s knew that reciprocal 
trade was, in fact, ―New Deal trade.‖ The division between the two came later, in the 
historiography, as the historical conception of the 1930s and the New Deal developed 
with a distinct lack of attention paid to trade policy. Americans in the 1930s thought 
about reciprocal trade in terms of the New Deal and about the New Deal having an 
international constituent. They expressed these conceptions in archived, recoverable 
sources: speeches from members of the Roosevelt administration, radio addresses, 
newspaper articles, editorials, and letters to the editor, and protests to politicians, letters 
to Hull, and messages to Roosevelt and a small quantity of responses back. International 
trade was a comprehensive issue in the 1930s in all economic, diplomatic, political, and 
social terms. Hull and the Department of State have not received their credit for engaging 
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with the United States and the rest of the world in the 1930s, and freer, reciprocal trade 
was much the issue that pushed it forward. 
165 
CHAPTER 6: NEW DEAL TRADE RECIPROCITY 
The American people in the 1930s were wise to support reciprocal trade, as Hull‘s 
trade programs brought numerous benefits. Freer trade meant a disproportionate recovery 
within the international market relative to the American economy overall. The trade 
connecting the United States and countries with a reciprocal deal and MFN status grew 
much faster than the trade with nations not involved in the program. Thus, trade helped 
American exporters, factories, farms, and workers find customers and jobs in a time of 
economic difficulties for nearly all individuals and households. Not all sectors of the 
economy grew equally, as agriculture continued to lag behind industry throughout the 
1930s. Yet, there were still gains, and there were no great threats to the total employment 
numbers or real price levels of the American economy from expanded international trade. 
Reciprocal trade had positive diplomatic effects in the dangerous, brooding world of the 
1930s, as well. Hull attracted immediate attention from foreign nations in 1933 and 
1934—foreign governments sought the new Secretary of State out to discuss the chances 
of a reciprocal trade deal, eager to enhance their economies through lower tariffs and 
access to the American market. Trade helped Hull in dealing with difficult problems in 
Latin America and helped prepare the United States and the Allies (if only inadvertently) 
for the Second World War in economic terms and by limited Axis access to South 
America. Trade continued through the war, and the program of reciprocal trade in the 
1930s served as a model for the world after the war based on liberal internationalism, 
equality of treatment, and free trade. The reciprocal trade program was an 
166 
underappreciated aspect of American history, and one of the successful parts of the 
exigent, taxing diplomacy and economics of the 1930s. 
Economic Analysis of Reciprocal Trade 
Cordell Hull and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 succeeded in 
expanding the United States‘ economy in a time of troubles. In the deepest of senses, to 
paraphrase from the French economist Claude Frédéric Bastiat, Hull ―saw the unseen‖—
the hidden, yet potential jobs and growth of a world of lower tariffs, increased exports, 
and lower consumer prices.
683
 In the 1930s, the Department of State considered the 
lowering of European tariffs on American farm products and American tariffs on 
European manufactured goods an indispensable policy.
684
 Such a design would help 
exporters, give farmers somewhere to empty their excess production, restore the 
prosperous economic balance of the 1920s, and foster closer diplomatic relations. As 
well, Hull wanted to help consumers. Roger Biles documented that the higher prices for 
commodities (in real terms) in the 1930s exacerbated the Great Depression and the 
economic ills of the era.
685
 Higher consumer prices increased income inequality and 
burdened household incomes in a time of high unemployment, so Hull took the step of 
reducing tariffs to help consumers, too.
686
 He and the Department of State had a lot to 
reverse to resuscitate the international trade back to the opulence of the Roaring 
Twenties. Mordecai Ezekiel provided a catalog: production subsidies, excess capacity, 
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warehoused surpluses, and depreciated currencies, nationalistic calls for ―self-
sufficiency,‖ and tariffs or quotas.687 It was a lot to tackle and maybe too much. 
Leuchtenburg described, somewhat sarcastically, ―Internationalists rejoiced in the 
triumph of their principles, and, throughout the decade, the public was given the image of 
Hull working miracles in breaking the fetters of international commerce.‖688 Results did 
not reflect this high billing. Nonetheless, Hull advanced the economy and the New Deal. 
Reciprocal trade did not produce recovery alone, but it helped, as the aggregate statistics 
involved showed. 
Reciprocal trade engendered disproportionate benefits to the international trade 
economy in comparison to the domestic economy. These gains to exporters and 
consumers overshadowed losses of protected groups, as the theory involved said the sum 
of the first two was greater than the latter. By 1939, the United States had signed twenty 
trade deals with other nations.
689
 This did not encompass the whole world economy, but it 
did include a significant portion of it. When Washington did sign a trade deal, the 
average reduction in tariff rates under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 was 
43%.
690
 The reduction in tariffs on agricultural goods averaged 44%; manufactured goods 
averaged 41%, raw materials 38%, foodstuffs 45%, processed foods 49%, light industry 
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and some semi-manufacturers 34%, and luxury manufacturers 33%.
691
 Thus, 
liberalization included all different types of industries, and consumers benefited from 
cheaper imports in the marketplace. Conversely, export industries grew under reciprocal 
trade and at a faster clip than the total economy. In 1933, in the dungeon of the Great 
Depression, the gross domestic product was $56.4 billion (1933 dollars) and American 
exports summed up to the total of $2 billion.
692
 By 1940, the gross domestic product grew 
to $85.61 billion (in 1933 dollars, which was an increase of 51.791%) and exports waxed 
to $4.55 billion in 1933 prices.
693
 Hence, the value of American exports more than 
doubled in seven years with a total change of 127.5%. Reciprocal and free trade programs 
help put the American and the world economy back on the right track, since these trade 
policies fostered more business with countries on a reciprocal plan in comparison to those 
who kept their higher tariffs. 
Year 
Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) 
Percentage Change 
from Previous Year 
American 
Exports 
Percentage Change 
from Previous Year 
1929 103.60 - 5.90 - 
1930 93.38 -9.865% 4.51 -23.559% 
1931 86.06 -7.839% 3.26 -27.716% 
1932 73.27 -14.862% 2.50 -23.313% 
1933 74.19 1.256% 2.63 5.20% 
1934 84.22 13.519% 3.32 26.236% 
1935 91.49 8.632% 3.49 5.12% 
1936 103.09 12.679% 3.69 5.731% 
1937 109.13 5.859% 4.75 29.428% 
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Figure 6.1 – All the figures are in billions of 1929 dollars for the sake of the price 
stability in the Roaring Twenties.
694
 Trade suffered in the tariff war of 1930 to 1932 (after 
Smoot-Hawley), and Hull stabilized the situation with the tariff truce of 1932 and 1933. 
Interestingly, trade‘s recovery does not track closely with the revival of the economy. 
Noticeably, exports exploded from 1936 to 1937—the year after ten reciprocal trade 
deals became legally effective.
695
 While this data is not conclusive, it was indicative that 
trade launched (in an outsized proportion) resurgence in American exporters and related 
industries, mostly by itself, outside of the growth of the rest of the economy. The 
reciprocal program came to life in 1936 with the involvement of many Latin American 
countries and the French Empire, so this makes sense from inside the numbers. 
 
International trade recovered much faster between the United States and countries 
with a reciprocal trade agreement than amid the United States and countries without a 
deal. According to Basil Rauch, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 brought 
economic growth in the international trade sector at triple the pace (or 200%) for 
countries with commercial reciprocity compared to those without a trade deal.
696
 Rauch 
was not the most accurate or precise with the 200% figure, but the available data backed 
the gist of his conclusion. In 1934, there was only one reciprocal trade deal, and it was 
with Cuba; by 1938, there were seventeen on the books.
697
 There were significantly large 
differences in the trajectory of trade relationships with the United States between the 
countries with deals and without deals from 1934 to 1938. In that period, exports to the 
―yes-RTA‖ countries increased 62.8%, and imports from them increased 21.6%.698 At the 
same period, exports to ―no-RTA‖ nations increased only 31.2% and imports from the 
no-RTA countries increased just 11.1%.
699
 The differences in the percentages were 
41.2% for exports and 20.1% for imports. However, there was a chance that the United 
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States‘ economy was naturally predisposed, through a combination of economic and 
secular forces, to grow in tune with certain nations. These might have been the countries, 
mostly coincidentally, involved in the trade deals program. Yet, these differences were 
too big to ascribe to ―natural predisposition,‖ and such a case ignores the new incentives 
created for individuals and firms in the face of lower tariffs. In addition, there was no set 
pattern to the nations involved in the trade program—it included five continents, most of 
Latin America, Canada, the British Empire, large countries in Europe, and minor 
European states. Thus, predilection had no apparent ―blueprint.‖ The program worked to 
reopen markets, especially in comparison to other methods. 
Exports 1934-1935 1937-1938 Growth Percentage Change 
Yes-RTA countries 759.8 1224.8 +465.0 +61.2% 
No-RTA countries 1448.0 1996.8 +548.8 +37.9% 
 
Figure 6.2 – All figures are in millions of nominal dollars.700 This information came from 
a Department of State report on the trade agreements program in 1939, which makes it 
all the more useful, as it revealed what policymakers like Hull actually knew at the time. 
Reciprocal trade only involved roughly a third of American exports, but it opened 
channels of commerce. This led to superior economic performance in comparison to the 
trade relationships with nations still struggling under Smoot-Hawley‘s high tariff 
schedule in the assorted customs houses. 
 
Imports 1934-1935 1937-1938 Growth Percentage Change 
Yes-RTA countries 793.9 1073.6 +297.7 +35.2% 
No-RTA countries 1057.4 1448.5 +391.1 +37.0% 
 
Figure 6.3 – All figures are in millions of nominal dollars.701 Contrary to the charges of 
Hoover, protectionists, and Governor Alf Landon, trade did not cost American producers 
much of a stake in the American market. In fact, imports from countries without a trade 
agreement and under Smoot-Hawley actually grew relatively quicker than imports from 
Yes-RTA nations. Therefore, Americans benefited more from lower foreign tariffs than 
from the high ones back at home. 
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Reciprocal trade paid healthy dividends for specific countries and industry. 
Critically, as well, Hull-style commercial reciprocity, MFN, and lower tariffs did much 
better in terms of pure economic performance when compared to other algorithms for 
liberalization. For example, in 1934, the volume of international trade involving the 
United States grew faster than it did for the entire European continent.
702
 Overall, 
European economies were in much better shape than the American one in the middle 
1930s. The Great Depression was not as bad in Europe, as the slump started in the United 
States through poor monetary policy. Europe was more proactive about the crisis while 
the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations offered only confusion or protectionism until 
1934. Europe was in a position to grow by 1934, and especially internationally—
European nations were small and adjacent to each other, and they had to trade together in 
order to survive. Yet, the United States beat Europe on growth in the international 
market. Hull had steered the United States to reciprocal trade, while Imperial Preference 
and bilateral barter agreements (the sort advocated by George N. Peek) were the rule in 
Europe.
703
 Hull put bilateral deals to shame. For instance, imports from Belgium 
increased a whopping 92.7% in the first year of a deal with Washington, while American 
exports to Belgium increased 66.6%.
704
 Steel, in particular, gained from reciprocal trade. 
American steel exports to Cuba increased 208.5% in the first year after a trade deal 
(while, in the same frame, the ―normal‖ growth rate for steel exports was 68.6%).705 Steel 
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meant power in the 1930s—steel symbolized the capacity to produce modern aircraft, 
guns, tanks, and warships in the event of armed conflict. Every world leader knew this, 
from Roosevelt to Joseph Stalin.
706
 Beyond steel, lower tariffs helped to invigorate 
certain industries out of the melancholy times of the Great Depression. 
Country 
Months 
(Number) 
Change in 
Exports 
Change in 
Imports 
Export per 
Month 
Import per 
Month 
Cuba Jan-Aug (8) 59% 228% 7.375% 28.5% 
Cuba Sep-Nov (3) 22% -73% 7.333% -24.333% 
Belgium May-Nov (7) 26% 56% 3.714% 8.0% 
Haiti Jun-Nov (6) 30% -10% 5.0% -1.667% 
Sweden Aug-Nov (4) 18% 25% 4.5% 6.25% 
 
Figure 6.4 – This shows the development of trade between the United States and a few 
other nations between 1934 and 1935 over a period of months, early in the life of the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. A Department of State office memorandum 
from 1936 collected the data itself.
707
 Trade agreements had to have some effect on trade 
relationships beyond the general economic recovery, since these stunning growth rates—
over a period of just months and not years—indicate a positive ―shock‖ to economy 
recovery through freer trade in the 1930s. 
 
While they did not benefit as much as industry, farmers saw gains from reciprocal 
trade. Under the leadership of such traders as Henry A. Wallace and Ezekiel Mordecai, 
the Department of Agricultural and the AAA utilized the Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Act of 1934 to expand farmers‘ customer bases for apples, lard, flour, cotton, and 
whatever commodities in surplus.
708
 International trade helped support sagging farm 
incomes.
709
 After all, despite its contributions and its system of price guarantees, the 
AAA did not and could not cultivate a comeback in the rural economy to the profitable 
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levels of the early 1920s.
710
 American farmers needed buyers, and government 
guarantees only took them so far. Total farm revenue was $4.7 billion nominal in 1932, 
rose to about $8.7 billion nominal in 1936, and then $9.2 nominal billion in 1937—still 
lower than the pinnacle of nearly $12 billion in 1929.
711
 Agriculturalist saw a way to 
combine the AAA with Hull‘s aspiration for commercial reciprocity. As an example, the 
AAA attempted a scheme were ranchers in the Southwest received lower prices for 
livestock feed via government guarantees.
712
 In exchange, Midwestern feed producers 
received compensation in lower tariffs from food-importing nations in reciprocation.
713
 
Therefore, ranchers had lower prices for inputs, farmers had exports, and foreign markets 
had lower prices—everybody gained and the efficiency of the economy increased by the 
resulting specialization from integrating trade. The stake of the rural economy in 
reciprocity never matched that of the consumer or industrial economies. Yet, there were 
some partial gains. Washington had to do something about the emergency in the rural 
economy, as farmers struggled in the 1920s and 1930s. 
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Year Farm Income
714
 Agricultural Exports
715
 Proportion Exports 
1929 11941 1692.9 14.177% 
1930 9454 1200.7 12.701% 
1931 6968 821.4 11.789% 
1932 5337 662.4 12.411% 
1933 6128 694.4 11.332% 
1934 6681 733.6 10.980% 
1935 8018 747.7 9.325% 
 
Figure 6.5 – Each of the numbers above is in millions of nominal dollars. Smoot-Hawley 
harmed the farmer, as farm exports struggled and declined through the early 1930s. 
Seeing this, from the actual archived documents that provided these numbers, economic 
policymakers like Hull and Wallace took the step of reducing tariffs and expanding 
American farm and food exports abroad to support farm incomes and increase the 
proportion of exports. Note these numbers only include market sales and not the 
government transfer payments from the AAA or other hefty agencies. 
 
Popular conceptions of the Great Depression usually remember the period for its 
high unemployment—and not for bad reason. Fully one-third of Americans were 
unemployed at the height of the Great Depression.
716
 Free trade risked some job losses in 
reallocation, but it also held the possibility of job and productivity gains. Some numbers 
here were useful. According to Mordecai Ezekiel in the 1930s, the American labor forced 
totaled 48.8 million in 1934.
717
 He figured 25.4 million people worked in industries 
unaffected by trade policy.
718
 He calculated 7.2 million workers would benefit from trade 
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liberalization while 16.2 million could lose from free trade.
719
 Here, on the surface, it 
appeared that trade was a ―bad deal‖ for the American worker. Yet, he maintained that 
the benefits to the smaller group of workers and to consumers (in the form of lower 
prices) would eclipse the losses for the threatened 16.2 million.
720
 There would be 
reallocations, readjustments, and unemployment; however, the free movement of capital 
and labor to productive and export-oriented industries would leave the national economy 
in better shape. Therefore, the brand of protectionism exemplified by Smoot-Hawley 
stunted the rise of potential growth fields by locking resources in ossified ventures. 
Likewise, protectionism failed to protect high wages. For instance, in 1935, 7.3 million 
Americans worked in industry.
721
 From that, 570 thousand made products for export and 
412 thousand were under tariff protections.
722
 Average wages for ―export workers‖ was 
$1,364 per year, but ―protected workers‖ averaged a mere $827 per year.723 As such, 
tariffs tended to defend unproductive enterprises, and they failed to produce higher 
wages. Productivity was the key with the labor market. In the late 1920s, for example, 
American textile workers were just as productive as European ones. It took $0.045 of 
wages in the United States to make a yard of cloth, $0.0433 in Britain, $0.044067 in 
Germany, and $0.0535 in France.
724
 American wages were competitive in real terms, and 
workers in the United States were more prone to embrace mechanization or work 
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multiple looms at the same time.
725
 Trade liberalization helped the United States‘ 
economy stand up in the late 1930s, and it provided leadership in a darkening geopolitical 
world in the decade. 
Diplomatic Analysis of Reciprocal Trade 
The diplomacy of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and Hull‘s 
program was one of the underrated but qualified successes of Roosevelt‘s foreign policy. 
Obviously, on some fundamental level, world diplomacy failed in the 1930s. Leaders 
failed to address the underlying problems of the Great War‘s repercussion, to stop 
totalitarianism, and to prevent the coming of the Second World War. There were chances 
to do so—Japan‘s invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Italy and Abyssinia in 1935, and 
Germany with Czechoslovakia in 1938. Reciprocal trade and the New Deal confronted 
such a world, but war in the 1940s was not a foregone conclusion in the 1930s. Arthur W. 
Schatz described Hull‘s view, ―Although the Trade Agreements Act was passed as an 
emergency measure to aid domestic recovery, Hull insisted from the outset that the 
program was an important diplomatic tool.‖726 Ironically, this diplomatic historian tried 
to claim reciprocal trade away from economic history, which had neglected it in the first 
place.
727
 On the other hand, Schatz‘s notion hits accurately on the ―other side‖ of the 
program besides recovery under the New Deal—the restoration of normal, peaceful 
commercial relations amid nations after Smoot-Hawley to develop economic 
interdependence, peace, and prosperity. Tariff reductions were economic leadership and 
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diplomatic genius in a time of crisis.
728
 In addition, besides the liberalization, Hull had 
other internationalist designs. He hoped the gains from reciprocal trade would increase 
the nostalgia for Wilsonian foreign policy and allow the United States finally to join the 
League of Nations.
729
 From there, he wanted Washington and the rest of the Roosevelt 
administration to lead the globe to a final, lasting peace. 
In addition to the economic ones, the leaders of the 1930s knew the diplomatic 
goals of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. There were some disagreements 
inside of the Roosevelt administration over Hull‘s agenda for diplomatic engagement 
through trade deals.
730
 However, there was not that much, in particular, after the 
economic nationalists like Raymond Moley and George N. Peek returned to private 
life.
731
 Roosevelt and officials in the Department of State (such as Sumner Welles, 
Undersecretary of State from 1937 to 1943) agreed with Hull that freer trade helped 
improve international relations, and they shared a similar ideological view on the issue.
732
 
Their disagreements tended to be about conflicting personalities and immediate politics, 
rather than solid policy.
733
 Economic nationalists saw what Hull was trying to achieve 
diplomatically and objected to it. They believed reciprocal trade would drag the United 
States out of isolationism and into world affairs.
734
 Logically, to the approach of Moley 
and Peek, a repeat of the Merchants of Death and the Great War followed. Hull‘s policies 
were necessarily incompatible with this view; yet, he had won the government and 
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Roosevelt‘s judgment over to reciprocal trade by 1934.735 Hull dreamed of prosperity and 
peace through trade: ―I repeated with emphasis the economic program of this 
Government and pointed out that it was much broader in its objectives than mere dollars 
and cents […] it contemplated normal restoration of international trade and the 
consequent removal of a large range of both economic and political difficulties and 
controversies‖ [emphasis added].736 Thus, he wanted it all, and other countries reacted 
favorably to the possibility of trade liberalization throughout the 1930s. 
Crucially, reciprocal trade was the United States showing headship after the 
disasters of the Smoot-Hawley tariff and the World Economic Conference. The most 
notable feature of the correspondence between Hull as Secretary of State and the 
ambassadors of foreign lands in the 1930s was the number of diplomats who—without 
prompting—approached Hull on the chances of a trade deal with the United States. That 
is, they came to Hull to make a deal, and not the other way around. There was a litany of 
examples of this phenomenon. The French specifically came to Hull to ask for a 
reciprocal trade treaty; Washington and Paris concluded one in 1936.
737
 The trade deal 
with France proceeded despite the longstanding debate between the two governments 
over the repayment of war debts, the subjugation of Germany, and the gold standard. The 
Greek government agreed to the tariff truce, but as tax revenue declined with economic 
activity in the early 1930s, Greece could not adhere to it.
738
 Athens was almost insolvent; 
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thus, the League of Nations enforced a high tariff regime around Greece for emergency 
income.
739
 Haiti approached the United States in hope of a reciprocal tariff agreement in 
1934 in order to sell excess coffee, bananas, and sugar production on the American 
market.
740
 Port-au-Prince imagined that lower Haitian tariffs would attract American 
investors to their half of Hispaniola and stimulate overall growth.
741
 The Japanese 
ambassador in Washington, Katsuji Debuchi, called up Hull after the London Conference 
to inquire still about ―reciprocity negotiations‖ between Washington and Tokyo.742 The 
Portuguese ambassador visited Hull on November 3, 1933 to express interest in a 
reciprocal trade agreement.
743
 That is, Lisbon (and not Hull) asked for inclusion. Uruguay 
asked Hull about the possibilities of a trade agreement.
744
 As late as 1936, Yugoslavia 
contacted him for the chances of a trade deal.
745
 There were others involved, too. 
The possibilities of trade liberalization and lower American tariffs in the 1930s 
allowed Hull and the Department of State many opportunities for engagement. 
Furthermore, successful trade negotiations generated goodwill, which could ―spill over‖ 
into all areas of foreign policy. Some of the foreign ambassadors, diplomats, and 
governments were more adamant about free trade and MFN than Hull himself. For 
example, the Belgian Trade Commissioner to the United States, M. Forthomme, visited 
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him in Washington in 1935.
746
 Afterwards, he reported that, ―The Trade Commissioner 
was very cordial and even profuse in his greetings and comment on the benefits of a trade 
agreement and of the initiative on the part of this government in favor of more liberal 
commercial policy.‖747 Two years previously, a similar incident occurred between the 
Argentine ambassador and Hull: ―The Argentine Ambassador came in and indicated a 
special interest in the matter of reciprocal commercial agreements based on tariff 
concessions.‖748 He asked the ambassador, Felipe A. Espil, for more patience. He told 
Espil to support the World Economic Conference and to wait for the American tariff law 
in summer 1933.
749
 This was not their first meeting either, as he told Espil something 
very similar just a week before.
750
 Some countries wanted to participate in the trade 
program, but they could not for various diplomatic or economic reasons in the exigencies 
of the 1930s. For example, the Hungarian ambassador, John Pelenyi, congratulated Hull 
on the success of trade.
751
 However, Pelenyi expressed his lament that Budapest could 
not participate, as Hungary‘s landlocked geography forced it to engage in barter 
agreements primarily with Germany, Balkan nations, and along the Danube River.
752
 The 
mistakes of 1933 in London and Washington fumbled some of Hull‘s chances for 
breakthroughs on trade liberalization. Then, they dimmed part of the enthusiasm for 
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economic recovery through freer trade in the 1930s. Hull still had to answer for the 
Smoot-Hawley tariff and the mistakes of the London Conference to foreign diplomats. 
 
Figure 6.6 – This map shows the nations involved in the Hull program.753 Michael A. 
Butler provided the list—but through only 1939.754 The United States and its possessions 
are in gray. Violet represents the 1934 deal with Cuba. Deals from 1935 (Belgium, Haiti, 
and Sweden) are orange. Deals from 1936 (Brazil, Colombia, Canada, Honduras, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Nicaragua, Guatemala, France, and Finland) are blue. Deals 
from 1937 (Costa Rica and El Salvador) are gold. Deals from 1938 (Czechoslovakia and 
Ecuador) are green. The 1939 deal with Britain is red. The coloration includes the 
British, Dutch, and French Empires. However, archived documents revealed there were 
eight trade deals in the 1940s (with Turkey, Venezuela, Argentina, Peru, Uruguay, 
Mexico, Iceland, and Iran); they are in cyan.
755
 Butler failed to note these, and—as far as 
I can see—no historian hitherto has ever mentioned specifics on them. This discovery, 
while quite accidental on my part, warrants further research on reciprocal trade, 
especially regarding foreign affairs and strategic resources during the Second World 
War. 
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Resentment of the Smoot-Hawley tariff and the debacle in London handcuffed 
Hull‘s diplomacy. This was not completely the case, as reciprocal trade was still able to 
engross much of the globe, but there were frictions. In 1935, Prime Minister Joseph 
Lyons from Australia (in office from 1932 to 1939) visited Hull.
756
 Hull kept things 
diplomatic and jovial, but Lyon spent the meeting complaining about Washington‘s 
tariffs on Australian meat and wine.
757
 Hull tried to express a desire for lessened tariffs, 
but he had little room to stand on in the debate.
758
 American legislative history (the 
Fordney-McCumber tariff of 1922, the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930, and the minor tariff 
hikes of the AAA in 1933) made him look like a hypocrite. Specific provisions in the 
Smoot-Hawley law haunted him.
759
 As late as 1939, Smoot-Hawley adjusted for the 
―unfair advantages‖ posed by subsidies for companies competing with American firms.760 
For example, Hull was powerless to halt tariff hikes against Italy when the Department of 
the Treasury found Rome had riddled Italy with subsidies.
761
 This made the American 
position appear duplicitous. While there was a deal with Argentina in 1941, the mistakes 
of 1933 cost Hull a shot at a pact with Argentina in 1934.
762
 Espil contacted Hull‘s office 
in October 1933 to articulate concerns about the Department of Agriculture‘s plan to add 
surcharges to Argentina exports to the United States; Espil claimed it would be harmful 
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to ―trade prospects.‖763 Washington and Buenos Aires conducted negotiations through 
late 1933.
764
 Prior to Montevideo, however, Hull worried about going too far with 
Argentina. He did not want to attract the fire of economic nationalists, and (since 
Roosevelt shelved the trade bill in 1933) he lacked the legal basis for any reciprocal trade 
deals. Argentina refused to yield, and Espil contacted him about the chances of an 
Argentina-United States trade deal in February 1934.
765
 Hull had to turn him back 
without a ―Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1933‖ to sanction a path forward.766 The 
Department of Agriculture‘s small tariffs made him look bad, and the lack of a novel 
trade bill forced him to postpone the Argentineans to the point that Buenos Aires lost all 
interest. The year 1933 was a washout for trade, and the two countries did not return to 
the table until 1940. 
Sweden was another exciting case of international enthusiasm for Hull‘s program 
for lower tariffs. The Swedish ambassador, W. Bostrom, called Hull in February 1934 to 
talk about the possibilities for a reciprocal bill from Congress in 1934 and Sweden‘s wish 
to be included in any American trade liberalization.
767
 Again, Stockholm came looking to 
negotiate with him, and not the other way around. After the passage of the reciprocal law, 
Bostrom returned to Sweden on official business and for a short vacation before the 
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winter in September 1934.
768
 He gave a summary of the new American position on tariffs 
while there in order to ―push the ball rolling‖ back in Sweden.769 Negotiations began and 
continued throughout the winter of 1934 and 1935, but what was notable about Sweden 
was its impatience. In February 1935, Bostrom called Hull again to complain about the 
slow pace of negotiations between trade representatives of the two nations.
770
 Hull had to 
explain carefully his prudence on the issue in light of the protectionist lobby in 
Washington, the necessity of the MFN principle to expand the program, and the fragile 
nature of the reciprocal trade program before it took off in 1936.
771
 Swedish fortitude 
paid off, however, as the Sweden-United States trade pact of 1936 was one of the first 
half-dozen of the system.
772
 Bostrom told Hull that he was, ―gratified with the conclusion 
of the trade agreement between our two countries.‖773 Moreover, trade made Hull 
somewhat popular inside of Sweden itself. For example, a release by the Swedish 
People‘s Party (a group of social liberals) included this blurb: ―He [Hull] is at the 
moment America‘s outstanding free trader, and [he] has done a great deal to lower tariff 
walls.‖774 Hence, some of the Swedish press liked him, and reciprocal trade continued to 
earn the United States increased respect. 
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Spain and Reciprocal Trade 
The economics and diplomacy between Spain, the United States, and their 
economies in the early 1930s is a fascinating case study of the full impact of reciprocal 
trade programs. Madrid and Washington, after the Spanish-American War, fought a low 
intensity trade war from 1898 to 1930.
775
 Fordney-McCumber raised tariffs against 
Spanish exports in 1922, sanitary relations at American ports in 1923 increased costs for 
Spanish firms, Smoot-Hawley raised anti-Spanish tariffs, and Madrid retaliated by 
increasing its tariffs on American automobiles and manufactured goods.
776
 These new 
Spanish tariffs were particular harmful to the United States, as the majority of Spanish 
imports came from the United States, while the majority of Spanish exports went to the 
rest of Europe. For instance, in 1935, the United States exported 147.6 million worth of 
gold pesetas to Spain; Germany was the next biggest competitor, near 130.3 million, 
Britain third at 91.5 million, and France a distant fourth at 48.8 million.
777
 Conversely, 
Spain itself exported the most to Britain at approximately 137.4 million gold pesetas; 
Germany second at 74.8 million, France third at 68.9 million, and the United States 
fourth at 55.9 million.
778
 Thus, the trade war from 1930 to 1932 threatened American 
commerce more than Spanish—the United States had more to lose. By the early 1930s, 
Spain wanted to restore its balance of trade by exporting its Mediterranean staples, such 
as onions, almonds, wine, cork, and silver, to the United States in exchange for American 
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goods like cars, trucks, tires, cotton, tobacco, and farm products.
779
 In 1929, the volume 
of international commerce amid the United States and Spain was $45 million nominal, 
which slipped to $19 million nominal by 1933 (down 57.78%).
780
 Both sides could gain 
inexpensively through the restoration of this quantity. 
Spanish diplomats were particularly unrelenting about reciprocal trade with Hull. 
They were more demanding than even the Swedes or any other nation recorded in the 
correspondence. The Spanish ambassador, Juan Francisco de Cardenas, called Hull at the 
behest of Madrid to ask about the American proclivity for (or lack thereof) for a Spanish-
United States reciprocal deal in 1933.
781
 To boot, Cardenas demanded a specific date for 
the beginning of the negotiations and a target for the completion of the final accord.
782
 
Hull pushed Cardenas off; he lacked much of a legal grounding for such negotiations 
without a reciprocal trade law. Cardenas, however, did not give up. The Spanish 
contacted the Secretary of State at least six times over the next eighteen months, and each 
time to ask about the possibilities of a trade treaty between Washington and Madrid.
783
 
Spain needed a deal with the United States, as Spain needed help on the international 
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market. In 1934, Spain‘s total imports were $38 million and total exports were $19 
million.
784
 Hence, Spain ran a negative balance of trade in the 1930s, and the Madrid 
government struggled to finance its activities. Spanish firms and households had to 
borrow abroad against their future earnings, or they had to sell foreign assets to make up 
the difference. This situation depressed Spanish wages and reduced the tax base of the 
government. Tragically, Hull delayed Cardenas and the Spanish for too long. It was too 
late come 1936. The Spanish Civil War erupted in July 1936, and American foreign 
policy shifted to military concerns.
785
 The new Spanish ambassador, Fernando de los 
Rios, visited Hull to request arms and support for the Royalist government, but American 
neutrality and the end of major commercial relations between Spain and the United States 
meant that Hull had to turn him down.
786
 Amongst warring nations, the chance for freer 
trade was gone. Hull did not move fast enough with Spain, but he did work rapidly in 
other parts of the planet in building a ―Yankee trade‖ superstructure. 
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Figure 6.7 – The above shows the volume of Spanish-American trade from 1925 to 
1934.
787
 The chief drop happened from 1929 to 1931, which included the apex of the 
Great Depression and the implementation of the Smoot-Hawley tariff. Notably, Spanish-
American trade declined more than the standard ―one-third‖ fall of the early 1930s in 
metrics. This indicated that tariff policy had an effect on the economy beyond deflation 
and stagnation (even when accounting for the monetary challenges of the early 1930s). 
Smoot-Hawley‘s trade war hurt both these economies. 
 
Latin America and Reciprocal Trade 
Reciprocal trade, a cornerstone of the Good Neighbor and New Deal diplomacy, 
was a great success in Latin America. Hull and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 
1934 helped Latin American economies expand, fostered interconnectivity with the 
United States, and kept South American nations from tending towards the Axis in the late 
1930s. Part of the idea of the Good Neighbor in Latin America was repairing the damage 
the early Great Depression and the Smoot-Hawley tariff. In 1929, American exports to 
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Latin America totaled over $1 billion, but this number shrunk to $291 million by 1933.
788
 
There was a huge decline in the overall volume of trade, and the balance swung more in 
the United States‘ direction, which peeved governments from Mexico City to Buenos 
Aires.
789
 Roosevelt and Hull wanted to overturn this state back to ―the glory days‖ of the 
late 1920s. To quote Robert F. Smith again, ―Hull and Roosevelt hoped that the 
stimulation of liberal economic policies would lead to an integrated hemisphere, open to 
the trade and investment expansion of the United States.‖790 Thus, Hull had Roosevelt‘s 
ear on the issue. Conversely, he had to worry about protectionist criticisms about Latin 
America. For instance, after the deal with Brazil, American manganese producers, 
Tugwell, and protectionist members of Congress threatened to undo the valuable 1934 
law.
791
 Trade deals in Latin America closely integrated the economies of Central and 
South America with that of the United States; therefore, if only incidentally, trade helped 
prepare the Western Hemisphere for war or common self-defense.
792
 The trade pacts kept 
a bad economic situation from becoming worse, and they served as a weapon of 
economic diplomacy in the struggle between the nascent Axis and Allies in Latin 
America in the 1930s.
793
 It all started at the Montevideo Conference, where Hull had his 
original conquest to bring Roosevelt into his trading camp. 
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The Montevideo Conference of 1933 first enshrined Hull‘s effectiveness as a 
diplomat in Latin America.
794
 He had learned plentiful tough lessons about conference 
diplomacy and the complex interactions between national delegations (and even within 
the delegations of a single country, including the American one) at the London 
Conference.
795
 He put these lessons to work in Montevideo: he engaged with as many 
different delegations as possible, brokered some deals, maintained the solidarity of the 
American group, made concessions by allowing non-American chairs of conference 
subcommittees, and avoided the thorny monetary policy.
796
 Moreover, in a stroke of 
fortune, his office booked his stateroom to Montevideo on the same liner, SS American 
Legion, as many of the foreign delegations.
797
 Upon realizing this, Hull did not waste 
time, and he conducted unofficial diplomacy for a week before reaching Uruguay.
798
 The 
declaration of the Good Neighbor policy made Hull appear magnanimous in Latin 
American. To demonstrate, La Razón, a newsweekly in Spanish from Uruguay, described 
Hull in glowing terms as a diplomat, plus a leader, a liberal, and global champion of freer 
trade: 
Es a caso el único gobernante en el mundo que ha unido la práctica a la 
prédica en la necesidad de restablecer la cooperación económica 
internacional quebraba en mil pedazos por el desastre de los cambios y la 
política nacionalista à outrance. 
 
He is perhaps the only world leader who has united practice to preaching 
on the necessity of reestablishing international economic cooperation, 
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which was broken into a thousand pieces by the disasters of exchanges and 
the policy of nationalism à outrance.
799
 
 
The Montevideo Conference produced a dialogue amid the United States and Latin 
American on trade policy. It also generated goodwill and popularity towards Hull and a 
few solid gains on the actual trade policies of governments. For example, Mexico, 
Uruguay, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Panama were not on the United States‘ list of 
most-favored nations prior to the Montevideo Conference.
800
 Argentina, Paraguay, 
Bolivia, and Costa Rica had a conditional MFN status.
801
 Reciprocal trade extended MFN 
status to all. Thus, all but three of these nations (which were only a section of those at 
Montevideo) joined the Hull program, modified their tariffs, adopted MFN, and came 
closer to the United States as a matter of course.
802
 
After Montevideo, the Good Neighbor policy and reciprocal trade combined to 
enhance the American position with Latin American governments. To quote from 
Roosevelt‘s declaration of the Good Neighbor policy from his first inaugural address, ―I 
would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor—the neighbor who 
resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others—the 
neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements.‖803 In 
his fashion, he had rhetorical flamboyance in issuing the Good Neighbor policy, but he 
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lacked on some details. Hence, it was up to Hull and the Department of State to turn the 
―Good Neighbor‖ platitude into solid diplomacy in Latin America and around the world. 
The true viscera of the approach for American diplomacy in the 1930s consisted of the 
reciprocal trade agreements.
804
 Butler explained the promise of non-interventionism on 
the part of Washington was popular in the New World.
805
 On the other hand, non-
interventionism was more about bandaging ills in the region in relation to American 
militarism, and it was not about making policy for the future.
806
 This is where Hull‘s 
prospectus entered. The two prongs of the Good Neighbor policy ―offensive‖ (non-
interventionism and freer trade) combined to improve American standing in the Latin 
America in the late 1930s.
807
 The two approaches mixed and complimented each other: 
Panama, for example, appreciated non-interventionism; Cuba and Haiti valued 
liberalization more.
808
 Hull considered the Good Neighbor policy of trade and non-
interventionism a decisive factor in keeping Latin American countries out of the Second 
World War and the Axis.
809
 For example, after Pearl Harbor, nearly all Latin American 
governments sent condolences to Washington and did not apply their neutrality acts 
against the United States as a ―belligerent‖ like the Axis.810 Overall, Latin America was a 
success for Hull and reciprocal trade, but the 1930s did not become a peaceful decade. 
There was trouble in Latin America in the 1930s, and Hull and the Department of 
State addressed it via reciprocal trade. European movements in the region, and in 
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particular the designs of Germany and Italy, were of the most concern. For instance, 
Laurence Duggan (the head of the South American desk at the Department of State in the 
1930s and 1940s) wrote Undersecretary Welles that there might be attempts to ―re-
colonize‖ Latin America and the New World through a number of different means.811 
Duggan feared that certain European governments (and without a shadow of a doubt the 
Axis ones) would use diplomatic coercion, outright military aggression, offers of 
alliances, promises of expanded territory or economic benefits, or other means to bring 
Latin American countries into their sphere of influence or into the Axis.
812
 There was a 
trend to protectionism before Hull entered office, as well. Guatemala and Peru raised 
their general tariff rates in 1929.
813
 Cuba and Mexico did the same in 1930.
814
 Hence, 
American diplomats had to worry about foreign aggression as well as increased 
protectionism in the 1930s.
815
 Reciprocal trade addressed both these concerns. It bucked 
the protectionism by lowering tariffs, and it drew countries together into an economic 
network of cooperation and interdependence with the United States. Trade was very 
successful in creating such a hemisphere. To demonstrate, in 1939, Hull almost managed 
to bring all twenty-one independent nations of the New World into a defensive 
alliance.
816
 However, Argentina refused, and Hull nixed the agreement without the 
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approval of all parties.
817
 This established a pattern; Latin Americans had to keep their 
eyes on Argentina in the 1930s and especially in the 1940s after the coup of 1943. 
Relations amid Argentina and the United States from 1933 to 1945 were a prime 
example of international trade‘s influence on ―traditional‖ diplomacy. Economically, the 
two sides needed each other. For example, Argentina was a source of a number of 
products on the domestic market for American consumers.
818
 This included flaxseeds, 
leather, hides, wool, and other commodities to diversify the animal-based wares available 
to American purchasers.
819
 Hull even commented in a report on a conversation with 
Felipe A. Espil, ―Our country would, at least for some years, need a substantial amount of 
flaxseed, hides, and possibly wool […] produced by his country, to supply the deficiency 
of our domestic production.‖820 Besides the American need for a number of Argentinean 
products, Buenos Aires desired of the United States a place to sell surplus farm 
production. To quote again from the report, ―The Ambassador then offered the suggestion 
that if by some arrangement the Argentine could export 2% of its meat production to the 
United States that would solve their domestic meat problem.‖821 Thus, Argentina needed 
the United States—and more than the reverse. Buenos Aires faced overproduction in the 
rural economy, glut, and failures. Argentinean ranchers needed exports to keep prices 
higher. Argentina and the United States (on literal opposite ends of the globe) were 
natural trading partners on agriculture. Both occupied fecund lands, the Atlantic made 
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exchanging surpluses cheap, and the summers in the Northern Hemisphere corresponded 
to winters in the Southern Hemisphere (and the opposite). Each side could help cover 
spring shortages with fall harvests. On the other hand, Argentinean politics drifted 
rightwards in the late 1930s, which culminated in the military takeover of 1943 and the 
ascendency of Juan Perón in 1945—however, the trade issue kept the United States and 
Argentina linked. They had signed a reciprocal trade deal in 1941.
822
 Despite fascist 
proclivities and a large Italian Argentinean population, Buenos Aires was in Hull‘s 
network. In the end, they needed the prosperity of the American market more than a war. 
Germany and Reciprocal Trade 
The Department of State‘s trade policy, under Hull‘s tutelage, intended free trade 
to serve as an aegis against the growing militarism of the 1930s. Hull wanted reciprocal 
trade to promote recovery, prosperity, interdependence, interconnectivity, efficiency, 
engagement, alliances, and collective security amongst liberal nations. He understood the 
threat posed by militarism; trade was a part of the necessary response. To quote from his 
report on a dialogue with the Belgian ambassador, ―I […] emphasized the broad objective 
and the extreme necessity for the success of the economic program this country is 
supporting, as well as how vital I consider it that important countries, especially in 
Europe, do likewise; and that this offers the only alternative to a purely militaristic 
course.‖823 Yet, the totality of the situation goes further. He believed that expanded 
international trade could prevent military conflict or shape a war‘s outcomes. Groups of 
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trade agreements, economic strength, and interdependence could serve as deterrents plus 
sprouting alliances against totalitarian rulers. Indeed, Hull succeeded, as the map of the 
participants in the reciprocal program includes no future Axis Powers and the vast 
majority of the Allied Powers in the 1940s.
824
 Serendipitously, he even marked Germany, 
Italy, and Japan for being impudent on trade policy—in 1936: ―It must be patent that such 
countries and Japan, Italy, and Germany, with either actual or implied force behind their 
movements, would be dominating virtually all phases of international finance and 
commerce.‖825 Hull recorded this troika as being headstrong on trade three years before 
the Pact of Steel and four years prior to the Tripartite Act.
826
 He tried to use trade to 
strengthen the position of nations in the path of the budding Axis‘ advance, even if he 
could not describe them in such terms. To demonstrate, Austria was in a dreadful 
economic and strategic position, stuck between Germany and Italy. Hull told Vienna the 
United States was eager to help dispose of Austrian production on the American 
market.
827
 In the end, however, reciprocal trade did not prevent another war. Conversely, 
it did assemble much of the diplomatic lineup, and trade relationships influenced the 
outcome of the war by bringing more countries into the American encampment and 
economic ―ring‖ of relationships. 
Reciprocal trade helped hem the growing Axis into less significant spheres of 
influence in the late 1930s and 1940s. Hull disliked the autocratic governments of the 
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future Axis, and he detested them for being particularly recalcitrant about the restoration 
of an international economy after the Great Depression.
828
 Resistances to the trade 
liberalization program was ―strike one‖ to him, and this colored his view of Berlin and 
Rome. He was the first executive in the Roosevelt administration to recognize and detest 
the autarkic, anti-democratic policies of the German and Italian regimes.
829
 The 
internationalists in him distrusted their hyper-nationalist nature, and their opposition to 
free trade confirmed his and Roosevelt‘s fears.830 In broadest terms, the autocratic states 
of Europe were not interested in reciprocal trade—they needed to prepare their 
economies for wartime autarky via peacetime isolation. Specialism and interconnectivity 
would only have weakened the aggressors once the fighting started; thus, they avoided 
trade. After attempts at a barter system, Hull blacklisted Germany from the trade 
agreements program for discriminating against American production on the German 
home market.
831
 In addition, Berlin had a habit of delaying American feelers about 
expanded trade relations, which only made the White House think about German autarky 
in terms of German militarism.
832
 Competition between the United States and Germany 
on the international market was critical, and trade greatly helped Hull‘s maneuvering. For 
example, American imports from the sixteen nations agreeing to a trade deal with 
Washington by 1938 increased 39.8% from period 1934-1935 to 1936-1938.
833
 
Conversely, German imports over the same timeframe and with the same countries 
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increased 1.8% (a twenty-fold difference).
834
 The American economy geared itself for 
prosperity and trade throughout the world, while Germany retooled for autarky and a new 
war. There were some specific points of departure in this diplomatic and economic 
competition, as well. 
Brazil had a choice between the United States and Germany in the middle of the 
1930s, and Rio de Janeiro selected the former when it joined the reciprocal trade 
initiative. The level of Axis involvement in South American during the 1930s and 1940s, 
its strategic implications, and its trueness are matters of conjecture. Nevertheless, in the 
case of Brazil, it was apparent that the international trade question marked a clear point of 
divergence in Rio de Janeiro amid the Axis and Allies. German diplomacy and espionage 
was active in Brazil in the 1930s for the sake of the large German Brazilian population, 
Brazil‘s place as the ―leading nation‖ of Latin America, its mineral wealth, and the 
potential for naval and U-Boat bases on the South Atlantic coastline.
835
 In the 1940s, 
Nazi agitators were present in Brazil during the Rio de Janeiro Conference of New World 
states.
836
 Yet, despite this, Latin American countries agreed to the American demand to 
sever diplomatic relations (though not to declare war) with the Axis after the 
conference.
837
 Hull approached Brazil about commerce reciprocity in 1935, hoping to 
bring them into the agenda.
838
 Like Germany, Hull believed that the rest of Latin America 
would jump the way Brazil went. The negotiations between the United States and Brazil 
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were tense from a geopolitical viewpoint. Furthermore, Brazil delayed a German 
delegation through 1934 in hope of a trade deal with the United States.
839
 With these 
stakes, Hull easily became impatient with Brazil. For example, he called the Brazilian 
ambassador to his office in Washington several times in order to lecture him on the 
slowness of the agreement‘s final approval in Rio de Janeiro.840 He did not want to lose 
his ―gateway‖ to the rest of Latin America, and he seriously feared the Brazilians would 
turn to the Germans. However, Brazil did not, and it attached Hull‘s program. 
Conjecturally, it is not difficult to imagine American relations with Brazil and the rest of 
Latin America taking a very different path without reciprocal trade. The circumstances 
presented a distinct choice for Brazil between the Axis and Allies. If Hull had not been 
there with free trade, then Germany was ready to step into the breach. Thankfully, he was 
there, and he never gave Hitler and the Germans the opportunity at a strong foothold in 
South America. 
Japan and Reciprocal Trade 
Brazil had a choice between the United States and Germany in the middle of the 
1930s, and Rio de Janeiro selected the former when it joined the reciprocal trade 
initiative. The level of Axis involvement in South American during the 1930s and 1940s, 
its strategic implications, and its trueness are matters of conjecture. Nevertheless, in the 
case of Brazil, it was apparent that the international trade question marked a clear point of 
divergence in Rio de Janeiro amid the Axis and Allies. German diplomacy and espionage 
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was active in Brazil in the 1930s for the sake of the large German Brazilian population, 
Brazil‘s place as the ―leading nation‖ of Latin America, its mineral wealth, and the 
potential for naval and U-Boat bases on the South Atlantic coastline.
841
 In the 1940s, 
Nazi agitators were present in Brazil during the Rio de Janeiro Conference of New World 
states.
842
 Yet, despite this, Latin American countries agreed to the American demand to 
sever diplomatic relations (though not to declare war) with the Axis after the 
conference.
843
 Hull approached Brazil about commerce reciprocity in 1935, hoping to 
bring them into the agenda.
844
 Like Germany, Hull believed that the rest of Latin America 
would jump the way Brazil went. The negotiations between the United States and Brazil 
were tense from a geopolitical viewpoint. Furthermore, Brazil delayed a German 
delegation through 1934 in hope of a trade deal with the United States.
845
 With these 
stakes, Hull easily became impatient with Brazil. For example, he called the Brazilian 
ambassador to his office in Washington several times in order to lecture him on the 
slowness of the agreement‘s final approval in Rio de Janeiro.846 He did not want to lose 
his ―gateway‖ to the rest of Latin America, and he seriously feared the Brazilians would 
turn to the Germans. However, Brazil did not, and it attached Hull‘s program. 
Conjecturally, it is not difficult to imagine American relations with Brazil and the rest of 
Latin America taking a very different path without reciprocal trade. The circumstances 
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presented a distinct choice for Brazil between the Axis and Allies. If Hull had not been 
there with free trade, then Germany was ready to step into the breach. Thankfully, he was 
there, and he never gave Hitler and the Germans the opportunity at a strong foothold in 
South America. 
The international market affected the relationship between the United States and 
Japan in the 1930s. Souring trade relationships throughout the world in the early 1930s 
helped to spoil the diplomacy betwixt Washington and Tokyo in the same period. The 
Smoot-Hawley tariff and the trade war of 1930 to 1932 trapped the Japanese economy.
847
 
Most of Japan‘s foreign trade in the 1920s went to the United States or the British 
Empire; therefore, when Washington passed the Smoot-Hawley bill and London adopted 
Imperial Preference, Japanese exporters had nowhere else to go.
848
 The trade war 
predicated an outburst of xenophobia in Japan in the early 1930s, and it made Communist 
and Marxist agitations (with a Soviet origin or not) look like a severe threat to the 
government in Tokyo.
849
 To boot, the Smoot-Hawley tariff specifically targeted Japanese 
exports on the United States‘ domestic market in key industries such as textiles.850 
Protectionists in Washington, like Senator Smoot and Congressman Hawley, wanted to 
―save‖ Americans from competition and the worst of the Great Depression. In effect, 
however, they helped turn Japan down an increasingly anti-Western, anti-American, anti-
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Communist, anti-Soviet, traditionalistic, and militaristic path.
851
 Obviously, this 
thoroughfare eventually ruined Japan with its crushing defeat in the Second World War. 
The numbers reveal that American trade policy put Tokyo in a difficult spot in the early 
1930s. For example, Japanese exports of cotton to the United States fell from 1.2 million 
yards in 1929 to 0.8 million yards in 1932 (which was an approximate decline of 
33.33%).
852
 On the other hand, these figures recovered through the 1930s, which gave 
Hull a chance at reconciliation with Japanese foreign policy. 
Japan-United States Trade, 1929-1933 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
       
Exports to Japan 
Crude Materials 133.4 83.9 93.0 94.7 97.2 
Semi-Finished Goods 46.9 29.3 22.7 16.7 26.2 
Finished Goods 78.3 50.8 39.1 22.4 19.4 
Total Exports 258.5 164.0 154.8 133.8 143.0 
       
Imports from Japan 
Silk 356.1 221.5 163.0 106.2 91.7 
Other 65.7 53.1 39.1 25.9 34.4 
Total Imports 431.9 279.0 206.3 134.0 128.4 
 
Figure 6.8 – The above table shows the extent and the composition of the international 
trade between the United States and Japan between 1929 and 1933.
853
 All figures are in 
millions of nominal dollars. As the above shows, the Smoot-Hawley tariff and secular 
economic changes in the early 1930s hammered the Japanese silk and textiles industries. 
It was only the beginning too, as Wallace Carothers of DuPont invented the synthetic 
fiber nylon in 1935. Nylon flattened the worldwide silk industry soon thereafter. Without 
silk, Japan lost its major export industry, and its weak economy helped engender an 
opening for radicals and militarists to influence the government to a policy of 
expansionism in Manchuria and an alliance with Germany and Italy. 
 
International trade policy offered Hull several opportunities for rapprochement 
with the Japanese in the early 1930s. However, Tokyo‘s penchant for the bilateral barter 
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agreement and Hull‘s relative inflexibility with MFN and reciprocal trade doomed any 
chances at understanding and a trade deal. Japanese diplomats welcomed the prospect of 
trade liberalization but declined to accomplish it through Hull‘s means. This stemmed 
from the poor opinion of the cash economy in Japan after the lessons of the Great 
Depression. Additionally, the militarists in Japan objected to trade liberalization in the 
first place—they wanted autarky for the sake of the preparedness of military production. 
Things with Japan started well for Hull. For instance, upon the retirement of the old 
Japanese ambassador, Katsuji Debuchi, Hull reported that, ―I then expressed gratification 
that upon his departure there were no sort of strained relations between the United States 
and Japan.‖854 Debuchi concurred with this view.855 There were no hoary commercial or 
diplomatic disputes amid the United States and Japan before 1930, and Washington still 
enjoyed an amount of goodwill in Japan for President Theodore Roosevelt‘s successful 
brokering of the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905 to finalize Japan‘s triumphant effort in the 
Russo-Japanese War. In 1934, the new Japanese ambassador approached Hull in order to 
―balance‖ the Japanese trade deficit with the United States with barter; Japan argued that 
such was standard practice in Europe between France, Germany, Italy, and smaller 
nations.
856
 However, Hull rejected the notion out of hand, as he wanted to lower tariffs 
through reciprocal deals and to spread lower tariff duties through the MFN principle.
857
 
He lectured the Japanese diplomats present in June 1934 on the same, and he invited 
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them to the program—but on American terms.858 Simply, though, Japan wanted barter. 
Tokyo tried again in 1936, and it offered support for Hull‘s idea of liberalization, but it 
insisted on bilateral or trilateral barter agreements.
859
 This impasse held through the rest 
of the decade. Other forces kept American relations with Japan from brightening. 
Roosevelt‘s personal beliefs about the Japanese and economic interest groups 
inside of the United States prevented relations between Washington and Tokyo from 
improving through the late 1930s and into the Second World War. Hull and Roosevelt 
both distrusted the Japanese and their leaders. Hull, for example, disliked Prince Konoye 
(the Prime Minister of Japan from 1937 to 1939 and 1940 to 1941 before his replacement 
with the military government of Hideki Tojo) on a personal level, and he did not deal 
with Konoye‘s diplomatic overtures in the 1930s and early 1940s in a frank manner.860 
Upon entering office, Roosevelt always found Japan the aggressor nation in East Asia. 
Moreover, according to John Toland in Rising Sun, the winner of the 1970 Pulitzer Prize 
for nonfiction, he believed that the Japanese had a systematic plan for conquest in East 
Asia and America.
861
 At boarding school, a Japanese American classmate of his told him 
that Japan planned to conquer Manchuria, Mongolia, China, the Pacific, Hawaii, and 
establish bases in Mexico and Peru.
862
 Thus, Roosevelt always read Japanese actions in 
Asia in the 1930s through an underhanded lens, and he never gave Tokyo a ―fair shot.‖ 
The archived records bear this idea out. For instance, in a letter to Hull, Roosevelt 
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quipped, ―No question of giving Red Cross assistance to Japan arises because no 
Japanese civilians need medical treatment or relief from destitution.‖863 Here, Roosevelt 
sneeringly noticed it was Japan attacking China, and not the other way around. Strife on 
international trade was a quick path to confrontation. As early as 1935, the Department of 
the Treasury prepared a paper called ―3 points of attack,‖ which described ways for 
American trade policy to undermine the Japanese economy.
864
 Morgenthau‘s office 
recommended high tariffs, excise taxes on silk, and red tape at customs houses to damage 
Japanese exporters.
865
 Labor unions joined in this effort, too. In 1938, for example, the 
American Federation of Labor (AFL) pushed for a boycott of Japan because of its 
aggression in China.
866
 The AFL previously called for an immigration quota against 
Japan in 1935 to prevent the large number of Japanese Americans in Hawaii, California, 
and Colorado from swamping the White majorities.
867
 As well, the president of the 
United Auto Workers (UAW), Homer Martin, said, ―A Japanese-made toy for an 
American child is a bomb for a Chinese child.‖868 Tokyo had few friends in the actual 
halls of the Roosevelt administration in the 1930s, and key New Deal groups like labor 
unions disliked competing with Japanese exports and espoused a racially tinged sort of 
American nationalism. The relationship between the United States and Japan continued to 
                                                 
863
 Roosevelt Memorandum to Hull, January 11, 1938, 1938, State, Cordell Hull, Box #74, President‘s 
Secretary‘s Files, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Papers, Roosevelt Presidential Library (Hyde Park, NY). 
864
 Department of the Treasury Memorandum, ―3 Points of Attack,‖ Japanese Trade, Subject File, 1933-
1945, Correspondence, Henry J. Morgenthau, Jr. Papers, Roosevelt Presidential Library (Hyde Park, NY). 
865
 Ibid. 
866
 Roberts, Putting Foreign Policy to Work, 112. 
867
 Ibid., 69. 
868
 Homer Martin quoted in Ibid., 89. 
206 
sink throughout the decade, but one of the first places it worsened was in trade policy. 
Neither side had the ability to make any mutual concessions. 
 The United States and Japan battled about trade through the 1930s. The stalemate 
over the international economy exacerbated the diplomatic situation, and it helped lead to 
real battles in the 1940s. For instance, the ―triangular‖ trade conflict amid the United 
States, Japan, and the nations of Latin America was one of Hull‘s major failings as the 
Secretary of State. Besides the want of barter agreements, Japan wished to restore its 
exports to Latin America lost in the early stages of the Great Depression.
869
 Ironically, 
Hull‘s success in Latin America was his mistake with the Japanese. Lower American 
tariffs on Latin American goods moved Central and South American commerce more 
towards the United States, and Japanese exports (of things like silk and cotton) started to 
become uncompetitive versus higher tariffs.
870
 Tokyo asked him for some sort of 
consideration or compensation for this situation—yet, the Japanese wanted protectionism, 
and he offered only participation in reciprocal trade.
871
 This partition, while seemingly 
not bitter, continued to divide the two countries in the late 1930s. For instance, in 1937, a 
year closer to the outbreak of the Second World War, a Department of State 
memorandum declared the principal grievance of Tokyo against Washington was 
American domination of cloth exports around the world.
872
 Hull, conversely, dismissed 
these concerns and turned the Japanese away with his rigid adherence to reciprocal trade 
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and MFN. He was a successful free trader. However, in the case of Japan, a ―nimbler‖ 
type of foreign trade policy would have helped. 
American worries over Japan turned purely to military readiness in 1937 and early 
1938. In April 1937, Roosevelt wrote Hull to ask about the precise process involved with 
embargoing American exports of scrap metal to Japan.
873
 Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, 
and Kyushu had little in terms of metallic ores, and an embargo would cripple the 
Japanese industrial base. In January 1938, Roosevelt asked Hull to investigate the rumor 
of Italian flight firms sending Tokyo plans for airplanes—if not finished ones.874 In 
August 1937, Roosevelt instructed Hull to address the idea of a highway to Alaska with 
the Canadians.
875
 Roosevelt greatly desired a link between the continental United States 
and Alaska, and he was willing to give Ottawa good terms on sharing the cost of the 
construction and establishing ―international parks‖ on the border.876 By late 1937 and 
early 1938, Roosevelt was clearly thinking strategically—and against Japan. In the event 
of war, American possessions in the Pacific might fall quickly. In such a situation, the 
―great circle‖ route (on the sphere of the Earth over Alaska from the United States) was 
the fastest way back to Japan for the American military. Roosevelt wanted a connection 
to Alaska to keep it from being isolated, to control the Aleutian Islands, and to have a 
quicker (albeit much colder) route to Japan if the naval war went poorly for the United 
States. Additionally, the effective range of the B-29 was approximately 3,500 miles, 
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which put bases in Alaska and the Aleutians in combat range of the Japanese 
archipelago.
877
 Reciprocal trade failed with Japan, but this was the exception and not the 
rule in the years leading to the Second World War. 
The British Empire and Reciprocal Trade 
New Deal trade helped bring the nascent Allies together in the late 1930s. Free 
trade was an economic, diplomatic, and military requirement within the policy of the 
Department of State under Hull‘s leadership. Policymakers in Washington knew that 
another war was coming soon after Roosevelt‘s reelection in 1936.878 For example, in 
1937, Paul Reynaud (a French politician and Paris‘ Finance Minister in the late 1930s) 
told Sumner Welles that Britain and France were hoarding dollars and gold for future 
emergency purchases in the event of a German invasion and a resumption of the Great 
War.
879
 However, despite militarism in the Axis, the reciprocal trade program fostered 
increased political and economic solidarity between the United States and other 
countries—particularly in Latin America. In fact, to give one anecdote, the relationship 
between Costa Rica and the United States was so positive that San José actually declared 
war on Japan before Washington did.
880
 Closeness with Latin America helped American 
diplomacy in other areas, even if countries like Costa Rica were not formal Allies. Brazil 
was instrumental in the effort to stop neutral Portugal from shipping wolfram (the 
element tungsten, a metal needed in the production of engines, steel, and rockets) to 
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Germany.
881
 Hull expanded the reciprocal trade system throughout the Second World 
War. In the late 1930s and 1940s, Washington inked trade pacts with Venezuela (1939), 
Argentina (1941), Peru (1942), Uruguay (1942), Mexico (1942), Iran (1943), Turkey, and 
Iceland.
882
 Conversely, these are smaller examples. Importantly, the program of 
reciprocal trade deals helped to bring together the grand North Atlantic alliance of Britain 
and the United States, and it ended Imperial Preference. 
The settlement between American foreign policy, trade policy, the British Empire, 
and Imperial Preference started with Canada. Freer trade produced good feelings in the 
relations of Washington and Ottawa. The Smoot-Hawley tariff hammered Canada in the 
early 1930s, and Canadians were glad to see Roosevelt and Hull‘s rise and the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Overall, Canadians closely followed the New Deal, and 
they supported it because of its freer trade policies.
883
 In addition, Roosevelt‘s reflation 
scheme made it easier for Canadians to buy American goods.
884
 Regulatory overhead 
from the NRA and AAA made Canadian firms more competitive against American 
businesses, and New Deal public works projects stimulated demand for Canadian lumber 
and minerals.
885
 Commercial reciprocity was not a new tradition between the United 
States and Canada. For example, Washington and Ottawa concluded a trade pact in 1911 
for lower American tariffs on Canadian lumber and wood pulp and lower Canadian tariffs 
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on American farm products.
886
 However, without a reciprocal bill on the ledgers during 
the Taft administration, the covenant had to go through the normal treaty process in 
Congress.
887
 Protectionists in the Senate blocked it, which incensed young Congressman 
Hull.
888
 Butler noted Canada desired an agreement with the United States to strengthen 
their economy from the export of raw materials.
889
 In essence, Canada needed the United 
States to sell its overload production. Accordingly, Hull utilized economic power for 
diplomatic gain. 
The Canadian government adored the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 
1934—and maybe more than Hull himself. Ottawa wanted to be the ―first in line,‖ ahead 
of Cuba, but Hull‘s caution with the protectionist elements in the United States made him 
wait until 1936 to proceed with the Canadians. There was a danger of backlash from the 
economic nationalists in dealing so soon with such a large economy right on the northern 
boundary. Yet, in 1934, William Duncan Herridge (the Canadian ambassador in 
Washington from 1931 to 1935) called Hull to ask about the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act of 1934.
890
 Herridge informed him that Canada wished for inclusion.
891
 
Hence, the Canadians came to him, and not the other way around. Indeed, Herridge 
contacted him again a month later; he was impatient for a reciprocal reform bill out of 
Congress and mused about the fate of the Canadian lumber industry.
892
 Canada 
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eventually received a deal with the United States in 1936 and a second one in 1939. The 
second one was in concert with the huge deal for the whole British Empire. Upon the 
latter, Prime Minister Mackenzie King stated, ―We cannot too earnestly hope that they 
[trade deals] will provide to other countries an example of the mutual advantages which 
flow from the broadening of trade relations, not only in the realm of material well-being, 
but in the wider sphere of human understanding and good will.‖893 Canada joined the 
American league of trade agreements and lower tariffs, and Hull had a coup and a 
diplomatic breakthrough inside of the British Empire. 
Hull desperately wanted a reciprocal trade agreement with London and the rest of 
the British Empire after the success of freer trade with smaller Latin American nations. 
He finally achieved an agreement with the British on trade in 1939. Hull imagined an 
economic concord between the United States and Britain as a profound statement of 
friendship—or even outright alliance—in the North Atlantic world.894 The Britain-United 
States trade pact of 1938 implied unity between the two ―chief democracies‖ on the 
globe.
895
 From there, commercial reciprocity would expand to include other nations, 
strengthen economies, foster interdependence, and form a wall against fascism and 
militarism. Negotiations between the two sides proceeded throughout the summer of 
1938. Representatives from Britain and the United States signed the final deal on 
November 17, 1938.
896
 Changes in final tariffs took effect in 1939. Basil Rauch described 
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the occasion of Hull‘s final triumph, ―The agreement signified a drawing together of the 
two great democracies.‖897 The pact between Washington and London buried the hatchet 
on old conflicts such as American nonparticipation in the League of Nations and the 
settlement of war debts.
898
 The timing of the agreement was interesting, as well. Britain, 
France, and Germany settled the infamous Munich Agreement on the division of 
Czechoslovakia in late September 1938.
899
 The trade agreement between the United 
States and Britain exited the diplomatic pipeline less than two months later. Typically, 
historians describe the giveaway of the Sudetenland at Munich as the failure of 
appeasement. While Hitler might have had legitimate protests about the Treaty of 
Versailles, Munich was a misapprehension of German trustworthiness.
900
 In addition, 
Munich probably squandered a chance to smash the Nazis on the battlefield. Hitler 
intended to fight for the Sudetenland—yet, the Wehrmacht was reconstructing itself in 
1938, Czechoslovakia had a small but well-equipped army dug into the Bavarian Alps, 
and Stalin offered the Red Army to guarantee Prague‘s borders. On the other hand, 
Britain and France thought their own militaries weak in 1939, and they were frantic to 
avoid another Great War. The Munich Agreement bought them time, and perhaps it 
would sate Hitler‘s desires. Moreover, in the memory that American participation was the 
tipping point of the Great War, the European Allies needed to grow their entente. Hence, 
if Munich was a show of weakness, then participation in the trade program was a show of 
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strength with implied American intervention. Trade helped to bring the Allies together 
and helped the New Deal‘s economic recovery. 
In the late 1930s, treaties with Canada and the British Empire profoundly 
expanded the impact of the reciprocal trade programs. The British economy was still one 
of the largest in the world in the 1930s. Therefore, the actual volume of international 
trade affected by the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 ballooned when Hull 
endeavored to bring London to the table. The early waves of trade deals benefited 
American industry more than agriculturalists, but the British Empire could help balance 
the situation.
901
 Britain could no longer feed its large urban population on domestic 
production, and London needed vast surpluses from somewhere else. Farmers in North 
America produced the obvious, secure surplus to ship over to Britain. Hull wanted to 
realize this potential commerce in the North Atlantic economy and break Imperial 
Preference.
902
 The Canada-United States trade treaty of 1935 lowered Washington‘s 
tariffs on Canadian lumber, dairy products, cattle, fish, alcoholic beverages, and potatoes 
and Ottawa‘s tariffs on American tools, automobiles, electronics, gasoline, machine tools, 
and meat.
903
 Hull negotiated a second deal with Canada in 1938, but with the government 
in London involved this time. The agreement between Washington, Ottawa, and London 
involved $675 million worth of British exports and $80 million worth of Canadian 
exports.
904
 Remembering scale, this equated to as much as 1% of the entire American 
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economy.
905
 London offered breaks on $300 million worth of American exports to the 
British Empire—two-thirds of which were agricultural, and Hull reciprocated with 
concessions on $141.5 million of British exports to the United States.
906
 Hence, the 
United States, and farmers specifically, came away as the beneficiaries of the 1938 
agreement. Harry W. Flannery congratulated Hull and noted, ―The agreements bring 
within the scope of the administration‘s trade agreements program nations which 
dominate sixty per cent of United States commerce and which, with the United States, 
control forty per cent of the world‘s trade.‖907 Thus, by 1938, reciprocal trade involved 
three-fifths of American trade and two-fifths of the worldwide international economy.
908
 
Trade allowed Hull to start building a network, in the ambassadorial sense, which 
scholars missed previously. 
Hull planned to accomplish much through the trade deal with the British. He 
favored an agreement with the British for the sake of propping up the American and the 
British economies in the late 1930s.
909
 He also intended it to strengthen the British ability 
to fight a modern war.
910
 Reciprocal trade could offer Britain a stronger industrial 
economy, higher productivity, cheaper raw materials from the United States, and a larger 
tax base—all the things a nation needed in the early twentieth-century to fight a modern 
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war. Additionally, if Britain and France were strong enough to defeat Germany alone, 
then it would preclude the need for American involvement in another European war. Hull 
did not wish to ruin the New Deal‘s domestic and foreign initiatives by dragging the 
Roosevelt administration through a repeat of the repugnant Great War. Such a course 
distracted the Wilson administration from its reforms in the 1910s, and he worked to keep 
this history from repeating. There were economic gains from reciprocal trade with 
Britain, as well. Britain was the leading export market for the United States in the 
1920s.
911
 In 1929, for instance, 16.2% of all British imports came from American 
producers.
912
 The Smoot-Hawley tariff and Imperial Preference throttled the volume of 
trade across the North Atlantic. By 1934, only 11.2% (down 5.0%) of British imports 
came from the United States.
913
 Imperial Preference filled the gap—in 1931, the British 
Empire furnished 36.9% of British imports, which rose to 39.4% by 1937 (up 2.5%).
914
 
Hull designed a restitution of North Atlantic trade with the British to improve the 
economy and increase Anglo-American interdependence in case of a war. The final trade 
pact was eclectic. London lowered tariffs on American flour, fruit, tobacco, lumber, 
office supplies, machine tools, automobiles, meat, vegetables, fish, paper, chemicals, 
iron/steel, textiles, aircraft, clothing, cotton, silk, and rayon.
915
 Washington lowered 
tariffs on the British Empire‘s exports of textiles, metal, whisky, leather, cheese, eggs, 
grain, maple syrup, potatoes, acids, brick, nickel, zinc, aluminum, furs, and Christmas 
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trees.
916
 Thus, reciprocal trade brought the two sides together and connected the 
American and British economies into more of a single economy in the North Atlantic. 
The reciprocal program, conversely, started to sound the death incantations for the 
exclusive nature of the British Empire. 
Reciprocal trade implied lower tariffs and the most-favored nation principle, but it 
left no room for Imperial Preference. The British perceived the United States was 
potentially a powerful ally, but London was reluctant to leave its tradition of preferential 
treatment for commerce inside of the British Empire compared to the remainder of the 
globe. Imperial Preference prevented the economies of the colonies and dominions from 
developing with regional partners, and it kept them dependent on British manufacturing, 
military protection, and politics. These circumstances would change without Imperial 
Preference, as they were already in the 1930s between the United States and Canada. The 
British feared that there might not be much of a British Empire without the jealous 
safeguarding of their interregional market through Imperial Preference. Hence, at the 
various meetings and summits of the 1940s, the British opposed American demands for 
blanket statements in favor of lower tariffs as a foundation for the new global order after 
the termination of the Second World War.
917
 This kind of statement implied the 
fragmentation of the vaunted British Empire, which was hard for London to swallow.
918
 
Hull, however, insisted on the end of the reviled Imperial Preference. William J. Barber 
described, ―The Department of State, under the leadership of Secretary Cordell Hull, 
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assigned high importance to one string: a commitment on Britain‘s part to foreswear 
Imperial Preference in trading arrangements. This condition […] reflected Hull‘s 
diagnosis of the Great Depression.‖919 Eventually, the necessity of American alliance 
overcame the preservation of the British Empire, and he won the day when the British 
agreed to give up Imperial Preference in exchange for Lend-Lease.
920
 He had his way 
again in the summation of the Atlantic Charter, where the United States and Britain 
codified free trade would be one of the seven fundamental precepts in remaking the world 
after the Second World War.
921
 Reciprocal trade finalized the association between the 
United States and Britain into the formal Allies, and it helped win the tempest of the war. 
Foreign Trade and the Second World War 
Freer trade expanded the collective ―Allied economy‖ in the 1930s, and it secured 
raw materials for war machines in the 1940s. Take steel production, for example, the 
quintessential building and structural material of industrial warfare. Before the Great 
Depression, in 1929, the United States produced 41.01 million long tons of steel.
922
 
Approximately 2.3 million long tons of that were exports (or 5.72% of the total).
923
 Steel 
and iron production declined nearly 75% in the worst of the Great Depression in the 
United States, but there was a recovery by 1935. That year, the country produced 23.96 
million long tons of steel, and exported 955,000 million long tons (or 3.986% of the 
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total).
924
 The United States was capable of producing more in the event of an emergency, 
but there was not the demand to justify it in the domestic/international economy in the 
1930s. Steel firms were unlikely to destroy an iron works in the face of a slowdown, 
given the massive capital investments involved in their construction. Hence, the steel 
industry cut back on production, waited for greener pastures, and held excess capacity in 
reserve. Crucially, on the other hand, this situation was a bad development for the 
American level of military preparedness. The steel industry needed to expand to increase 
the United States‘ ability to produce guns, tanks, ships, and planes. Marking time and 
holding excess capacity meant the productive capacity of American steel mills was not 
expanding. On the bright side, reciprocal trade helped steel exports to recover faster than 
general steel production in the 1930s. In 1932, the United States rolled out 10.45 million 
long tons of steel and exported 364,000 million long tons (exports were 3.49% of the 
total).
925
 Thus, by 1935, steel exports were recovering quicker than the rest of the 
industry. Hull noticed, ―Steel manufacturers have had a share in the larger trade 
opportunities which the Trade Agreements Program has made possible.‖926 American 
steel meant military power in the 1930s and 1940s, and trade helped gear the industry up 
for total war. 
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Year Steel Production Steel Exports Proportion Exports 
1929 41069416 2352957 5.729% 
1932 10451088 364771 3.490% 
1935 23964552 955284 3.986% 
 
Figure 6.9 – The above table shows overall American steel production and steel exports 
in 1929, 1932, and 1935 in millions of long tons.
927
 Of the most note, American steel 
production for the international market recovered quicker from 1932 to 1935 than 
overall production—129.302% growth for overall production and 161.886% growth for 
exports in this frame. Hence, freer trade helped the United States prepare for war 
production by engendering disproportionate economic benefit to export-oriented steel 
firms compared to the demands of the domestic economy alone.  
 
Mexico was a problem for Hull in the 1930s but a success in the 1940s. Foremost, 
the Allies needed Mexican oil supplies during the Second World War to fuel thirsty 
airplanes and vehicles and for production and transportation back home. In opposition to 
this, Mexico City clung more determinedly to its protectionists tariffs in the 1930s than 
the rest of Latin America. A certain level of distrust for the United States in Mexico—
which went back to the Mexican-American War and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 
the 1840s, as well as the incursion of General John ―Black Jack‖ Pershing into Mexico in 
the 1910s—made things complicated for the Department of State. Mexico City raised its 
general tariff rates in 1937.
928
 Mexico‘s tariff hike frustrated Hull.929 After progress in 
Latin America, he resented the growing protectionism right in the metaphorical American 
backyard. To boot, it was poor timing in the international context. Mexico raised its tariff 
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rates right as Hull began the negotiations with Britain about a reciprocal trade deal.
930
 
High Mexican tariffs, while a sovereign and legal action, made it appear as if the 
Roosevelt administration could not control the United States‘ sphere in North America 
through diplomatic means alone. To add insult to injury, he tried to invite Mexico into the 
program in 1936—only to face stalling and rejection.931 The largest expansion of the 
program happened in 1936 when it spread through Latin America and the French Empire, 
but Mexico‘s absence was rather conspicuous. To Hull, a rising tide of protectionism in 
North America in the late 1930s was an eyesore compared to the successes of the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Yet, he was unable to progress with Mexico 
until after 1941. The two sides finally agreed on a trade deal in 1942.
932
 Thereafter, the 
Allies gained access to Mexican petroleum, which helped in strengthening their 
economies in the war. Indeed, Hull wrote Roosevelt at least once to tell the president 
about the decisive nature of Mexico in terms of securing oil stocks.
933
 Dealing with 
Mexico became a Sisyphean task, but this kind of diplomacy and constant tries at 
engagement secured the American strategic position before the actual fighting. 
Reciprocal trade deals in the 1930s limited the Axis‘ concluding stratagems in the 
1940s. The United States and Czechoslovakia finalized a trade deal in March 1938, for 
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example.
934
 This deal specifically intended to assist American farmers by lowering 
Czechoslovakian duties facing American farm produce.
935
 Additionally, at the same time, 
the agreement had a dual purpose, as Washington‘s concessions on the duties facing 
manufactured goods out of Bohemia and Slovakia stimulated Czechoslovakian industry 
for production aimed at the American domestic market.
936
 Such a design prepared 
Prague‘s economy for war and geared the Škoda Works for greater arms production. The 
agreement was too little and too late for Czechoslovakia, but it is hard to know what 
might have transpired without the Munich Agreement. Elsewhere, in Latin America, the 
goodwill of the Good Neighbor policy and reciprocal trade led to an interesting 
pronouncement at the Havana Conference of 1940.
937
 In Cuba, an assembly of North and 
South American states announced they should request to take over the administration of 
any European colonies in the New World.
938
 In theory, the possessions would stay in the 
name of their European overlords, but practical management would pass to American 
regimes with the goal of giving the colony its independence.
939
 The Havana Conference 
anticipated German conquest in Western Europe and prevented the Nazis from easily 
absorbing the remnants of the French Empire and Dutch Empire in the Caribbean and 
South America. The Panama Canal was a particular point of concern, since German air or 
naval bases in the immediate vicinity could threaten the American lifeline linking the 
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Atlantic and the Pacific.
940
 Trade did not have the impact to determine the conclusion of 
the Second World War, but it did setup a few things around the edges. Additionally, there 
were tense moments in 1942 before the Battle of Stalingrad and the Battle of Midway, so 
the Allies needed every advantage they could find. Yet, with the war eventually won in 
1945, Hull could turn his attention to the assembly of the postwar world, and what role 
his antecedent of reciprocal trade in the 1930s would play in 1945 and thereafter. 
Free Trade and the Postwar Order 
Roosevelt and Hull believed that the Great War and the Second World War came 
partly from conflicts in international trade. This outlined their views on the architecture 
of the postwar world order and the United Nations. Hull thought that the economic 
rivalries amid the nations of Western Europe and their competition for colonies in the 
1910s exacerbated the situation enough to create the conditions for the Great War.
941
 Like 
the British under the arrangement of Imperial Preference, European leaders wanted 
exclusive access to rare, strategic resources and colonies for exports of manufactured 
goods. Hence, Hull conceptualized the start of the Great War as a conflict in trade 
markets. He rejected the Merchants of Death thesis, and he believed that war was never 
good for business.
942
 To him, war was too dangerous, frightening, and unpredictable for 
executives to plan to make an assured profit from it. In the 1930s, he thought that the 
Great Depression led inexorably to the Second World War. Without chaos and poverty, 
people would not naturally rush to support autocracy and war, as they did in Italy and 
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Germany.
943
 To quote Hull on the discussion, ―When people are employed and they and 
their families are reasonably comfortable and hence contented, they have no disposition 
to follow agitators and to enthrone dictators.‖944 He was paternalistic in his conception of 
an inert family, but the point holds. As always, he brought prosperity and diplomatic 
relations back to the tariff controversy: ―Healthy international commercial relations are 
the indispensible foundation of wellbeing and of lasting peace between nations.‖945 
Contextually, this passage comes from February 1937, and he said it with the intention of 
expressing the American desire for commercial relations with the British and the 
French.
946
 Roosevelt was on the bandwagon for Hull‘s program of international peace 
from prosperity and free trade, as well. In 1945, for instance, he stated that, ―The world 
will either move towards unity and widely shared prosperity or it will move apart into 
necessarily competing economic blocs‖ [emphasis added].947 Hull‘s last manifesto on 
trade and peace had seven points: (1) economic warfare hurts the economy, (2) privation 
creates political strife, (3) prosperity helps prevent war, and (4) policymakers should 
above all ensure the comfort of their constituents.
948
 Furthermore, regarding trade, (5) 
international trade is always essential, (6) peace and prosperity beget each other, (7) freer 
trade engenders prosperity—thus, it was a keystone of any peace.949 Hull and Roosevelt 
wrote these beliefs into the blueprint of the postwar world at various conferences and 
with the association of the United Nations. 
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Liberal internationalism framed the postwar peace of the Second World War. This 
was especially true regarding the United Nations, where Hull and other Wilsonian 
internationalists wished to avoid the mistakes of the early twentieth-century due to the 
United States‘ minimal participation in the League of Nations. Additionally, at first, 
internationalists conceived the UN as a much more powerful, muscular, and militaristic 
body in comparison to the weak League of Nations. American planners for the Council 
on Foreign Relations, for instance, originally slated the UN to have control of the world‘s 
air forces under a single ―International Air Force.‖950 The International Air Force would 
also fall under the command of the permanent leadership of the General Staff of the 
United Nations—with officers drawn from member nations in rotation.951 With this sort 
of internationalism in mind, Hull started planning for postwar liberalization just days 
after Pearl Harbor. For instance, he received a Department of State memorandum on the 
Friday after the Sunday attack in Oahu in 1941 discussing potential Anglo-American 
differences on the postwar order.
952
 The paper identified free trade as an American 
aspiration, and it marked British devotion to Imperial Preference as a big postwar 
problem.
953
 Conversely, Hull erased that dissimilarity by making London‘s departure 
from Imperial Preference a necessary stipulation for sharing Lend-Lease. Indeed, one 
version of a United Nations charter explicitly mentioned the role of trade: ―[T]he 
Executive Council shall make every effort to bring about a general leveling of tariffs in 
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order to provide for a freer exchange of goods all over the world.‖954 It was not clear 
what Hull did with this drafted constitution. However, its placement in the Library of 
Congress amongst the San Francisco Conference (which determined the organization of 
the UN in 1945) suggested that it received at least some airtime at the meeting. The 
Department of State had the theory and the diplomacy, and the postwar peace became 
one of free trade. 
Reciprocal trade in the 1930s set the stage for a world of reciprocity and lower 
tariffs in the 1940s and beyond. International trade after the Second World War was 
generally open for the sake of creating, maintaining, and strengthening alliances and 
prosperity.
955
 From the American perspective, the threat of the Soviet Union developed in 
the Cold War of the late 1940s. Yet, the United Nations and other organs guarded the 
―free world‖ by fostering freer trade, a prosperity, and interdependence. The General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) lowered tariffs via ―rounds‖ of negotiations and 
shared concessions until the 1990s.
956
 The GATT ceased existing in 1993. However, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) replaced it as the world ―clearinghouse‖ for tariff 
policy and trade liberalization in the 1990s and 2000s. The reciprocal trade program of 
the 1930s formed the basis for the postwar international order about Washington. By 
1947, the United States concluded twenty-nine reciprocal trade deals all over the globe.
957
 
These deals eventually folded into the GATT and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Additionally, the trade pacts from the 1930s continued to function smoothly 
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through 1940s, and they kept relations positive with most of Latin America.
958
 In the end, 
Cordell Hull, the New Deal, its diplomatic-economic policies, and more liberal American 
tariff rates were the rule from 1933 and through the Second World War. The aged 
Secretary of State ultimately succeeded in putting an end to the protectionism of the 
1920s and Smoot-Hawley. Such was the trade story of the New Deal and the 1930s, as I 
have seen it and recorded it down here. 
* * * 
The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 was the modest and understated 
successes of the Roosevelt administration and the New Deal in the 1930s. Reciprocal 
trade did not prevent the Second World War. Nevertheless, in light of the circumstances 
and the scales involved, trade probably could not have done so. Conversely, the economic 
situation influenced the chess match in the diplomatic arena. The reciprocal trade 
program was a demonstrable example of American leadership on an international issue at 
the height of the Great Depression. Other countries, from Sweden to Argentina and 
everywhere in between, came to Hull looking for a trade deal. As well, reciprocal trade 
aided the American economy, as lower tariffs helped American exports recover faster 
than the rest of the economy in the late 1930s. As with the Smoot-Hawley tariff, changes 
in trade policy had a perceptive effect on the trajectory of American foreign trade 
relationships. The volume of trade with countries in the reciprocal trade program grew at 
a much quicker pace than the quantity of commerce with nations outside of the plan. 
Trade helped keep Brazil and Argentina out of a Nazi-led union in the late 1930s and 
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early 1940s, and Allied war production gained from reciprocal trade‘s expansion of 
worldwide demand for materials like steel and from greater access to resource pools. Hull 
could have done more. He moved too slowly with Spain to help save the Madrid regime‘s 
tenuous grip on power in the Great Depression, and he seriously misread Japanese 
intentions and eagerness for more trade due to his inflexibility on issues like the most-
favored nation principle. However, the gains of reciprocal trade outweighed the loss, and 
the reciprocal trade program was one of the successes of the New Deal. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
The historical conception of the New Deal in the 1930s was too limited. It needs 
growth to include its international components, the foremost of which is reciprocal trade. 
The career of Cordell Hull symbolized the nexus between different types of governmental 
policies and political and social identities. For example, the United States of the 1930s 
considered trade as a part of the New Deal, as newspapers, magazines, editorials, plus 
radio broadcasts, speeches, and letters to government amply demonstrated. The New Deal 
was classically a system of domestic policies in the historiography, but the era of the New 
Deal itself did not see it that way. Hull and free trade factored into the Good Neighbor 
policy, as well. Hence, the New Deal did not limit itself to only the United States in the 
1930s, and historians should not conceive of it in similar terms. The New Deal was a 
comprehensive sort of government policy, and it affected politics, American society, and 
Washington‘s foreign policy in substantial ways. There were interesting interactions 
between different types of policies and scholars have not often studied the Roosevelt 
administration and the New Deal through this mirror. This sort of synthesis, which I 
attempted here, can broaden the academic and historical understanding of the crucial time 
of the New Deal and the 1930s in the United States. There was more to look at, and 
things to plug back into the narrative, as reciprocal trade somehow left the conversation 
on the New Deal in the latter half of the twentieth-century. Hoover, Roosevelt, Hull, and 
the country as a whole did not have it that way in the 1930s, and neither should we in our 
historical understanding. 
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International trade needed integration into the fuller narrative of the decade of the 
1930s. To start, tariffs marked a clear delineation between Democratic and Republican 
identities in the early portion of the twentieth-century. President Herbert Hoover and his 
administration faced a crisis in 1929, and he responded with the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 
1930. On the other hand, Hull and Roosevelt were nearly the cardinal opposites with the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Hull did not bring the United States to free 
trade in the 1930s, but he did move it away from autarky and protectionism towards trade 
liberalization in steps. There was Republican folly on trade in the 1920s, but the 
Democratic Party and remnants of the Wilsonian internationalists turned the course of 
American trade policy the other way in the 1930s. Trade policy had obvious applications 
to the field of economic history. Smoot-Hawley damaged the American economy from 
1930 to 1933, but Hull and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 repaired some 
of the killing for the rest of the decade. Political historians put trade policy on the 
horizon, but not in the center. However, in light of my attempts to establish reciprocal 
trade as a part of the total New Deal, trade needed insertion into the political tale of the 
decade. In the dominion of foreign policy as well, economic diplomacy applied to the 
construction of alliances and the formation of the Allies before the 1940s. Trade fit into 
all of these, and it needed registration in the sum of the history of the New Deal, the 
Roosevelt administration, and the 1930s. 
Reciprocal trade showed how economic history and diplomatic history interact 
with each other in weighty ways. Unfortunately, trade policy occupied an uncomfortable 
position between the two in the typical historiography. To bring up another example of 
230 
this problem, take John E. Wiltz‘s classical diplomatic textbook From Isolation to War: 
1931-1941. Written in the 1960s, it is still the regular introductory text to American 
diplomatic history in the 1930s and the start of the Second World War. Indeed, owing to 
its continued popularity as the baseline text for the era, Justus D. Doenecke updated From 
Isolation to War: 1931-1941 for mass production with some more recent scholarship on 
Roosevelt in 2003. Wiltz and Doenecke included Hull, but they only mention him in the 
context of state-to-state diplomacy with no reflection on economic foreign policy.
959
 
Furthermore, Wiltz mentioned nothing about reciprocal trade programs, the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements Act of 1934, and the international market.
960
 The body of economic 
history, on the other hand, stuck modestly to the domestic policies of the Roosevelt 
administration and the New Deal in the 1930s. These views had their places, but they 
were incomplete. Economics and commercial activity influenced Hull and Roosevelt‘s 
diplomacy, and international trade assisted the recovery out of the Great Depression and 
the New Deal. There was a neat exchange, a dialogue even, between different types of 
policies, and the general history of the 1930s missed these interactions and functions. 
Hull‘s work touched on many aspects in the New Deal, and I have tried to show them 
here in Free Trade and the New Deal. Such was the proper abode for international trade 
in the major narratives of the 1930s. 
The usual story of the United States‘ place in the world talked about 
disengagement and isolationism between the Great War and the Second World War. Yet, 
Hull and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 flew sternly in the face of this 
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conception. Washington, in fact, engaged with the rest of the world in the 1930s on 
economic terms. The reciprocal trade program eventually included over two-dozen 
nations by the end of the 1940s, and it subsumed over 40% of American-related 
international commerce and 60% of the international market as a whole. This made sense, 
too. Many factors made the brewing of the Second World War in the 1930s look 
inevitable. The inherent militarism of Italian fascism, Nazism, and the imperialists‘ 
control of Japan after 1931 argued for a greater confrontation with Western European 
powers and the United States. Yet, in the 1930s themselves, the world‘s major problem 
was economic and not diplomatic or military. The future Axis‘ wars of aggression in the 
1930s stayed in the smaller, colonial areas of the world in Africa and Asia, and the globe 
had far too much to worry about in the economic crisis of the time. Statistically, the Great 
Depression was the worst in the United States—thus, Hull understandably oriented 
American foreign policy to help in the efforts of the Roosevelt administration at 
economic recovery through the New Deal. Ironically, Hoover did exactly the same thing 
in the 1930s with the Smoot-Hawley tariff with the exact opposite of means and results. 
Hull drew the national and the international together, with reciprocal trade, with the Good 
Neighbor, and with economic interdependence. 
The popular conception of the New Deal in the 1930s is incorrect without freer 
trade. It is not wrong in any titanic sense, but it is unfinished. A search of the policy 
standings that made the material outcomes of the 1930s (and, from that, much of the 
political and social history of the decade) required international trade. The Great 
Depression, for all of its undeniable awfulness, had an origin partly in human affairs and 
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mortal decisions. It was not a demonic force, and there were reasons that it happened. 
The Smoot-Hawley tariff was one of them, as Hoover fumbled the international market in 
the early 1930s and left Hull and Roosevelt to pick up the pieces and start anew. Trade, 
notably, helps explain the high unemployment of the decade by the damage done to 
exporters and the unrealized growth potential under Okun‘s Law. The misunderstanding 
of trade in the 1930s and its role in the New Deal has implications for the American 
identity and political decisions in Washington. Cordell Hull was a lifelong champion of 
both the Democratic Party and the policies of freer trade. Additionally, President Franklin 
Roosevelt—slowly but still surely—joined Hull in the advocacy of reciprocal trade in the 
middle of the 1930s. The protectionists of the 1920s and 1930s were the Republicans, but 
the party identities on trade somehow flipped by the election of 2008. The media, 
politicians, and voters alike still consider the New Deal a lesson on the proper 
governance of the United States. At least, if they are going to do this, they should have it 
right with the New Deal as a free trade deal. Hull and Roosevelt made it that way, as an 
important part of the 1930s, which cut across many areas. 
While supposition, it is interesting to speculate on the importance of reciprocal 
trade by imagining a world without Hull‘s programs in the late 1930s. Foremost, the 
economic recovery of the New Deal was tenuous at best through the 1940s. Accurate 
statistics were not available at the time, but the Great Depression most likely took the 
American unemployment number to 30% by 1933, and it probably never fell below 10% 
before the Second World War. Furthermore, the actual rate of private sector 
unemployment was higher without counting government assistance programs and 
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agencies like the CCC and WPA. Smoot-Hawley hurt the international economy, and the 
reciprocal trade program helped it recover faster with countries involved in the program 
compared to those out in the cold. Freer trade made the American economy at least a bit 
more robust in the 1930s, even if it did not have a truly gigantic effect. This secured 
Democratic rule, Roosevelt‘s presidency, and national solidarity in confronting the world 
problems of the 1940s. Besides a slower recovery, a lack of reciprocal trade would have 
undermined the Good Neighbor in Latin America and the development of the 
Montevideo Conference. We should not minimize the importance of Hull and 
Roosevelt‘s promise of non-interventionism in the affairs of Latin American nations from 
Washington, but trade was the other side of the policy. Hull concentrated on Latin 
America with reciprocal trade, drew it (voluntarily) into the American sphere of 
influence, and prepared the New World for a confrontation with the newly autocratic 
bend in Europe and Asia. Hence, reciprocal trade made the United States stronger, in 
both the diplomatic and the economic realms of analysis. 
Reciprocal trade influenced the outcome of the most significant historical event of 
the twentieth-century—the Second World War. Again, the reasoning here is somewhat 
speculative, but informed. It is doubtful that reciprocal trade determined the outcome of 
the clash between the Allies and the Axis by itself. However, there were points where 
Hull‘s trade work in the 1930s influenced their relative strengths, their alliances, and 
helped decide the conclusion of the war. Without the strength of the ―dual‖ Good 
Neighbor policy of non-interventionism and free trade, the United States would have had 
a much weaker position in Latin America. Historical evidence showed that Brazil 
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considered joining a German trading network in 1934, but the Brazilians held out for the 
United States—for Hull and reciprocal trade. Brazil had a large population of people 
from Germany in the 1930s, and its position on the eastern end of the South American 
continent offered it as a natural ally for Germany. Argentina, just south of Brazil, was 
another chance for the Axis. Argentina had a significant populace of Italian immigrants, 
and the government of Juan Perón maintained fascist pretentions after 1943. Perón liked 
dressing in military garb and Nazi regalia. The military junta in Buenos Aires brutalized 
dissenters in a method reminiscent of the totalitarian regimes of Europe. On the other 
hand, reciprocal trade bound the Argentina economy to the American market. Buenos 
Aires greatly desired a trade deal with Washington in the early 1930s, and it received a 
deal in 1941. Nazi success in Europe combined with an absence of freer trade out of the 
United States would have made Brazilian or Argentinean cooperation with the Axis—or 
even outright membership—look more attractive. In addition, trade strengthened the 
British Empire‘s economy, and tied the Anglo-Alliance together after 1939. Trade 
shadowed all these issues, and it aided the American strategic position overall. 
There were some ironies with Roosevelt‘s selection of Hull to be the Secretary of 
State in comparison to the typical history of the decade. Paradoxically, Hull intended the 
1930s to be a decade of peace and recovery through freer trade, while the era of the 
deprivations of the Great Depression ultimate resulted in the horrors of the Second World 
War. Historians tended to focus on the forces creating the conflict, rather than the 
potential forces working against it. The trade program endangered closer international 
relations for the United States, which goes against so much else in the decade. For 
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example, Roosevelt‘s ―Quarantine Speech‖ of 1937 suggested that the United States and 
Western Europe should use economic pressure to weaken the aggressive moves of 
Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia. On the other hand, the Quarantine Speech was 
deliberately vague under Roosevelt‘s tact, and Roosevelt did not involve free trade much, 
―The overwhelming majority of the peoples and nations of the world […] seek the 
removal of barriers against trade.‖961 This statement showed Roosevelt‘s support for free 
trade, but he was fuzzy about its exact diplomatic role besides its popularity and potential 
for expanding the economy. The United States and Britain inked a reciprocal agreement 
in 1939, but Prime Ministers Neville Chamberlain and Winston Churchill spent the late 
1930s and early 1940s focused on the Nazis. The scope of the trade deal and the 
weakening of Imperial Preference was a big deal at the time, but it necessarily pales in 
comparison to the gathering war. Japan approached the United States for trade 
agreements and economic balancing. Conversely, Manchuria, the Marco Polo Bridge 
Incident, and the Second Sino-Japanese War ensnared Japanese foreign policy by the end 
of the 1930s. There were many threads to the diplomatic and economic history of the 
1930s leading to the Second World War. On the other hand, reciprocal trade went the 
other direction. Tariffs set it up in the 1920s and 1930, and Hull turned it the opposite 
way. The narrative of economic foreign policy and diplomacy was more complicated in 
broader appraisal. 
Hull‘s efforts in the 1930s foreshadowed the postwar international economic 
order of the United Nations, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Bretton-
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Woods agreement on monetary exchange, the International Monetary Fund, and the 
World Bank. Such international governmental bodies were an internationalist‘s dream, 
but they did not spring out of nowhere at the San Francisco Conference of 1945. They 
had roots, which actually ran fairly deeply by the time of the 1940s. Hull came out of the 
free trade tradition of the South. Childhood, education, and tradition in Tennessee left 
Hull a cotton free trader in a nineteenth-century sense. However, other liberal intellectual 
and political identities added to the apprehension of free trade with the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act of 1934 and the GATT. Hull combined southern identity with Wilsonian 
internationalism and liberalism, and he brought them to the table of the New Deal and the 
Roosevelt administration. He represented a distinct contrast with the Republican majority 
of the 1920s, Hoover, and the Smoot-Hawley tariff. He was a Wilsonian who wanted 
liberalization in the 1930s. Reciprocal trade involved the United States with the reminder 
of the world, helped to grow the economy out of the Great Depression, and showed a 
Wilson-style of liberalization in the international market could work. Hull started with 
the third of Wilson‘s Fourteen Points, and he realized it as the Secretary of State in the 
1930s and 1940s.
962
 Hull marked the maturation of internationalism from regional to 
national policy. Additionally, the careers of Roosevelt and Hull demonstrated the 
nationalization of the American trade identity. 
Roosevelt and Hull‘s time together in the White House symbolized the merger of 
a pair of countervailing American identities and traditions. This included the obvious 
political ones, but also economic identities on work‘s place in the American economy, 
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the world, and the issues of social identities and regional development. Hull was a 
southerner and a free trader. Hull hailed from a land where the high tariff was a stinging 
point of complaint against federal power since before the Civil War. On the other hand, 
Hull slowly lowered tariffs and brought Roosevelt on board with his platform after 1933. 
Roosevelt was from the Northeast, and he was a ―Yankee‖ in the traditional sense. He 
lived in an industrial state with all the ordinary desires for high levels of protection from 
European competitors through most of his life. While he had no big convictions on 
economic policy, he was still naturally cautious and predisposed to a region where the 
high tariffs of William McKinley were the norm. However, Hull won the new president 
over in the 1930s, and Roosevelt thereafter voraciously defended the reciprocal trade 
pacts in the elections of 1936 and in the 1940s. That was, a southern free trader won over 
a New Englander on the trade question. Reciprocal trade became the policy of the New 
Deal, and free trade became the United States‘ national and world policy towards the 
international market after the conclusion of the Second World War. Hence, Hull and 
Roosevelt merged the tariff positions of the different regions of the country together, and 
they melded them into a homogeneous, national, American stance. In the final tally, Hull 
won, and Hoover and the Republicans of the 1920s lost on trade. Regional competitions 
on international trade subsided, and the free trade identity became more of the complete 
American identity. Naturally, there were some protests. Yet, Hull‘s way was the way of 
the United States and the rest of the postwar world. 
La Razón and its profile of Hull in 1933 during the Montevideo Conference 
described him the best. To quote from ―Personajes de Actualidad: Cordell Hull, 
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Secretario de Estado‖ in Spanish and English, ―Cordell Hull es idealista y realista a la 
vez / Cordell Hull is idealistic and realistic at the same time.‖963 Undeniably, Hull was an 
idealist. He was a pacifist, a Wilsonian internationalist, and a free trader to the bone. He 
worked tirelessly from the 1900s to the 1940s on the free trade issue, and he brought the 
United States closer to the condition of free trade in comparison to the protectionism of 
the Smoot-Hawley tariff. He was never a great economist in the formal, academic sense, 
but he had a practical understanding of what trade could do for the American economy 
and foreign policy in the 1930s. He took the economic theory that argued almost 
exclusively for freer trade relationships since the days of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, 
and Frédéric Bastiat and made it reality in the 1930s and after the Second World War. 
Hull‘s gains were modest in his era, but he established precedents and paths for the 
future. In addition, he was a skilled and sage politician in a dangerous era—both national 
and internationally. He successfully navigated choppy New Deal political waters for over 
a decade, garnered the close fondness of President Roosevelt, and outlasted his foes in 
making reciprocal trade the American policy regarding tariffs. He was a popular figure 
within the New Deal, and he ran the country a few times in Roosevelt‘s steady in the 
summers of the 1930s. Hull was almost himself formally the president in the 1930s and 
1940s, and a few other political circumstances would have left the United States with a 
President Hull after President Roosevelt instead of a President Truman. We have 
considerably underrated his influence on American history. 
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We live in Hull‘s world. After the lessons of the Smoot-Hawley tariff and the 
remainder of the Great Depression, the United States of the Cold War moved away from 
protectionism and towards engagement with global economy. For instance, the GATT 
involved sixty-two countries in the Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations in 1964. Eleven 
years later, the GATT included over a hundred nations (102) in the Tokyo Round of tariff 
reductions. Regional agreements, while a technical violation of the purity of Hull‘s most-
favored nation principle, have grown around the world, as well. The Europe Union 
reduced tariff rates and established a common currency for the whole continent to 
facilitate the ease of international exchange. There are barely any duties on the 
international commerce between Canada, Mexico, and the United States after the 
NAFTA deal of 1993. There are agreements pending amid the United States and 
Columbia, Panama, and South Korea on unhindered tariff relationships.
964
 There are still 
some tariffs left in the world today, but free trade defines economic foreign policy. If 
anything, the biggest problem now in the international economy is the use of subsides to 
support domestic industries. Such subsidies transfer wealth from taxpayers to privileged, 
underproductive industries, and it gives the latter unfair advantages compared to 
unsubsidized foreign competition. This is ―protection,‖ though through a different way. 
Nonetheless, despite these problems in the global market, Hull would see the prosperity 
of the world, the free trade relationships, and the end of industrial warfare and smile 
about them. He, knowingly, created it with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 
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1934. Such was the tale of the United States and the international market in the 1930s. 
The New Deal stays with us to the present day with it and Hull‘s efforts at free trade. 
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